300. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of State Rogers, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)1

R: Joe’s on the line too. We have to touch base on how we will do this discussion with Rabin.

K: I think State should do it. Joe, so you will not—

R: He will do it and he will ask him to come in now. He will tell you exactly what we will say.

S: What do you think we should say?

K: What the Secy. proposes—we agree in principle and would like to review later in the day. We have passed it to the King and if he disagrees, we would want to consider that. It must succeed and we have preference for air action but if it must be coupled we will go with that. And confine it to Jordan.

S: That’s all the points I have.

R: We haven’t conveyed it to the King. We are conveying it.

K: Bill, you may not have seen it. We have a flash from Brown which says that in the King’s mind, ground action is different.2 We need the King’s thinking exactly.

R: We will pass this message right away3 and it should take care of it.

K: Send out the flash and try to get the King’s thinking. By the meeting this afternoon.

R: We will if we can reach the King. I can’t believe the King will [omission in the original] without knowing the intentions of the troops.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.
  2. Telegram 5008 from Amman, September 21, 1345Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)
  3. In telegram 154488 to Amman, September 21, 1545Z, the Department asked Brown to ascertain Hussein’s reaction to Israeli ground intervention. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)