Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

329. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 26, 1970, 1941Z.

159035. For Chief of Mission.

1. We note that within Arab world Arab leadership and public media are taking the line that Hussein is responsible for the bloodshed in Jordan and that resulting deep feelings mean that there can be no reconciliation and that he is “finished”.

2. From the history of the past months it is clear that Hussein exercised maximum restraint in attempting to avoid confrontation and to coexist with Palestinian movements on the basis of agreements which invariably were violated by uncontrolled elements within Palestinian complex. If there are villains in Jordan tragedy they are clearly George Habbash, Hawatmeh and others in leadership of extremist groups.

3. We hope that you can get across in your contacts with Arab leaders and representatives that while it is understandable that feelings are deep when such bloodshed has been involved, we believe Hussein forced into situation by Maoist-inclined forces among Palestinians, and that he is fully capable of putting his house in order and maintaining the broad support of his entire population.

4. Arab and western press has posed question in terms of loyal Bedouin forces versus the Palestinians. Fact of the matter is that Hussein’s army is made up of 55 percent Palestinians. Moreover there is no evidence that PFLP and Fatah in fact reflect the broad consensus of the Palestinians. There are still many Palestinians who favor a political solution, though we recognize that when radicals take the lead it makes it hard for the more moderate elements not to follow.

5. In the days ahead we hope that you can help maintain this view. Jordan Ambassador here is convinced that in a week or so a more moderate approach to Jordan will develop among the Arabs.

6. We are particularly concerned at hard line Nasser and UAR media have taken toward Hussein. It is hard for us to conceive that UAR’s interest would be served by replacement of Hussein by Baathi supported radical Palestinian-dominated regime or regimes. This would have resulted in an indefinite postponement of further peacemaking efforts since it is highly unlikely that there would have been anyone with whom peace could have been made in Jordan.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Davies; cleared by Seelye; and approved by Davies. It was sent Priority to Amman, and was also sent to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and USUN.