Attachment
Summary of the Murphy Commission Report3
SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
1. Organization
The commission was established by Congress to “submit findings and
recommendations for providing a more effective system for the
formulation and implementation of the nation’s foreign policy.” Its
aim was to propose improvements in the organization of the executive
departments as well as in relations between the executive branch and
Congress.
2. Political Issues of the Future
Government organization must be related to the evolving nature of
political problems. The near future will be characterized by growing
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interaction and
tightening interdependence among all nations of the world. Economic
issues, technological and environmental and related affairs will
become more important, with foreign policy and domestic policy
tending to merge. Policy making will require greater public and
congressional participation.
3. The President
The President is dependent on assistance of three kinds:
—an able staff. The present Assistant for National Security Affairs
has met the requirements of this post while also serving as
Secretary of State. However, the responsibilities of this Assistant
are sufficiently different in nature from those of the Secretary of
State that the Assistant should in the future hold no other
duties.
—an effective organizational structure. The NSC should be upgraded and, with the recent increase in
importance of economic issues, should be expanded to include the
Secretary of Treasury and should address itself to international
economic problems.4 Other cabinet and
staff officials concerned with domestic issues should also be
invited to attend sessions on an ad hoc basis. The NSC should be more extensively used as
a deliberative body.
—cabinet departments. These departments must be drawn into policy
formulation.
4. Department of State
As the central point for the conduct of foreign affairs, the State
Department should concentrate on three major functions: (1) Assess
the overseas impact of proposed decisions; (2) Play a major part in
the formulation of all policy with significant foreign implications
and “monitor and influence” the foreign activities of other foreign
agencies; and (3) Conduct relations with other governments and
international organizations.
In keeping with these aims the Department should be reorganized as
follows:
—the Under Secretary of Political Affairs should be retitled Under
Secretary for Political and Security Affairs while the position of
Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be abolished. The
Under Secretary should be the focus of greater Department attention
to defense issues.
—the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs should become the Under
Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs.
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—EB, OES, and the functional units of IO should be reorganized into four new
bureaus:
- —International Economic and Business Affairs
- —Energy, Transportation and Communication
- —Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs
- —Food, Population and Development
—a new senior officer for policy information should be established to
direct press affairs and policy information activities currently
belonging to USIA.5
—CU should be transferred to a new
Information and Cultural Agency.6
—the Deputy Under Secretary for Management should be made an Under
Secretary.7
5. International Economic Policy
International economic policy deserves greater attention; the
following steps would lead to this objective:8
—The White House should appoint a senior assistant for economic
policy; establish an international policy advisory board of private
citizens; establish an independent study group on international
economic issues and create a subcouncil on international economic
policies.
—The State Department must significantly improve its ability to deal
with foreign policy aspects of economic, scientific, transportation,
population and related issues by:
- —appointing more ambassadors and DCMs with economic
expertise.
- —expanding personnel interchange among agencies and between
government and business.
- —increasing “multiagency participation” in political
negotiations overseas.
- —giving Treasury primary responsibility for supervising U.S.
commitments to international development institutions.
- —transferring the President’s special trade representative to
the State Department upon completion of current trade
negotiations.
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6. Defense
To strengthen defense as an instrument of foreign policy, the
following steps are recommended:
—Create a National Security Review Committee to insure integration of
defense policy with foreign policy aims.
—Create an Advisory Board on National Defense comprised of private
citizens to inject the public view into defense affairs.
—The State Department should improve its handling of
political-military issues; the new Under Secretary for Political
Affairs should assist this.
—ACDA should be strengthened by (1)
making the Director the principal advisor to the NSC on arms control and
disarmament;9 (2)
making the Director a member of the National Security Review
Committee; (3) expanding external research concentrating on
long-term issues; and (4) substantially increasing ACDA’s budget.
—OMB should give greater attention
to broad defense policy issues.
—Within Defense, ISA should be given
a greater role in formulating defense programs and budget.
7. Intelligence
National security and an effective foreign policy require an
intelligence capability. However, there should be firmer oversight
of the intelligence community and a better review of its covert
activities.10 To this end:
—The Director of CIA should have
closer contact with the President (with an office in the White
House) and delegate much of his day-to-day responsibility to his
deputy, who should no longer be military.
—CIA should be retitled FIA (Foreign Intelligence Agency) to
emphasize its exclusive foreign responsibility.
—The Director of FIA should normally
be someone from outside the career service.
—The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should become
the President’s principal source of intelligence.
—The NSC Intelligence Committee
should be more active in improving the quality of intelligence.
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8. Public Opinion and Humanitarian Considerations
—The new Office of Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department
should be upgraded.11
—An Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State on Human Rights
should be created.
—The U.S. representative to the U.N. on Human Rights should be given
a broader mandate.
9. Practice of Diplomacy in our Bilateral
Relationships
—Ambassadors must have greater control of communications and
personnel in their missions.
—Foreign service reporting requires substantial improvement.
—Inspections of overseas posts should be modified.
In our public diplomacy the conclusions of the Stanton Panel should
be endorsed.12
10. Planning
Serious planning work is of great importance and a Council of
International Planning should be established at the presidential
level.
11. Budget
Congress should simplify the authorization process.
12. Personnel
The State Department’s personnel system must be improved by:
- —encouraging greater functional expertise.
- —encouraging better management.
- —revising employee-management relations.
- —instituting a strong executive development program.
13. Executive-Congressional Relations
There should be better arrangements regarding executive agreements,
executive privilege and a comprehensive security classification
system. The four presidential proclamations of national emergency
which are currently in effect should be terminated.
14. Congressional Organization
A Joint Committee on National Security should be established to
perform for Congress the political review and coordination now
performed for the executive branch by the NSC. This committee
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should take responsibility for congressional
oversight of the intelligence community.
Supplementary Views
In comments attached to the report,13 Congressman Broomfield, Senator Mansfield and Vice President Rockefeller disagreed with some
aspects of the report. Broomfield strongly opposed the Commission’s
endorsement of the Stanton panel report on USIA, in particular the proposal to give VOA greater independence. Vice
President Rockefeller also
expressed some reservation on this point. In a scathing attack on
the entirety of the Commission’s work, Mansfield remarked that “the ratio of effort to
result has not been up to expectations. A surfeit of words masks an
absence of clarity.” Mansfield considers the commission’s findings and
recommendations on executive-congressional relations to be fatuous
at best, the section on intelligence inadequate at most and the
emphasis on economic issues risking the danger of fadism.