Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

197. Telegram 4337 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹ ²

Ankara, June 23, 1971, 1030Z.

Subj:

• Narcotics: June 21 Meeting With Prime Minister Erim

Ref:

• State 110121

Summary: In long and frank discussion of opium issue with Erim on June 21, Turks stuck firmly to economic nationalist objections raised before to opium eradication. In addition they gave special significance to public opinion problems and most particularly to those of farmers affected by possible opium eradication. In end, however, Erim said he would meet three USG conditions. (Complete eradication by June 1972, full purchase of crop by GOT, and seeking pass legislation prohibiting all future poppy farming), if agreement reached on long term American assistance to improve living conditions of farmers affected by ban on poppy farming. Lower level meeting on that subject set for June 22. End summary

1. I met from 1800 to 2000 June 21 with Prime Minister Erim to continue our discussion of opium. Meeting took place in relatively informal and unofficial environment of Prime Minister’s residence. Attending on Turkish side were Deputy Prime Minister Karaosmanoglu, Foreign Minister Olcay, Minister of Commerce and Industry Cilingiroglu, Foreign Economic Relations Minister Derbil, and FonMin Deputy Director General Arim. Hill, Dillon and Greene accompanied me. This is full report of conversation summarized in Ankara 4302

2. I opened session at scheduled 1800 hours with only Erim, Olcay and Arim present on Turkish side. Other Turks joined us over next ten minutes. I explained I had just returned from Washington, where on June 14 at White House I had attended what I termed most important meeting of my career. I summarized President’s presentation of national and international narcotics problems and listed names of participants in meeting including Cabinet members and Ambassadors. (Foreign Minister Olcay interrupted to ask if India represented; I said Ambassador Keating was in fact in town but fully preoccupied with refugee problems.) I noted heroin problem had become one of even greater American concern in few months that had passed since Karosmanoglu left Washington. Noted President’s message to Congress including strong statement on controlling psychotropics. I reported that when my turn for “short” comments came, I remained at podium for more than an hour. This was clear proof of importance of Turkey as largest source of opium. I explained I had outlined to President and Cabinet members Erims proposals given to me in our June 11 meeting and answered numerous questions.

3. Turning to Erim directly, I read verbatim paras two and three reftel so Prime Minister would have full flavor of President’s views. In particular I stressed President’s deep concern that “opium is casting a pall over our entire relationship”, his hope “to avoid jeopardizing our close relations,” and his fear that he “may not be able to control punitive measures proposed by Congress”. I later noted that President fully realizes problem is global one and that, therefore, other steps are being taken in other parts of world.

4. Parenthetically I pointed out I had not on this, unlike last summer, made appearances before congressional committees. The administration, I said has sought to postpone such appearances until after June 30 in order not to complicate decision making in Turkey. After June 30, appearances can no longer be postponed and it seems clear that there will be many.

5. In view of these contacts, I told Erim I had no choice but to conclude that most important and most beneficial step Turkey could take. Would be to announce by June 30 that there would be no rpt no future planting of poppies in the country. Heroin is killer drug and Turkey is now our largest source. I asked directly whether eradication this year was legally possible. After some hesitation, Karaosmanoglu and Ciglingiroglu agreed the law requires one year notice for such a decision; to do otherwise would require new law. Prime Minister confirmed. Ciglingiroglu, who came late, noted he had just left National Assembly where opium licensing bill had been passed and sent to Senate. He said debate had been qte very tough unqte and attempt to past law permitting instant eradication would be impossible. Prime Minister nodded agreement.

6. With these points established, I commented I had in Washington done my best to explain Turkey’s circumstances, but I must also explain, Washington views to Turkey. Not only Congress, but also many officials at highest levels believe time has come for Turkey to make that extra effort. Turning to my instructions, I said that if, in this month’s decree certain conditions are met, then we can consider assistance. Conditions are: (a) prohibiting all planting, cultivation or productions of opium poppy after June 30, 1972; (b) purchasing entire crop to be planted this fall; (c) seeking to pass legislation prohibiting all future poppy farming in Turkey after June 1972.

