Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

133. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Polish Ambassadorʼs Conversation with Mr. Kissinger February 3

The Ambassador came in for a talk that had had to be rescheduled several times.

After some opening discussion of Polish attitudes toward Germany in which the Ambassador noted that it was hard to convince the older generation of the feasibility of good relations with Bonn, Mr. Kissinger asked why the Poles then placed so much faith in German renunciation of territorial claims. He² said this was a political necessity and was required to make establishment of relations possible. He said that the US could contribute by telling the FRG that we wanted an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger said that we had made clear that we want reconciliation between Poland and the FRG. Michalowski said this was not enough. Mr. Kissinger said that we would present no obstacle to Polish-German understanding. He went on to comment that most border disputes these days seemed to be inside the Communist world.³ Michalowski agreed but said with a smile that these problems were not geographically close to Poland. As the saying went in Warsaw, there was a big buffer state between Poland and China.

Michalowski said that Mr. Kissingerʼs remark about not presenting obstacles was important. German-Polish relations were very important for Europe generally and their improvement was a stepping stone to a European conference. Kissinger asked how the Soviets felt about the Polish-German talks. Michalowski said they were encouraging the Poles; but they were worried the US was not doing enough for Europe as a whole and for a conference. Mr. Kissinger responded that no one had really told us what a conference would accomplish. Why have a conference to restate the obvious? We were not hostile toward it, but what was it for? Michalowski said it was the best means to improve the situation. The Poles were working on additional agenda items. A system was needed to replace the division of Europe. Mr. Kissinger asked how.

Michalowski responded that cooperation was needed in every field. Both the US and the USSR belonged to Europe. What was needed was a regional security system with a range of measures on all aspects—non-use of force, assistance for victims of aggression, recognition of borders, etc. Two-power agreements were not enough. Czechoslovakia would never have happened if there was no division. (Mr. Kissinger had interjected how a problem like Czechoslovakia would be dealt with in the system Michalowski was describing.) A new Europe was needed and the process had to be started. There could either be one or several conferences. Mr. Kissinger concluded that we would watch developments and would not oppose a meaningful eventual conference. Michalowski rejoined that the US used to work actively against a conference.

Before ending the meeting because of another commitment, Mr. Kissinger noted that Michalowski presumably wanted to talk mostly about bilateral relations. Michalowski said these were favorable; there were no conflicts. The only problems were economic. It was agreed that at a future meeting, bilateral relations would be reviewed.

In leaving, Michalowski asked about the status of our review of Port Security regulations.⁴ He said he had heard the papers were on Mr. Kissingerʼs desk. Mr. Kissinger said he would look into the status. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said the matter was moving along; while he could make no promises, he was hopeful that there would be a resolution that the Poles would find helpful. They would of course be informed as soon as the matter had been decided.

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger. A typed notation indicates that Hillenbrand received a copy directly from Sonnenfeldt.
2. Michalowski. [Footnote in the original.]
3. Reference is to the Ussuri River boundary dispute between China and the Soviet Union. Armed clashes between the two states began in February. After further clashes and a military build-up, negotiations opened in Beijing in October.
4. Reference is to a Polish request for clearance to permit its ships to port in the Great Lakes. See Documents 8, 13, 15, and 16.