105. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information Agency (Payeff) to the Director (Keogh) and Deputy Director (Kopp)1

SUBJECT

  • East Asia Assessments

Attached are the cabled replies we received following our request to IEA posts for a reassessment of program priorities in the wake of the Viet Nam collapse.2 Also attached is a set of abstracts taken from these cables which will provide a quick idea of the substance of the responses.

We have found these useful in our program planning and were very pleased at the posts’ thoughtful responses.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information Agency (Payeff) 3

REASSESSMENT REPORT ABSTRACTS

In the wake of the fall of South Viet Nam, IEA began a reassessment of its East Asia programs4 and asked its posts to submit their own evaluations of the impact of Viet Nam and Cambodia on public opinion and program implications for USIA. Following are abstracts of each post’s response:

Japan

The American defeat has been in good part written off by the Japanese since the US withdrawal two years ago. Although events in Southeast Asia are a destabilizing factor on the international political scene, [Page 376] we must respond to larger Japanese concerns over such issues as oil, food, monetary stability and trade balances. Multilateral cooperation is required; the unity of the developed world must continue to receive our first attention. We must also explain to the Japanese the nature of our Viet Nam commitment and how it differs from our security treaty with Japan.

Korea

Even before the fall of Indochina, the task of convincing Korean target audiences of American determination and ability to meet its commitments was already difficult because of the public debate over our military role in the ROK. In the post-Viet Nam period, all Korean target audiences recognize all too clearly that crucial US Executive Branch decisions affecting the ROK will be strongly influenced by Congressional and public attitudes, of which the Koreans are extremely uncertain. We must therefore attempt to obtain and transmit reassuring public comment from key Congressional members in the foreign affairs and military areas. A discussion of the stakes that the US, PRC, and USSR have in continuing détente would also be useful.

Thailand

The recent Indochina developments have speeded up Thailand’s reassessment of its foreign policy and relations with the U.S. What is important now is for Washington to determine our policy goals so that the Mission and USIS can disseminate these and influence Thai public opinion. If the determination and articulation of U.S. policy is delayed, we risk allowing the momentum of public opinion in Thailand to fill the vacuum and compel the Thai Government to fix its own policies without a clear perception of US regional intent.

During this waiting period, programs on U.S. security relations in Asia lack credibility and may in fact do damage to our relations. Thais still see us as friends and admire much in the American system. It is to our advantage to support Thai aspirations for the development of democratic institutions, economic development, and an increased role as a leader in the affairs of the region.

Our programs should focus on expansion of the exchange programs, support promotion of trade and economic cooperation, reinforce Thailand’s growing interest in regional cooperation, and publicize the U.S. assistance effort in Thailand.

Philippines

The US is in the midst of sensitive renegotiations with the GOP on trade and military base agreements, and the developments in Indo[Page 377]china have had a direct impact on Philippine attitudes. The Marcos5 government, although formally still wedded to its US alliance is keeping its options open, encouraging anti-American columnists and arguing for an independent policy and closer ties with the Third World. We must emphasize that the US intends to maintain a presence in Asia and that we will honor our defense commitments to the Philippines. In addition, we should aim at improving the image of the US military and stress the contribution of American business and the military bases to the country’s economic and military security. US policy in Asia is the key issue at the present.

Indonesia

The Indonesians are concerned about the role of the US Congress and the ultimate direction of US foreign policy, fearing the possibility of a US withdrawal from Asia. It is highly important that American policies and problems be communicated to the broadest spectrum of influential Indonesians in an effort to instill confidence that we intend to maintain our presence in Asia and to fully keep our treaty commitments. Round-ups of American opinion from periodicals, statements of Congressmen and American notables outside the USG which focus on support for continued American presence in Asia would be most useful.

Singapore

It is not so much the loss of Indochina which concerns the Singaporeans as the perceived loss of a sense of proportion by the US administration and indications that our failure in Viet Nam would place serious limitations on world-wide US capabilities. We should focus our programming on the benefits accruing from the end of our involvement; hoping that we have all learned the lesson that America is not omnipotent and that other nations cannot rely on Uncle Sam to do what they should be doing themselves. Our emphasis should be on how we snap back from defeat and the various inputs into making a new and realistic foreign policy.