7. If GOT agrees to the foregoing, then, I continued, USG is prepared on grant basis to provide additional assistance to Turkey of $10-15 million to be used over two-three year period to compensate farmers who can no longer produce opium to meet resulting foreign exchange losses. Lira equivalent from part of grant would be used to pay farmers who voluntarily refrained from planting in four provinces where cultivation would be permitted. Payment would be over three-year period and would be based on 110 percent of amount paid to farmers this summer. This year’s payments must, thus, be made between June 30 and Sept 1. I then told Erim about possible further grants to help improve living conditions of affected farmers and also mentioned our williingness to increase world bank and UN Development Fund loans. Finally, I noted it would be impossible for USG to offer guaranteed sale of leather and textiles.

8. I concluded this portion of my remarks by saying clock is ticking if decree announcing no more planting after June 1972 not issued, there will be, as result public concern in US, actions taken by Congress which will seriously complicate our entire relationship and with which Executive Branch would be unable [to] cope.

9. Recalling emphasis in our June 11 meeting on growing opium on state farms, I said all present should know that USG could in no way be associated with such project.

10. I hoped GOT could announce this month full and immediate eradication. If that happened, undoubtedly Turkish flag would fly high around the world. If that impossible, I must urge Erim to announce eradication by June 1972. I offered these possibilities with full understanding of American mood and desire of President and Secretary Rogers to strengthen US-Turkish relations. Rarely in our history, I said, are American Ambassadors recalled for Cabinet discussion of domestic issues. That this happened in this instance is one indication of gravity of situation, which is only intensified by Vietnam addiction crisis among American soldiers. Nearly $160 million being made available to fight problem in U.S. supply situation is now in Turkish hands.

11. As I turned to Prime Minister, Olcay said he, as only “non-expert” present, would like to speak first and to speak frankly. Said he realized importance of heroin question in U.S. and knew I had done my best for US-Turk relations. He also appreciated fact that President was understanding of Turkish problems. Erim govt, however, has had to face one important question after another. In its first serious problem with US, Olcay believed Turkey, as result congressional and public pressure, being confronted with something like Johnson letter. He knew this not as President Nixon intended but at least this is way it seems to Turkish public which considers Turkey being threatened as result of question which has suddenly become number one issue.

12. Olcay, who during meeting generally followed line of Cabinet’s economic nationalists, continued that heroin problem is an American one. Turkey should not suddenly be blamed for it. Rhetorically he asked whether USG had ever informed Americans that blame for heroin should not be placed entirely on Turkey. Answered his own question, qte you have not unqte. This is not question which should overwhelm our relationship. He noted some people believed U.S. pharmaceutical industry was trying to force eradication of Turkish opium, so it could sell more.

13. Finally, Olcay wondered whether we were making similar appeals in other countries. He, as did others throughout meeting, specifically wondered what we were doing about India.

14. Replying in kind, I said I too would like to speak in complete frankness. I said we had been in contact with many countries. We had been working closely with France to control heroin laboratories there. Ambassador Bunker has put enormous pressure on Vietnamese Govt and situation is similar in Thailand. In Mexico, border was virtually closed for several days. As for India, the answer was qte no unqte. We are not making similar appeals there because India controls its opium, and Turkey does not. I continued that if Turkey, like India, had taken control measures required by single convention, I would not be sitting there talking. To be quite frank qte your collection record is dismal and you have not controlled poppy farming. WHO last year purchased sixty tons but police just since January this year have seized nearly eleven tons. Suleyman Demirel promised to end all production and pass licensing bill in four-five years, yet here we are with Turkey still the only problem country among those which can legally produce opium. In end, we could say let chips fall where they may, but that would be serious decision in terms US-Turk relations. Unqte Turkey was not singled out for special attention in President’s message, I said, in fact no country was, but they should be mindful of fact that Turkey is largest single supplier of opium reaching US in form of heroin.

