137. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • Lunch with Mr. Ryszard Frackiewicz, Counselor at the Polish Embassy

At lunch yesterday, Frackiewicz spent the first 20 minutes summarizing the Presidentʼs foreign policy report,2 as he understood it (highlighting the references to normalization of relations with Eastern Europe), and wondering whether our economic policy toward Eastern Europe was not in contradiction with the basic thrust. He said he could not understand why we seemed to treat Eastern Europe the same way as the USSR (in contrast to the Johnson Administrationʼs different treatment of different Communists) and why we were not granting Romania MFN. I said the Presidentʼs view of East-West trade was outlined in the Report and that as a practical matter economic policies were in fact tailored to different situations. Basically, however, we doubted that economic contacts would lead to great political breakthroughs; more likely, political progress would lay a more solid foundation for greater commercial contact.

Frackiewicz then turned to Polish-German negotiations and stressed how important it was for the US and other allies to encourage the Germans to settle the Oder-Neisse, including necessary amendments to the Paris Agreements.3 I took occasion to tell him that the Poles would make a bad mistake if they tried to play the Western allies off against each other on this question. I had been very disturbed to learn that Mr. Kissingerʼs general comments to the Polish Ambassador about our support for German-Polish reconciliation had been passed on to the Germans by Polish officials in a version that had us supporting the Polish interpretation of Potsdam.4 I also noted that an American journalist in Washington had told me that Mr. Kissingerʼs alleged comments had also been passed to newspapermen by the Poles. [Page 324] I said that this sort of thing made private conversations very difficult and could not help the cause of Polish-German agreement. Frackiewicz professed to be shocked by what I told him and said he could not imagine that any Polish official could have been guilty of an indiscretion. I said I hoped that no further attempts would be made to use us in order to undercut the German position in the Warsaw talks.

On the substance of the matter, I reiterated that we welcomed German-Polish reconciliation and, indeed, would consider it of historic significance. I personally hoped that the complex juridical questions involved could be settled although it seemed doubtful to me that the maximum Polish demands provided a suitable basis.

Frackiewicz then wondered whether we had cooled on the idea of normalization of German relations with the East. I said our position was as stated in the Presidentʼs Report. He returned to the theme that we should press the Germans to move on the Oder-Neisse. I said a matter of this kind cannot be resolved by pressure but only in a natural way involving substantial acceptance by the parties concerned of what was being done. I added that if at some point the Germans and the allies considered it desirable to examine the juridical issues among themselves then this would presumably take place in the normal course of events. But pressure would not be likely to bring about such an examination.

I then briefly raised the question why the Poles, after all that had happened to them at the hands of the Germans and the Russians over the centuries placed so much faith in formal agreements about borders. Frackiewicz said that if the Poles let themselves become the prisoners of their history they might as well go out of existence. But he agreed that even without an agreement with the FRG, Poland had ample relations with that country in the economic, technical and cultural fields.

Toward the end of the lunch, Frackiewicz asked about the status of our decision on Polish shipping into the Great Lakes. I said it did not appear, contrary to earlier indications, that a favorable decision would be forthcoming soon.5

HS
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger and a copy was sent to Ash. Copies were also sent to Haig and Lord.
  2. For the relevant excerpts from the Presidentʼs annual report on U.S. foreign policy, presented to Congress on February 18, 1970, see Document 7.
  3. The Paris Agreements, signed on October 23, 1954, among other things, ended the postwar occupation of Germany. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 424–436.
  4. See Documents 133 and 134.
  5. See footnote 4, Document 133.