Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

31. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

• CIA Analysis of Soviet Covert Activity in Mideast

Two weeks ago Al Haig sent CIA some questions (Tab A)² about possible Soviet covert involvement in recent events in various parts of the Middle East—such as the upheavals in Morocco and the Sudan, Libya’s efforts to buy off Malta, Soviet pressure on Ethiopia via threats of increased aid to Somalia and the Sudan, and the Cyprus situation. Our staff seemed skeptical about the degree of Soviet involvement, and Al wanted an independent judgment. He also wanted to know if the Russians have stepped up their covert action program lately.

CIA has come back with its answers (Tab B),³ which boil down to the following:

• —Soviet covert operations increased in the first year after the 1967 war. But events since Nasser’s death “are all manifestations of trends in the Arab world that are not only not stimulated by Moscow but in general add up to a set-back for the Soviet covert action capacity” in the area.
• —Specifically, CIA sees the Moroccan and Sudanese upheavals and Libyan actions as internally generated, with no evidence of Soviet collusion.⁴ “There is no evidence” that Soviet military aid to Sudan and Somalia is “designed to intimidate Haile Selassie,” although it does “serve to put pressures on him” (a subtle distinction!). And Moscow has been cautious on Cyprus, for fear of upsetting the Greeks and particularly the Turks.
• —CIA believes that “in the past year the Soviets have, for the first time in more than a decade, been forced by events into a defensive covert action posture.” The Soviets sustained an offensive over the previous decade that was generally successful, but their capability has now suffered serious setbacks—Sadat’s move in May against the pro-Moscow elite in Cairo; extensive damage to the influence of the pro-Soviet WFTU in the Egyptian and Sudanese labor movements. In general, “the political tide is running against the USSR” in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, and the Soviets are encountering “other problems” (unspecified) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula.
• —In conclusion, CIA believes that the situation in the Mediterranean and Mideast is, “from a U.S. viewpoint, now more favorable for covert action as a means of achieving limited U.S. objectives than it has been for some years.”

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East General, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Rodman. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is an August 12 memorandum from Tom La timer, White House Staff, to Cord Meyer, Acting Deputy Director for Plans, CIA.
3. Attached but not printed at Tab B is an August 19 memorandum from Meyer to Latimer, which enclosed an August 18 report. An attached note reads, “File—White House side of street only.”
4. References are to a failed coup in Morocco and a successful mid-July coup in Sudan. The August 18 CIA report enclosed at Tab B concluded that the Soviets may have had insight and been supportive of the coups but were not involved. There was no evidence that Libya and the USSR were working “hand-in-glove in the Mediterranean.” The report also noted that Qadhafi’s offer to Malta of $10 million annually for 10 years, and an offer to import skilled Maltese labor and technicians in return for eliminating British military bases on Malta was consistent with Qadhafi’s stated intentions to eliminate all foreign military bases from the Mediterranean. This ran counter to Soviet rejection of the idea that both the United States and the USSR leave the Mediterranean.