15. Karaosmanoglu pointed out he lived in US for seven years and, thus, understands our problems. If addiction situation is as bad as I said, however, my specific proposals did not match in magnitude gravity which I had described. More is needed to compensate Turks.

16. In reply I noted that $10-15 million offer was generous and, beyond that, we williing consider possibility of longer range projects. I recalled that Demirel had told me money was not important in considering erclication problem. What was important, I continued, was to guard the millions of dollars of assistance that Turkey receives annually from US. Qte when our phone rings and you ask for 500,000 tons wheat we act nqte. It is tough struggle, however, to maintain such a relationship.

17. Karaosmanoglu returning to his pet project, said we should not write off qte guaranteed US purchase unqte of leather and textiles. As he had before, Karaosmanoglu claimed he knew we had qte gone outside the marketplace unqte to make such arrangements with other countries, even unfriendly ones.

18. Ciglingiroglu said he had heard people comment that, if US can put men on moon it should be able to control heroin problem. To him, conversation so far did not prove US wanted to eradicate opium worldwide but wanted instead to pressure Turkey into issue decree. Turkey is prepared to control its opium, so why bring US-Turk relations into this issue?

19. Olcay agreed with another Ciglingiroglu comment to effect that if US forces this issue and Turkey does not respond as desired, entire countryside could be turned to poppy farming. I said I assumed highest degree of statesmanship. Ciglingiroglu added we should appreciate fact Erim govt has done more about opium in its two and one half months in office than Demirel did in five years. To do so, they had to face serious opposition from the public.

20. Olcay once more turned to India, at which point I replied strongly that I was dealing with country (Turkey) whose opium is killing Americans. Insofar as I knew, no Indian opium came to us and none got into veins of Americans.

21. Prime Minister then, for first time, entered substantive conversation. He spoke in Turkish, using Karaosmanoglu as interpreter. Recalled item on opium in his govts program and fact he personally had written it. Said problem will be solved from humanitarian viewpoint and so pressure statements had no place in that context. Recalled that Demirel told him American anti-opium drive was part of propaganda of American Jewish population which objects to Turkey’s Middle East policy. Bizim Radio (clandestine Turkish Communist broadcasts from East Germany) has been asserting for past month that his govt has sold out to US.

22. Erim continued my suggestions did include some acceptable ones: (a) purchase by GOT of entire crop; (b) subsidy for farmers who volunteer not to grow; (c) compensation for “three, four, or five years”. Poppy farming, however, is 400 years old in Turkey and is not easy to halt. What happens after four years of short term projects? Qte had you accepted our proposal and we announced it tomorrow, there would be few grounds for public objections unqte.

23. Coming to key point, Erim said most obscure item is what US will do in long run. Qte with such obscurity, I cannot go to public unqte. With US proposal, Erim concluded, he could only promise to restrict next year’s production to four provinces, pass licensing bill, and compensate farmers who voluntarily abstain from growing.

24. I replied I had no instructions, no specifics on what might be done to bring better life to affected farmers or what US financial assistance might be possible. I suggested GOT officials think about possibilities for day or two and come up with suggestions. I noted, referring to Erim’s reference to pressure, that I had not come to threaten. I wanted to serve as a bridge of friendship between his government and my own.

25. Erim wondered how he could explain all of this to Turkish public. I immediately said I would be happy to write his speech. I would emphasize humanitarian aspects, possibility of increased development, compensation plan, and fact there already assurances of outside help.

26. Following my mention of assurances of help which Turks have, Erim quickly turned to English saying qte do we? unqte, and Karaosmanoglu, in his best American English, added qte what do you offer? unqte. Erim continued that public opinion is key question and there must be something specific and of substance to offer affected turks. Qte our common people are skeptical of generalities unqte.

