Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

132. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, September 24, 1969, 1735Z.

Secto 41/3189. Subject: Secretaryʼs Meeting with Polish FonMin, Sept. 23.²

Following summary based on uncleared memcon,³ Noforn and FYI only subject to revision upon review.

Jedrychowski started by saying Polish policy was to improve relations with all nations. US-Polish relations were improving and were especially favorable in economic and cultural fields. He believed major difficulties had been eliminated in our talks on consular convention and said he hoped signature could take place soon. Jedrychowski termed certain financial problems which two countries had settled “too insignificant to mention here.” Poland intended to make more use of US technology, he said. In next two years Poland would not be able to afford purchases of industrial capital goods because of outstanding debts. Starting in 1971 Poland could increase purchases from US, particularly of complete industrial plants, as part of five-year plan now being formulated. Jedrychowski said total investment in period 1971–75 would be equivalent to investment of previous 19 years and total 1,250,000,000,000 zlotys or 30 to 35 billion dollars. Jedrychowski cited two obstacles to increased purchases from US: (a) US embargo—Poles never know which items will be turned down and (b) credit offered in US not comparable with that offered in Western Europe. He pointed to amendment to Ex-Im Bank charter⁴ which prevented Poles from making use of ExIm guarantees for purchases in US. Jedrychowski requested Secretary to look into possibility of modifying Ex-Im Bank policy so Poland could come into US market in bigger way in future.

2. Secretary assured Jedrychowski we also wished to improve relations. President still remembered warm reception he had received from Polish people when he was Vice President. He asked for reaction in Poland to Apollo 11 flight. M Jedrychowski said reaction was one of great appreciation and respect for US achievement. Polish people were well informed of all details of Apollo mission. Secretary commented: “Not as in some other Communist countries.” Jedrychowski said he didnʼt know. He thought some Communist states were late in presenting TV transmission because of technical or financial reasons but that situation had been corrected later and coverage provided.

3. Secretary asked for report on Polish-Chinese relations. Jedrychowski pointed to one profitable joint enterprise: Polish-Chinese company of shipping brokers. Trade between two countries was down, however. Jedrychowski said China was one of those big powers which considered trade to be just a function of foreign policy. This was case with USG or at least with some US Congressmen. Poland tried to separate ideology from formal relations with other states. For example, Poland had correct trade relations with Albania.

4. Jedrychowski said ideological questions would be no problem between US and Poland but for shadow cast on our relations by war in Vietnam. Poland was interested in seeing Vietnam war come to peaceful settlement. Jedrychowski wanted to assure US both North Vietnam and “Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam” have necessary good will to bring war to end. Their own national interests and their geographic location declare this. NLF 10-point proposal⁵ has many elements which offer basis for negotiations. Many of points are formulated in general terms and are flexible. There are just two postulates on which US must agree: withdrawal of US troops and agreement that new Government South Vietnam be based on coalition of national “patriotic elements.”

5. Secretary welcomed FonMinʼs comments on Poland but said he did not in least agree with his commentary on Vietnam. There was no sign from other side that they desire settlement or even to discuss settlement. We have made clear fact that we are prepared to discuss. Other side has made no proposal except that we get out and that they be able to provide government officials to run Government of South Vietnam. These proposals are clearly unacceptable. We are prepared to negotiate and would welcome opportunity to talk. We would be pleased to have officials from Communist governments take part in supervisory force during time of free elections in South Vietnam. Jedrychowski said other side would agree to national elections but not under international supervision and not under “unilateral South Vietnamese Government.” There must be new coalition government with broad base of support, he maintained.

6. Secretary said this kind of talk tends to sour relations between our two countries. If North Vietnam wanted to discuss this question, that would be one thing. However, he did not welcome Polish presentation on behalf of North Vietnamese. Jedrychowski said that this was Polesʼ own initiative; President Nixon in GA speech has asked for help in ending war.⁶ Secretary said he did not find Polish remarks helpful. Jedrychowski asked what was way out. Secretary said President had made answer quite clear. Polish FonMin said question of prestige on both sides made solution difficult. In case of small nation such as North Vietnam there was even more sensitivity than in case of great nation. North Vietnam was trying to find face-saving solution.

7. Jedrychowski turned to subject of Europe. Poland advocated policy of collective security which could assure Poland and other European nations opportunity for peaceful development. This policy was in tune with Budapest appeal for ESC.⁷ Secretary said we were curious to know how Poles envisaged ESC would work. Jedrychowski replied that ESC should draw up all-European agreement on security and cooperation. This would guarantee to all European nations respect for (a) their national independence, (b) their territorial integrity, (c) their national borders, and (d) their internal affairs. Secretary asked if that included Czechoslovakia; if it did, we might be interested.

Jedrychowski said it did. Czech “affair”⁸ arose from insecurity and instability in Europe. We should understand throughout Polish history Czechoslovakia had always been place from which attacks were launched on Poles. In 1939 Nazis had launched three-pronged attack on them. South prong came from Czechoslovakia. Secretary asked if Poland was expecting attack from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Polish FonMin said no, but Poles had serious apprehensions that Czechoslovakia could serve again as base for attacks. Secretary asked if this apprehension justified their first attacking Czechoslovakia. Jedrychowski said Poland and Czechoslovakia had been bound by close alliance. Perhaps if all countries in Europe had recognized existing boundaries and if revisionist tendencies inside Czechoslovakia had not been present, situation might have been different. Despite 25 years since Potsdam Conference, Western boundaries of Poland were still questioned by some states. FRG maintains it has legal right to take up at any time question of Polish borders. Unfortunately, US and UK encourage this policy on part of Germans. Of major Western powers only France has clearly recognized Polandʼs western boundaries as final.

8. Secretary said he would be glad to discuss any sensible plan for reduction of East-West tensions. We were still considering matter of ESC. Jedrychowski said that in course of preparations for ESC questions to be discussed will be clarified and agenda developed. ESC would reduce tensions and improve situation in Europe. As Polish contribution to European security considerations they had proposed to FRG an agreement which would recognize Polish western borders and in itself lead to normalization of relations with FRG. Jedrychowski said Poles were ready to discuss. He asked US use influence with FRG to obtain recognition of final character of western borders and to obtain German signature of NPT.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 POL. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to Warsaw, London, Paris, Moscow, and Prague.
2. In telegram 2648 from Warsaw, August 20, Stoessel reported that Winiewicz had requested the scheduling of a meeting between Rogers and Jedrychowski, who would be attending the UN General Assembly in September. (Ibid.)
3. Memoranda of conversation are ibid., Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 30S1B, CF 397—24th UNGA, Sept 1969, Memcons II.
4. Reference is to the Findley Amendment, adopted October 18, 1966, as a rider to the 1967 Export-Import Bank appropriations bill. It forbade the Bank to make loans to any Communist Bloc state without a Presidential determination that such action was in the national interest. For the text of the relevant portion of P.L. 89–691, approved October 15, 1966, see 80 Stat. 1024.
5. For the text of the peace plan, May 8, see Keesingʼs Contemporary Archives, 1968–1969, p. 23653. For documentation on the North Vietnamese proposal and U.S. reaction, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Documents 67 ff.
6. For text of the September 18 address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 724–731.
7. Reference is to a communiqué issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at the conclusion of its March 17 meeting. For relevant portions, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1035–1037.
8. Reference is to Polish participation in the Warsaw Pact military invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.