Office of the Historian

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

Washington, September 22, 1970, 0017Z.

155165. SANDSTORM. Hold for action officer opening of business Sept 22. Subject: Syrian Intervention in Jordan.

1.
Sisco met with Rabin late afternoon Sept 21. Read him King’s answer to Allon (Amman 5023)2 and Rifai comments3 (Sisco cautioned Rabin re Rifai fluctuations from euphoria to depression and back.)
2.
Sisco said he wanted to explore with Rabin another possible option in addition to those discussed this morning, i.e., an Israeli operation from Golan Heights to relieve pressure on Jordanians. This would be an operation in Syria rather than in Jordan.
3.
Rabin said as he had said to Sisco earlier it would be quite an operation to undertake in Jordan since 300 Syrian tanks was quite a considerable number. This was why an air strike just was not sufficient. Sisco said he had reported this. Rabin said such an operation ran the risk not only of Syrian reaction but also Iraqi, and possibly Egyptian reaction. Nothing of small size, Rabin said, would take care of 300 Syrian tanks. Rabin said he was opposed in principle to diversionary move if it was not aimed ultimately at source of problem, namely Syrian tanks in Irbid/Ramtha area.
4.
Rabin noted Sisco had earlier today said that strike into Syria would be risky politically.4 Sisco said that he had reference to this being riskier vis-à-vis Soviets in light of their special interest in Syria, From Jordanian angle, operation outside its country more politically attractive and less injurious to King’s position. Sisco said any move outside Jordan would be less problem for King. Rabin asked whether this was an estimate. Sisco answered in affirmative. Rabin agreed with this judgment. Rabin then discussed topography and strategy, noting that perhaps best route would be direct across Jordan River south of Lake Tiberius. It was possible a strike to the north from Golan Heights would by threatening Syrian supply lines force Syrian units to withdraw from Jordan, but he doubted this. If this did not result in Syrian withdrawal, then Israelis would have to go south to strike at them.
5.
At end of conversation after discussing other subjects, Rabin commented there really three options; i.e., direct thrust at Irbid/ Ramtha, or sweeping movement from north out of Golan or combination of two. Pursuant to Sisco’s request, Rabin agreed to query Jerusalem re alternative option calling for Israeli move into Syria. Chargé should follow up.
Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on September 21 by Stackhouse; cleared by Atherton; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Amman. Passed to the White House.↩
  2. See footnote 7, Document 304.↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 305.↩
  4. See Document 302.↩