Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

136. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Ambassador to Poland (Stoessel)¹

Washington, March 9, 1970.

Dear Walt:

I have read with much interest your thought-provoking letter of February 25 concerning the Oder-Neisse line.² I am glad you did not hesitate to send in your views. They have been a stimulus to our thinking on this sensitive issue.

As I read it, your letter makes two basic proposals. First, the U.S. should be prepared to encourage the FRG, including Brandt himself, to be forthcoming in negotiating on this issue. We should use our influence with the Germans if an impasse were to develop in FRG-Polish talks. Second, the U.S. ought not overemphasize the legal aspects of the frontier question to the detriment of achieving a satisfactory political solution and should be prepared to sacrifice unessential legal desiderata to this end.

On the first point, the Department has made it clear that we hope the FRG-Polish talks will succeed in eliminating the Oder-Neisse issue as an impediment to improved relations. I assume that by encouraging the FRG, however, you mean something more than this. You will already have received [Emory] Coby Swankʼs letter of February 26³ (which crossed yours in the mail), in which he pointed out the importance of our not conveying any impression of undercutting the FRG in its bilateral negotiations. The Germans will have to make up their own minds on how to handle this issue and, except where our treaty rights and obligations are directly involved, I do not believe that we should try either to spur them or to restrain them. As you point out, the FRG seems to be moving along well at present. Should an impasse in FRG-Polish negotiations develop over this subject, we could review our thinking, but even in those circumstances I do not believe we should volunteer unsolicited advice. The effect of such advice on German domestic political considerations, once it became publicly known, could do serious harm to U.S.-German relations.

The considerations you set forth on the U.S. attitude towards any FRG-Polish agreement are well taken. I fully agree that we should not overemphasize legal aspects per se to the detriment of a satisfactory political solution. We hope that a way can be found which will satisfy the political requirements of both negotiating parties without doing violence to our own substantial interest in the continuing validity of wartime and postwar agreements on Germany. In general, I concur that we should show as much flexibility as is consonant with our own vital interests in dealing with any solution that may develop from the German-Polish negotiations.

You recommend specifically that we take the “Belgian route” in dealing with the problem, whereby the contracting parties would state that the border is final between themselves without referring to the eventual peace settlement as foreseen by the Potsdam Agreement. In this case you recommend that the Allies come forward with notes of consent, establishing for the record our view that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await a peace settlement. I would tend to agree with you that if we were to treat a hypothetical FRG-Polish agreement in the same manner as we did the FRG agreements with the Benelux countries, we would not have sacrificed essential legal points. From the political standpoint, however, I wonder if such an approach would satisfy the Polish demand for a definitive agreement. Since our reservations would become public, it seems quite plausible that the Poles in such an event would be unhappy with us, though perhaps not with the FRG. It is just for this reason that I agree with Cobyʼs point that we should not now mislead the Poles into thinking we would automatically and unconditionally accept and support whatever agreement the Germans and Poles might make.

Another variant, as suggested in L/EURʼs memorandum of December 10, 1969, might be to seek some Four Power agreement recommending that the eventual German peace settlement adopt the Oder-Neisse Line as the final boundary between Germany and Poland. While I do not believe we would wish to take any sort of initiative to promote this point, we could respond favorably to some FRG-Polish proposal to this effect,⁴ assuming of course that the Soviet Union would be willing to endorse such a recommendation.

I hope that this letter will lead you to the conclusion that even though unwilling to put pressure on the FRG, we are open-minded about how we could support any solution the Germans and Poles might reach, while at the same time safeguarding essential Allied legal rights stemming from valid international agreements which have important implications beyond the Polish border question.

Elliot Richardson is, as you surmised, very interested in this subject and I have sent him copies of your letter and this reply. You will have noted Stateʼs 24567⁵ reporting his conversation with the German Ambassador on the Polish-FRG talks.⁶

Sincerely,

Marty

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72. Secret;Limdis; Official–Informal. This letter is attached to a March 21 letter from Stoessel to Hillenbrand. Copies were sent to Richardson and to Fessenden in Bonn. A handwritten notation in an unknown hand on the first page reads: “A useful response—ret: AMB.”
2. Document 135.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72)
4. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “interesting.”
5. A comment in margin reads: “attached.” Telegram 24567 to Bonn, February 17, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US.
6. In a March 21 letter to Hillenbrand, Stoessel responded: “I appreciated your letter of March 9, responding to mine of February 25 on the Oder-Neisse question. Your comments are well-taken and do indeed lead me to the conclusion that our official position is open-minded and flexible.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72)