Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

138. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Polish Ambassador, Michalowski, May 26

The Ambassador came in at his initiative prior to returning home for consultations. His main purpose was to complain about the poor state of bilateral relations. He cited our failure to grant the Poles access to Great Lakes ports for their shipping line² and our delay in granting a license for a fluid catalytic cracking plant.³ He said that he had always been a strong advocate of better US-Polish economic relations but that these developments undermined his credibility in Warsaw.

I said that after careful consideration it had not proved possible to change our regulations with respect to the ports; this was of course not applicable just to Poland but to other East European countries as well. I told him that I was not informed about the cracking plant license but would try to find out where it stood. (Michalowski said he had heard it was being reviewed in the White House.) In general, I said that prospects for major changes in our legislation or in economic relations did not appear to me to be promising as long as the Vietnam war continued. I added that in any case Poland was pretty well off since it had MFN and other aspects of our relations (e.g. scientific and cultural exchanges) seemed to be progressing well.

Michalowski said that MFN was of course helpful but the Poles found that they could not spend the money they earned by their exports because of our refusal to license US exports of the type of industrial equipment the Poles wanted. He, Michalowski, had urged Polish economic planners to provide for cooperation with the US in the new five-year plan but that now it seemed this was an illusion. Michalowski went on to say that Vietnam had already lasted five years and would probably last five years more; that was a long time to wait for better relations, especially since the Poles could do nothing to bring about peace in Vietnam. Michalowski professed to be especially pessimistic because recent US actions in Indochina would only serve to harden DRV and VC positions and probably rule out a negotiated settlement. Michalowski went on at some length about the importance of decoupling economic relations from political ones. Reverting to the cracking plant, Michalowski said that this was really the test case from which Poland would determine whether it could expect any significant economic assistance from the US. It wanted such assistance (at least many in Warsaw did) not as a gift or favor but on a purely commercial basis. He personally felt it important that the US be among Polandʼs significant economic partners.

I said we felt on the whole that improved economic relations with the East would have the most solid basis if they flowed from better political relations. Soviet practice, certainly, had shown repeatedly how deteriorating political relations serve to disrupt economic ones (viz. what they did to Yugoslavia, Albania, China, Romania and Poland itself). This did not mean that we opposed a certain level of activity; on the contrary. But I did not see any prospect for major changes under present circumstances. Michalowski said that his return to Warsaw in these circumstances would be a rather sad one.

We briefly talked about the Rome NATO meeting at which I said there probably would be a statement on MBFR.⁴ Michalowski asked whether there would be anything on a conference, which the Poles still believed was a desirable goal. He also asked whether there would be specific proposal on MBFR. I said that MBFR was a complex subject on which a good deal of preparatory work still needed to be done; but NATO was probably ready to express more vigorously its interest in talks with the East on it. As regards a conference, I said there were different approaches among the NATO allies on this and I could not say at this point precisely how the NATO communiqué would deal with it. My own personal view continued to be that we should concentrate on issues rather than procedure. Michalowski said there ought to be active preparatory work for a conference.

As regards the Polish-German talks, Michalowski felt that a good deal of progress had been made and he felt there was now some prospect of success especially if at the right time the Germans received some encouragement from the US. He said the Poles were still not quite satisfied with the FRG formula on the Oder-Neisse since it still fell short of “final recognition.” There also was a hitch in Polish-German economic negotiations. All told, he felt that it would probably not be until the autumn that both these negotiations would be crowned with success. In his view, Brandt was unlikely to give more ground before the Land elections in June, although a Polish delegation would be going to Bonn for more talks before then.

I said we continued to be in favor of German-Polish reconciliation. I foresaw no serious problem for us if the Poles and Germans agreed on a frontier formula. We were not going to inject ourselves into the talks, however. I asked if diplomatic relations would be established once the agreement had been settled. Michalowski said not right away; there still were psychological inhibitions in Poland. Eventually, however, this would occur.

Michalowski asked if I was optimistic on SALT. I said I had tried to avoid using words like optimistic and pessimistic, but that in my 20-year experience with disarmament negotiations, I felt that SALT had gotten off to the best start. The problems were complex ones and much hard work was ahead. Michalowski said he was encouraged by the fact that SALT was progressing despite the bad international situation. I said disarmament talks over the years had occasionally made progress while the political climate was bad (e.g. the NPT and the test ban treaty shortly after the Cuban missile crisis); the pattern of interrelationships was not clear-cut. We had of course never put forward specific political preconditions for holding SALT but clearly on this crucial set of security issues there was bound to be a connection with the over-all US-Soviet relationship. Michalowski said we should treat economic relations the way we seemed to treat SALT—carry on regardless of political difficulties.

The conversation ended with Michalowski again bemoaning the unfortunate state of our relations and his “sadness” in returning to Warsaw with empty hands.

Note: The license application for the Polish cracking plant is being considered in the normal fashion. State, Commerce and DuBridge are evidently in favor; Interior and Defense have reservations. Mr. Downey of this office has informed the Polish Ambassador (May 27) that the application was under active consideration but that we are not in a position to indicate what the outcome will be. The Ambassador noted he had neglected to mention two points during his conversation with me: The Poles are ready to offer assurances that (a) the cracking plant would not be used to produce fuel for jets, but only for automobiles, and that (b) the technology of the plant will not be transferred to third countries. He expressed the hope that a favorable answer would await him on his return to Washington on June 9.

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger and a copy was sent to Ash. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.
2. See footnote 4, Document 133.
3. In telegram 1825 from Warsaw, July 2, Stoessel reported: “Recent high-level Polish representations have convinced me that a broad spectrum of US-Polish relations could be adversely affected by a negative decision on the pending export license application for the fluid catalytic cracking process…. [T]he Poles have repeatedly stated that the decision on the catalytic cracker will be regarded as a test case of the US Governmentʼs trade policy vis-à-vis Poland and of the seriousness of its professed interest to develop and expand trade relations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971)
4. The North Atlantic Council approved a special “Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions” at its meeting in Rome May 26–27. The text of the declaration is in NATO: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971), p. 380.