Kuala Lumpur

The US “failure” in Indochina serves to strengthen the Malaysian argument for neutralization of Southeast Asia. Faced with the reality that American military power is ineffective in dealing with subversion and insurgency of the type present in Malaysia, respect remains only for American military power to deter global war and promote disarmament. Confidence in US economic power, technological and scientific [Page 378] capability, and our leadership role in seeking solutions for world economic and social problems remains. Our emphasis should now be in demonstrating American achievements and leadership ability in these fields, highlighting the strengths of American society.

Hong Kong

The denouement in Indochina has left Hong Kong viewing USG as “very clearly in default.” Until USG clarifies its policies re China and Southeast Asia, and enunciates them at the highest levels, the post feels it most useful to concentrate on programming illustrating American political processes and the viability of the American system.

Taiwan

Until the line set forth by Chiang Kai Shek 6 changes drastically, of which there are no signs so far, the ROC will have particular concern about USG steadfastness vis-à-vis the PRC and nascent Communist takeovers. The results in Indochina have heightened the ever-present doubts on Taiwan about USG intentions and capabilities in Asia. ROC concerns go beyond declared Administration policy to Congressional and public willingness to support a strong American role in international politics. As a corollary, a stricter definition of détente on the part of the USG may raise the problem of generating unwarranted hope in the ROC. Unless and until a new USG policy emerges the post suggests continuing on its present course, with more effort at explaining American society and the USG conception of détente.

Burma

The USG and Burma have no mutual commitments, but contrast between USG words and deeds re Indochina are not lost on the Burmese. Until USG policy clarifies post suggest emphasizing themes of vitality of American political processes, society and culture.

Laos

Already a coalition government, and for a long time a direct factor in the general Indochinese situation, Laos is not subject to the same policy reassessments which haunt some other Asian countries. American policy has been in support of coalition and stability, and the post urges that its programming continue in the same direction.

Australia

The Australian labor Government’s policy in recent months had tilted considerably towards Hanoi at the expense of Saigon and had been critical of continued US involvement in Vietnam. This policy has [Page 379] caused considerable internal political problems for the Whitlam7 government which are reaching almost the crisis stage. The post believes that its highest priority objective stated in its 1975 CPP—to encourage appreciation of the importance of the alliance of Australia with the US and the retention of US facilities in the country—should continue to receive priority emphasis and support. They request Agency support for this objective which also emphasizes the determination of the US to remain a Pacific power and that US foreign policy does not include a withdrawal from our commitments in this area of the world.

New Zealand

There is a general concern on the future role of the US in the Pacific. There is belief that the US no longer has the ability or the desire to control events in Asia. There is also concern that the reduced military role of the US in the area may be followed by a paralleled aloof stance in political and commercial contacts. Even the pronouncements by US officials following the recent ANZUS meeting8 have not fully assured the New Zealanders that our reassessment of policy would not produce greater retrenchment. The post believes that its original priorities for program emphasis are correct. Its primary objective concerns itself with “American Foreign Policy and Balance of Power in Asia”. The Post further feels that due to the recent events, greater emphasis be placed on this objective.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 305, Records of the USIA, Office of the Director, Subject Files, 1975, Entry UD–UP 7, FRC 306–84–0003, 7501300–7501309. No classification marking. Sent for information.
  2. The cables were not found attached. The VOA, which was under the authority of the USIA, received criticism for allegedly suppressing news of developments leading up to the American evacuation of Vietnam. Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D–Texas) wrote Kissinger on April 10 “to inquire about reports that the Voice of America, on your instructions, has recently begun censoring and suppressing news of events in Southeast Asia.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975) Later, during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on USIA’s FY 76 budget authorization, Senator Percy stated, “during the last two months of April, as the evacuation of Americans from Vietnam became a preoccupation of the world press, the administration, and the Congress, the VOA news was not similarly preoccupied.” This oversight, he claimed, represented a violation of the VOA’s charter, which required it to broadcast “accurate, objective, and comprehensive” news. (Richard M. Weintraub, “Percy Says VOA Violated Charter,” Washington Post, May 6, 1975, p. A10)
  3. Confidential.
  4. During its November 27, 1974, meeting, USIA’s Executive Committee discussed and approved a plan for reorganizing its USIS Vietnam program and staff. (National Archives, RG 305, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee File, 1975, Accession 306–89–0045, Meeting No. 232)
  5. Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines.
  6. Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), President of the Republic of China.
  7. E. Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia.
  8. Reference is to the Anzus Council meeting held in Washington April 24–25. For a record of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 54.