Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

106. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• USIA and the Stanton Report

You expressed an interest in the NSC’s views on what the Administration’s position should be regarding Frank Stanton’s report on USIA.² In particular, you asked what position Director Keogh has been told the White House holds on the subject.

As you will recall, the Stanton Panel recommended that the USIA’s information functions be transferred to the Department of State; that the long-range cultural and educational functions of USIA and State be combined into a new autonomous agency within State; and that the Voice of America be established as an independent entity under a Government/Public Board. In your meeting with Stanton on March 11,³ you were careful not to endorse these recommendations but merely indicated they would receive careful attention within the Executive Branch.

A task force has been formed within State under the direction of Deputy Secretary Ingersoll to study the implications of Stanton’s proposals. But any formal Administration position has been held up pending the report of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. The Commission’s report, due in July, is expected to incorporate much of the work of the Stanton Panel and make further recommendations in the information-cultural area. We have thus taken the position that any Administration position on these issues would be premature pending the Murphy Commission’s report.⁴ The NSC staff has similarly held off undertaking a formal review, with a view toward a full interagency study of both the Stanton and Murphy Commission proposals later this summer.

After his meeting with you, Stanton was reported to be saying that you favored his proposals. Director Keogh checked with the White House and was told by Don Rumsfeld that the White House would not take a position on the Stanton Report. He has subsequently held closely to the line that any formal Administration position should await a full interagency review of the Stanton proposals and the results of the Murphy Commission’s study. However, Keogh has published his own, personal critique of the Stanton Report and has used this critique as a USIA position in Congressional testimony.⁵ A copy of the relevant portion of Keogh’s opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday is at Tab A (the remainder of the statement covered the USIA budget authorization).⁶

In summary, Keogh disagrees with Stanton’s recommendations to restructure U.S. information and cultural activities because there would be no central planning and coordination, since there would be no central management in Stanton’s scheme. Our public diplomacy functions would be split into too many different agencies and would not be effective. To quote Keogh, “. . . it would fragment rather than consolidate and thereby weaken rather than strengthen.”

Some of the specific problems that Keogh foresees under Stanton’s proposed structure would be:

—The international cultural programs would lack substance and realism due to their distance from, and lack of concern with, foreign policy; as such they would be taken even less seriously by Congress and the Department of State.

—An enlarged public affairs bureau at State would not give the priority to explaining U.S. policy to foreign audiences that a separate USIA does.

—State would not be able to provide the timely constant flow of policy commentaries and news analysis to a Voice of America constituted as a separate agency, nor would such an independent Voice be as amenable to USG policy guidance.

Keogh’s critique emphasizes the key issues involved in such a restructuring and notes several of the budgetary and management problems such a fragmentation would engender. His alternative is to unite the cultural, educational, and information programs of State’s CU, USIA, and other agencies into a new and strengthened independent agency with direct, effective policy ties to the White House, NSC and the Department of State.

We shall continue to follow Congressional interest in these issues very closely and will ensure that no Administration positions are taken on these proposals without a full interagency review and presentation of any reorganization plans for your approval.

1. Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230: United States Information Agency (Executive), 6/1/75–12/31/75. No classification marking. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.” Ford also initialed the memorandum, which an attached correspondence profile indicates he noted on June 5. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Janka sent it to Kissinger on May 6 with the recommendation that he sign it and forward it to the President. (Ibid., 1/1/75–5/30/75)
2. In a May 5 memorandum, Rumsfeld notified Scowcroft that Ford “would like some information on the NSC’s views concerning USIA.” (Ibid.) The Stanton Panel report is Document 103.
3. See Document 102.
4. The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, chaired by Robert D. Murphy, issued its final report on June 27. For more on the Murphy Commission’s findings, see Documents 45, 147, and 179. The Commission’s three recommendations with regard to public diplomacy coincided with those of the Stanton Panel. First, the Commission recommended that “the function of policy advocacy should be placed in the Department of State,” where a proposed Senior Officer for Policy Information would “direct the press, public affairs and policy information functions currently assigned to the Department, and those to be transferred to State from the U.S. Information Agency.” Second, it recommended that “the longer range functions of cultural communication and general information should be combined in a separate agency,” a proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency. This new agency was to absorb the Department’s extant Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and be independent from, but responsible to, State. Third, the Murphy Commission recommended that VOA “should be independent, under a separate board made up of public and private members, taking guidance from the Department of State on all policy commentary.” (Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 5–6, 12–13, 136–141)
5. Keogh sent his 16-page critique to Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, and Friedersdorf under separate covering letters, April 14. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 30, FO 5: Information—Exchange Activities (Executive) (1)) Friedersdorf forwarded Keogh’s critique to Marsh under an April 14 covering memorandum, on which Marsh wrote: “This appears to be throwing the baby out with the bath water.” (Ibid., John Marsh Files, General Subject File, Box 42, United States Information Agency) Previously, on March 11, Keogh sent Scowcroft a copy of his press release responding to the Stanton Panel’s report. Janka forwarded it to Scowcroft under a March 19 memorandum, which Scowcroft initialed. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230: United States Information Agency (Executive), 1/1/75–5/30/75)
6. The text of Keogh’s opening statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, dated May 5 and summarized below, is attached but not printed.