40. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird1
SUBJECT
- Diego Garcia
I–21269/70
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify precisely the nature of your decision regarding the proposed US communications facility on Diego Garcia.
Although the attached Navy recommendation2 emphasizes communications, ISA believes that it constitutes a considerably larger installation than is politically advisable at the present time. So long as the Cam Ranh Bay Naval Communications State is in operation, there is no requirement for a strategic communications facility on Diego Garcia to link Asmara and Northwest Cape, Australia. CINCMEAFSA [Page 130] contingency operations are so unlikely that expenditure of funds to support them would not be warranted now.
Second, the proposed deep-water anchorage dredging would immediately be associated with the potential use of Diego Garcia by Polaris submarines and carrier task groups. Although obviously desirable in the event of general hostilities, this would be highly provocative at the present time. Both in public statements and privately with the UK, we have consistently denied any intention to establish a “Polaris base” at Diego Garcia. Even the appearance of doing so now would inevitably generate a drumfire of criticism from Indian Ocean littoral countries as well as in the UN, which could serve to reinforce Congressional opposition, and possibly defeat the project entirely.
Accordingly, I again recommend that you consider limiting the project on Diego Garcia to tactical communication for ships and aircraft transiting or operating in the area, [less than 1 line not declassified]. In our view, it should include only such airstrip, waterfront and POL storage facilities as are necessary for construction, and for support of these two activities. Even though the Senate proves willing to fund the entire Navy proposal, which appears doubtful, I believe that a strategic communications capability and anchorage dredging should be eliminated from any work actually undertaken there. Presumably this would result in appreciable cost and personnel reductions as well.
Even our reduced proposal would have significant foreign policy implications, and State should therefore have an opportunity to review the matter fully. Moreover, State Department support could help significantly in overcoming the opposition of such Congressional figures as Senators Mansfield and Proxmire,3 who have reservations from a foreign policy standpoint. In light of the foregoing, we would appreciate an indication of your own desires regarding Diego Garcia, before we officially approach State and advise the British regarding DOD plans.
Approve Navy 31 January recommendation, including strategic communications and anchorage dredging.
Approve ISA alterative, limited to tactical communications [less than 1 line not declassified], plus supporting airstrip and POL storage.
Other4
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Indian Ocean 1970. Secret.↩
- Not attached. The proposal is in a memorandum from Chafee to Laird, January 31. (Ibid.)↩
- Senate Majority Leader William Proxmire (D–WI).↩
- There is no indication on the memorandum of Laird’s action.↩