Attached are the cabled replies we received following our request to
IEA posts for a reassessment of
program priorities in the wake of the Viet Nam collapse.2
Also attached is a set of abstracts taken from these cables which will
provide a quick idea of the substance of the responses.
We have found these useful in our program planning and were very pleased
at the posts’ thoughtful responses.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant
Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States
Information Agency (Payeff)3
REASSESSMENT REPORT ABSTRACTS
In the wake of the fall of South Viet Nam, IEA began a reassessment of its East Asia programs4 and asked its posts to submit their own evaluations
of the impact of Viet Nam and Cambodia on public opinion and program
implications for USIA. Following
are abstracts of each post’s response:
Japan
The American defeat has been in good part written off by the Japanese
since the US withdrawal two years
ago. Although events in Southeast Asia are a destabilizing factor on
the international political scene,
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we must respond to larger Japanese concerns
over such issues as oil, food, monetary stability and trade
balances. Multilateral cooperation is required; the unity of the
developed world must continue to receive our first attention. We
must also explain to the Japanese the nature of our Viet Nam
commitment and how it differs from our security treaty with
Japan.
Korea
Even before the fall of Indochina, the task of convincing Korean
target audiences of American determination and ability to meet its
commitments was already difficult because of the public debate over
our military role in the ROK. In the post-Viet Nam period, all
Korean target audiences recognize all too clearly that crucial
US Executive Branch decisions
affecting the ROK will be strongly influenced by Congressional and
public attitudes, of which the Koreans are extremely uncertain. We
must therefore attempt to obtain and transmit reassuring public
comment from key Congressional members in the foreign affairs and
military areas. A discussion of the stakes that the US, PRC, and USSR have in
continuing détente would also be useful.
Thailand
The recent Indochina developments have speeded up Thailand’s
reassessment of its foreign policy and relations with the U.S. What
is important now is for Washington to determine our policy goals so
that the Mission and USIS can
disseminate these and influence Thai public opinion. If the
determination and articulation of U.S. policy is delayed, we risk
allowing the momentum of public opinion in Thailand to fill the
vacuum and compel the Thai Government to fix its own policies
without a clear perception of US
regional intent.
During this waiting period, programs on U.S. security relations in
Asia lack credibility and may in fact do damage to our relations.
Thais still see us as friends and admire much in the American
system. It is to our advantage to support Thai aspirations for the
development of democratic institutions, economic development, and an
increased role as a leader in the affairs of the region.
Our programs should focus on expansion of the exchange programs,
support promotion of trade and economic cooperation, reinforce
Thailand’s growing interest in regional cooperation, and publicize
the U.S. assistance effort in Thailand.
Philippines
The US is in the midst of sensitive
renegotiations with the GOP on trade and military base agreements,
and the developments in Indo
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china have had a direct impact on Philippine attitudes. The
Marcos5 government, although
formally still wedded to its US
alliance is keeping its options open, encouraging anti-American
columnists and arguing for an independent policy and closer ties
with the Third World. We must emphasize that the US intends to maintain a presence in
Asia and that we will honor our defense commitments to the
Philippines. In addition, we should aim at improving the image of
the US military and stress the
contribution of American business and the military bases to the
country’s economic and military security. US policy in Asia is the key issue at the present.
Indonesia
The Indonesians are concerned about the role of the US Congress and the ultimate direction
of US foreign policy, fearing the
possibility of a US withdrawal from
Asia. It is highly important that American policies and problems be
communicated to the broadest spectrum of influential Indonesians in
an effort to instill confidence that we intend to maintain our
presence in Asia and to fully keep our treaty commitments. Round-ups
of American opinion from periodicals, statements of Congressmen and
American notables outside the USG
which focus on support for continued American presence in Asia would
be most useful.
Singapore
It is not so much the loss of Indochina which concerns the
Singaporeans as the perceived loss of a sense of proportion by the
US administration and
indications that our failure in Viet Nam would place serious
limitations on world-wide US
capabilities. We should focus our programming on the benefits
accruing from the end of our involvement; hoping that we have all
learned the lesson that America is not omnipotent and that other
nations cannot rely on Uncle Sam to do what they should be doing
themselves. Our emphasis should be on how we snap back from defeat
and the various inputs into making a new and realistic foreign
policy.
Kuala Lumpur
The US “failure” in Indochina serves
to strengthen the Malaysian argument for neutralization of Southeast
Asia. Faced with the reality that American military power is
ineffective in dealing with subversion and insurgency of the type
present in Malaysia, respect remains only for American military
power to deter global war and promote disarmament. Confidence in
US economic power, technological
and scientific
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capability,
and our leadership role in seeking solutions for world economic and
social problems remains. Our emphasis should now be in demonstrating
American achievements and leadership ability in these fields,
highlighting the strengths of American society.
Hong Kong
The denouement in Indochina has left Hong Kong viewing USG as “very clearly in default.”
Until USG clarifies its policies re
China and Southeast Asia, and enunciates them at the highest levels,
the post feels it most useful to concentrate on programming
illustrating American political processes and the viability of the
American system.
Taiwan
Until the line set forth by Chiang Kai
Shek6 changes drastically, of which there are no signs
so far, the ROC will have
particular concern about USG
steadfastness vis-à-vis the PRC and
nascent Communist takeovers. The results in Indochina have
heightened the ever-present doubts on Taiwan about USG intentions and capabilities in
Asia. ROC concerns go beyond
declared Administration policy to Congressional and public
willingness to support a strong American role in international
politics. As a corollary, a stricter definition of détente on the
part of the USG may raise the
problem of generating unwarranted hope in the ROC. Unless and
until a new USG policy emerges
the post suggests continuing on its present course, with more
effort at explaining American society and the USG conception of
détente.
Burma
The USG and Burma have no mutual
commitments, but contrast between USG words and deeds re Indochina are not lost on the
Burmese. Until USG policy clarifies
post suggest emphasizing themes of vitality of American political
processes, society and culture.
Laos
Already a coalition government, and for a long time a direct factor
in the general Indochinese situation, Laos is not subject to the
same policy reassessments which haunt some other Asian countries.
American policy has been in support of coalition and stability, and
the post urges that its programming continue in the same
direction.
Australia
The Australian labor Government’s policy in recent months had tilted
considerably towards Hanoi at the expense of Saigon and had been
critical of continued US involvement
in Vietnam. This policy has
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caused considerable internal political problems for the
Whitlam7 government which are reaching
almost the crisis stage. The post believes that its highest priority
objective stated in its 1975 CPP—to encourage appreciation of the
importance of the alliance of Australia with the US and the retention of US facilities in the country—should
continue to receive priority emphasis and support. They request
Agency support for this objective which also emphasizes the
determination of the US to remain a
Pacific power and that US foreign
policy does not include a withdrawal from our commitments in this
area of the world.
New Zealand
There is a general concern on the future role of the US in the Pacific. There is belief that
the US no longer has the ability or
the desire to control events in Asia. There is also concern that the
reduced military role of the US in
the area may be followed by a paralleled aloof stance in political
and commercial contacts. Even the pronouncements by US officials following the recent ANZUS
meeting8 have not fully assured the New
Zealanders that our reassessment of policy would not produce greater
retrenchment. The post believes that its original priorities for
program emphasis are correct. Its primary objective concerns itself
with “American Foreign Policy and Balance of Power in Asia”. The
Post further feels that due to the recent events, greater emphasis
be placed on this objective.
