14. Editorial Note
On August 20, 1970, Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger submitted a memorandum to President Nixon on the sale of petroleum refining technology, including catalytic cracking plants, to Poland and Romania. Kissinger recommended that the President approve the sale of such technology to Romania because “whatever minimal strategic costs might exist seem clearly outweighed by your commitment to economic cooperation.” In the case of Poland, Kissinger recommended postponement of a decision. “The key is the signaling effect,” he wrote. “The Poles have made strong pleas for approval, describing the project as an important test case in our relations. It is clear that our decision on the license will be a major signal to them on two levels: (a) U.S. interest in participating in Polandʼs new industrialization plans, and (b) our attitude toward overall U.S.-Polish relations. Approval of the license would give a positive signal on both counts. Refusal of the license would be negative on both, particularly if coupled with approval for Romania. Deferral of the decision would be a middle course, which would be read as negative on (a) but leaving (b) essentially open.
“As long as we base our relations with Poland largely on its attitude toward Vietnam, which has not changed, I do not believe that approval is justified. They could read approval as a relaxation of our concern about their attitude on Vietnam.”
On August 26 President Richard Nixon approved Kissingerʼs recommendations to permit the sale of the refining technology to Romania and to postpone a decision in the case of Poland. For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 319.