Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

13. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Port Security

In early January you sent a memo to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Transportation, the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence seeking their concurrence in a revision of the U.S. Port Security Program originally proposed by State. Their comments and general concurrence were received before the end of January. You sent a memorandum to the President in mid-March (Tab C)² noting that the basic suggested changes in the program were:

• —the elimination of the automatic requirement for continuous Coast Guard surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels calling at U.S. ports, and
• —removal of the blanket restrictions which currently permit Soviet bloc vessels to call at only 12 U.S. ports (no port on the Great Lakes).

The NSDM, which you recommended the President approve, also assigned to the Secretary of Transportation the responsibility to promulgate the detailed port security program, in close consultation with State, Defense, Justice and the CIA.

The President disapproved the recommendation, and noted that he would not approve “unless and until there is direct Soviet reciprocity when we do it.” In recent months there has been increasing interest in resolving this issue: the Poles have been pressing for permission to enter the Great Lakes (the Ambassador has raised this with you).³ Congressmen from that area have strongly urged similar action, particularly as the St. Lawrence Seaway revenues are declining, and State has gently pressed for a response. I understand that during lunch on June 2, the Attorney General inquired about the status of this issue, and that you offered to provide him with a report.

In disapproving the NSDM, the President perhaps did not focus on the fact that the restrictions imposed by the Soviets on the entry of U.S. ships to their ports were instituted in retaliation for the restrictions we first placed on their port entry. The Soviets have repeatedly proposed improvements in our bilateral maritime relations, and Gromyko took this up directly with Secretary Rogers. In addition, the proposed NSDM did not provide for an automatic opening of new ports for the Soviets (or for the Eastern Europeans), but indicated that Defense and Justice should concur in the opening of any additional ports to ensure adequate protection of sensitive defense facilities.

To step up the momentum on this issue, and to respect the Presidentʼs instruction that reciprocity must prevail with respect to relaxing the restrictions on Soviet port entry, it would seem desirable to provide the President with a revised NSDM fully reflecting his wishes but which permits the agencies to implement the operation without further delay. A memo for the President containing such a revised NSDM is at Tab A.⁴ At Tab B is a memo for the Attorney General providing a status report on the general port security issue.⁵ Note: The memo for the Attorney General is written on the assumption that you will also sign the memo to the President.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo for the President at Tab A, and the memo for the Attorney General at Tab B.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 369, Subject Files, U.S. Port Security Program. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Ash.
2. Printed as Document 8.
3. See Document 133.
4. Printed as Document 15.
5. Attached but not printed.
6. On June 16 Winston Lord forwarded to Kissinger Sonnenfeldtʼs memorandum on port security, along with a memorandum from Russell Ash of the NSC staff on the same subject. “Ashʼs primary difference with Sonnenfeldt,” Lord wrote, “is that he sees no documentary proof that the Soviet restrictions were in retaliation to our own and that they are likely to relax them as we relax ours. Sonnenfeldt believes that both these facts are true, but says that it is primarily a judgment call on Soviet motivations. In either event, we will find out when we insist on Soviet reciprocity and the Presidentʼs objective would be protected.” At the top of Lordʼs memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “Iʼve signed Tab C. Iʼm inclined to go along with Ash.” For the resulting NSDM, see Document 16.