Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

45. Memorandum From Kathleen Troia of the National Security Council Staff to Robert C. McFarlane of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 16, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Murphy Commission Recommendations on the Intelligence Community

The Murphy Commission addresses the question of the intelligence community in Chapter 7 of its Report (Tab A).² Various members of the Commission have additional comments contained in several addendum (Tab B).³ The Murphy Commission as a whole identifies three main tests for intelligence services in a democracy: one, to provide accurate information and competent analysis; two, to avoid unnecessary costs and duplication; and three, to function in a manner which commands public confidence. To achieve these goals, the Commission concludes that firmer direction and oversight of the intelligence community are essential.

In this regard, the Report asserts that the CIA Director serving also as Director of Central Intelligence has worked only partially. While the Director does have line authority over CIA, he has only limited influence over other intelligence units. This situation results in the Director devoting himself almost entirely to CIA affairs at the expense of the rest of the intelligence community.

Director of Central Intelligence

The Murphy Commission makes the following recommendations on the role of the Director of Central Intelligence:

—The DCI should be a close assistant to the President, should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.

—The DCI should delegate much authority for day to day direction of the CIA to his Deputy.

—There should be a slight extension of the DCI’s current responsibility for community-wide planning and budgeting.

In choosing a DCI, the President should select someone who has a broad understanding of foreign and national security affairs; has managerial skills; has a sensitivity to the constraints within which an American intelligence service must operate; and has a sense of independence and high integrity. Finally, the DCI should be a person of stature from outside the intelligence career service.

PFIAB

The Commission recommends that the President have sources of advice independent of the DCI. PFIAB, as the principal source, should be the steady, external and independent overseer of the intelligence community. In citing the Rockefeller Commission Report, the Murphy Commission recommends:

—that each incoming President review and make such changes in PFIAB’s membership as may be required to give him high personal confidence in its values and judgements;

—that the President make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB upon the latter’s request; and

—that PFIAB be increased in size, drawn in part from sources outside the intelligence community.

NSCIC

The Commission feels that the NSCIC, charged with providing guidance on consumer needs and intelligence requirements, has not functioned adequately. To correct this situation the NSCIC should be actively used as the principal forum (short of the President) for resolution of differing perspectives of intelligence consumers and producers, and should meet frequently for that purpose.

Intelligence Analysis

The Commission believes that intelligence analysis should be improved on four fronts.

1. More effective utilization of the State Department’s routine Foreign Service reporting is essential. The Commission notes several problems in current reporting; particularly the absence of overall direction and guidance on information needed, the general lack of communication between the field and the mission, and the lack of analytical training and/or abilities of Foreign Service Officers.

2. While intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their improved competence in analysis of international economic issues, the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisers must maintain and significantly strengthen similar analytical capabilities pertaining to their responsibilities.

3. Regarding the NIO system, a small staff of highest quality, drawn from within and without the intelligence community and responsible for drafting and review of NIE’s, should be established. This staff should report directly to the DCI and be charged with reporting different viewpoints of the agencies.

4. The entire intelligence community should strive for better balance between technical and human means of intelligence collection, and avoid the current trend to slight human contributions.

Finally, in an attempt to more adequately manage resources, the Commission recommends two initiatives be taken:

—One, that the IC staff prepare an annually-revised, multi-year plan for allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence community, and

—Two, that the IC staff prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget for the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security.⁴

Covert Action

While the Murphy Commission feels covert activities should not be abandoned, it believes covert actions should be employed only where such action is clearly essential to vital US purposes and then only after careful high level review. The Commission feels the present functioning of the 40 Committee to be inadequate, and proposes:

1. That covert action be authorized only after collective consideration of benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee members;

2. that the 40 Committee also regularly review the continuing value of on-going operations; and

3. that PL 93–559 (Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974)⁵ be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement for the President’s personal certification of covert activities.

Finally, the Commission recommends that the DCI be retitled the Director of Foreign Intelligence and the CIA be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency.

Addendum—Supplementary Statement of Cong. William Broomfield (R–Mich.)

While agreeing with the Commission recommendation of a Joint Committee on National Security, Broomfield believes its intelligence oversight responsibilities should be vested in a separate joint committee.

Additionally, Rep. Broomfield is not convinced that DIA, as presently constituted, is either an effective or essential element in the intelligence effort. If DIA is to be preserved, it should be strengthened and made more effective.

Addendum—Supplementary Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D–Mont.)

Senator Mansfield objects to the creation of a Joint Committee on National Security because:

1. The committee would cut across jurisdictions and tasks assigned existing standing committees and in time inevitably would decrease their authority and powers.

2. The committee would become a favorite tool of the executive for centralizing Congressional oversight functions and diminishing their scope.

3. The committee would have no promise of access—quite the contrary—to NSC materials and deliberations.

4. According to the Commission Report, the Committee would be composed of the most senior members of Congress and would squeeze out the junior members.

5. The Committee would presumably take over intelligence oversight in time, but that would not be the main function and it could easily drop out of view.

6. The Committee could become a barrier to dissemination of sensitive material to standing committees, while having little or no power itself to initiate legislation.

7. Giving such a Committee control over report would mean control over information and soon mean control over action; a “super-committee” might easily fall under executive dominance and reduce the overall authority of the Congress.

Mansfield also chides the Executive and Legislative branches for being inexcusably lax in overseeing intelligence activities. He refers to the intelligence community as swollen, expensive and inefficient and calls for either the abolishment of several military intelligence agencies or the dismantlement of DIA.

Mansfield believes there must be a full housecleaning of CIA and, thereafter, the Agency’s standing in the intelligence community should be restored and strengthened. Initially, the necessary restructuring of the intelligence community should be accomplished by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thereafter, a Senate or Joint Committee on Intelligence should be created with responsibility for extensive oversight.

Mansfield disagrees with the Commission’s proposals for PFIAB. He feels “it would be easier, cheaper and logical (sic) to abolish it.”

He also believes that the DCI and his deputy should be civilians.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane Files, Box 1, Intelligence Investigations Subject Files, Murphy Commission Recommendations on Intelligence. No classification marking.
2. Tab A is attached but not printed. The Murphy Commission, officially the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, submitted its final report on June 27. See the attachment to Document 147. On July 11, the NSC dispatched copies of the report to the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, and the CIA for comment. These comments, addressed to President Ford, are in the Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Boxes 98–99, IFG Logged Documents, Murphy Commission—Comments on the Commission Report—Organization of Intelligence.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. The Commission proposes a Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security be established to serve as Congress’ NSC Staff. It would also be the central linking point between Congress and the Executive and take responsibility for Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. [Footnote in the original.]
5. See footnote 4, Document 26.