27. I noted that any long range aid that we might discuss must be considered as promissory since our fiscal year is ending and Congress must consider all future appropriations. Turks nodded understanding. Karaosmanoglu again asked what magnitude our offer was. Turning questions to them, I repeated I had no instructions on specific magnitude but would be interested in what figures they had in mind. I wondered if complete eradication announced, plans for better life prepared, and reasonable assurances receiived from USG, what would be magnitude of assistance needed by Turkey?

28. As he had in our June 11 meeting, Karaosmanoglu replied this is multi-billion dollar problem for US and also involves lives of many Americans. I noted that President’s recent message to Congress had proposed nearly $160 million in additional appropriations for internal programs. Karaosmanoglu inquired, with one of his rare grins, how much would eighty percent of that be, since Turkey is source of 80 percent of trouble? Continuing more seriously, he hoped we wanted to solve the problem for good. I assured him we did. Karaosmanoglu said all Turk officials in that room qte are biased in your favor unqte.

29. Ciglingiroglu promised Turkey would solve opium problem, but said qte it must be done in our own way unqte. Qte this is long term problem that must be solved in long term way. As Turkish Minister, I cannot tolerate Turkey as a smuggling nation. Unqte. Karaosmanoglu added that to appreciate long term aspects I should have been present that morning when he qte had unqte to receive delegation to Denizli opium farmers. Qte there are economic problems, but there also problems of pride which must be considered unqte. There must be compensation for economic losses but without loss of pride.

30. Karaosmanoglu agreed USG under pressure at home. On other hand, GOT has been making decisions on toughest possible questions involving prices, wages, taxes. All have been difficult and now US confronts GOT with another. In addition, Karaosmanoglu said, America wants Turkey to take eradication step abruptly. This will be very difficult for Turkey unless there proof of acceptable long range program to help farmers.

31. Erim commented issue is such a touchy one that he would probably have to take any decision to Parliament and perhaps even ask for vote of confidence. Ciglingiroglu said thrust of parliamentary pressure is toward expanding, not limiting, poppy farming.

32. I once more repeated three basic USG conditions (eradication by June 72, buying entire crop, passage of law to prohibit poppy farming). Erim suggested meeting tomorrow at expert level to put together paper on possibilities. Qte. Then I may have to tell Parliament about it unqte. Once more I said no proposals could include possibility of production on state farms. To that, Karaosmanoglu came back with qte you have not given an inch and are asking us to give a mile unqte. Ciglingiroglu chimed in with comment he had returned from tough parliamentary debate on licensing bill to find US offering qte only unqte $10-15 million.

33. At this point, Karaosmanoglu made only reference in conversation to assistance to three provinces which will be dropped from production between 1971 and 1972. No one took him up on this point.

34. I asked then whether Erim agreed that full eradication was possible at a price, including no state farms and no opium factory. Karaosmanoglu commented US was trying to change name of province of Afyong (which means opium) to qte Little America unqte. He said we are asking GOT to change its laws, so why can’t US laws on textiles be changed?

35. Several of us then agreed that Hill and Toner should meet June 22 with Turkish qte technicians unqte to, in effect, discuss para 7 of reftel, i.e., assistance to improve living conditions of farmers affected by complete eradication. Ciglingiroglu said talk should not be restricted by eliminating possibilities of state farms, textile exports, etc.

36. Turning to Erim, I again repeated our three conditions and asked whether he would agree to those if we could agree on longer term matter. He said qte yes unqte, but added, as we were standing, qte we must agree on something so farmers will not give anything, but will actually gain unqte.

Handley

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. The Embassy reported in detail on a key meeting with Prime Minister ERIM on the opium issue. ERIM agreed to U.S. conditions on eradication, purchase, and anti-opium legislation in return for U.S. assistance to affected Turkish farmers.