Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

15. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon ¹

Washington, August 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Port Security Policy

Earlier this year I submitted to you a proposed NSDM reflecting suggested changes in our port security program² which had been suggested by the State Department and concurred in by the other interested agencies. The changes related to:

• —administrative matters (assignment of prime responsibility to the Secretary of Transportation);
• —the elimination of the current automatic requirement for continuous surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels while in U.S. ports, and
• —the prospect of opening additional ports to calls by Soviet and Eastern European shipping, currently restricted to 12, none of which are on the Great Lakes.

You decided not to approve the proposed NSDM, noting that there should be provision for direct Soviet reciprocity.

The Poles have expressed a very strong interest in securing permission for their vessels to call at our ports in the Great Lakes.³ In addition, members of Congress from the Lakes area have pressured to have the Great Lakes ports opened to Eastern European shipping, since they feel such a change would help the economy of that area. In late April the Soviets raised with the State Department the question of entry of two Soviet vessels at U.S. Great Lakes ports. The State Department reports that (1) prospects are good for reciprocal arrangements between the U.S. and the USSR regarding ports accessible to merchant shipping, and (2) ports of the East European countries are considered fully open to U.S. shipping.⁴

In keeping with your comment on my earlier memorandum I have revised the proposed NSDM (Tab A)⁵ expressly to provide, in Paragraph 2, page 2, that requests for the entry of Soviet and East European vessels into U.S. ports must be considered on the basis of direct reciprocity insofar as the designation of accessible ports, advance notice of arrival and frequency of port calls are concerned, but without relaxation of the U.S. port security measures provided elsewhere in the NSDM. An unknown factor is the relative U.S./Soviet volume of shipping and numbers of port calls expected for the future. (U.S. merchant shipping to Russia has been nil since 1964, while Soviet vessels have visited U.S. ports at a modest but steady rate. At this rate the Soviets can pledge reciprocity without having to grant it, if U.S. merchant vessels do not have occasion to seek entry to Russian ports.) Another unknown is the position which may be taken by some members of the International Longshoremenʼs Association who on past occasions have refused to work Soviet ships calling at U.S. ports.

The security measures prescribed in the NSDM appear to satisfy national security requirements. There is provision for interdepartmental consultation of the security risk presented by the presence of a particular Soviet or East European vessel applying for entry into a particular U.S. port. Also, denial of entry is required if information indicates that presence of a vessel in a U.S. port would constitute an unacceptable risk to the national defense and security. Depending upon the risk factor involved, a vessel may be admitted subject to, or without, continuous surveillance by the Coast Guard.

The NSDM makes no change in the present policy which excludes from all U.S. ports the vessels of Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, East Germany and Cuba.

Recommendation

That you authorize the issuance of the National Security Decision Memorandum (Tab A) revising the U.S. port security program.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 82. Secret. Sent for action.
2. See Document 8.
3. See Document 133.
4. Reported in a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, July 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 82)
5. Document 16.
6. According to the attached routing memorandum, Nixon initialed the approval option on August 29.