196. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
YAR–PDRY: WAR CLOUDS DARKEN
RNAN–36
Full-scale war between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) seems to be increasingly more imminent. Although both sides still seem to be hoping to avoid a major clash, they are preparing for the worst.
No Apparent Let-Up in Skirmishing. PDRY forces, which took and then relinquished the YAR border town of Qa’tabah on October 1–2, have continued to shell the town. PDRY aircraft reportedly bombed Qa’tabah and also the Harib area to the northeast on October 12. (See map.)2 The YAR, for its part, appears to be moving troops south toward the PDRY border. On the same day, PDRY accused the YAR of massing troops near Perim Island, located in the entrance to the Red Sea. A subsequent report indicated that the YAR had actually begun to shell Perim on October 11 from the YAR mountains overlooking the island. YAR Prime Minister al Ayni, the most dovish figure in the YAR government, told a French newsman that both Perim and Kamaran Island, which the YAR had seized October 6, belonged to the YAR. [Page 592] President al Iryani has also made this claim. In the meantime, there were indications that the insurgents, collectively termed the National Unity Front (NUF), hoped to persuade the PDRY troops on Perim to surrender in the same manner as did those on Kamaran.
Elsewhere, YAR tribal forces, army units, and insurgent forces have been gathering at several major points along the YAR–PDRY border: a large tribal force funded and equipped by the Saudis is gathering at Harib; a 600-man force of regular YAR troops arrived in Baydah on October 12; and about 15,000 troops, commanded by the YAR’s best officers, are gathering south of Ta’iz on the Ta’iz–Aden road.
YAR Frantically Shaping Up Its Forces. In the last few weeks, the YAR has been busily trying to upgrade its poorly trained and under-equipped armed forces. On October 11, IL–28 bombers and MIG–17 fighters, together with a large quantity of spare parts, reportedly arrived in the YAR, presumably from Egypt and possibly at Libyan urging. (Egypt promised some IL–28s to the YAR some time ago.) The spare parts were to make operational YAR aircraft that had been grounded for lack of spare parts. Only two of the YAR’s eight IL–28s and four of its 12 MIG–17s were flyable prior to the airlift. Another report stated that there was a feverish effort by the YAR to overhaul several of its IL–28s and MIG–17s that had been rendered useless by long neglect. In the meantime, Saudi air force transports have been stepping up arms shipments to the YAR and the insurgents, and there are also indications that the Egyptians are sending in military equipment.
Extent of Outside Assistance Unclear. It seems doubtful that President al Iryani would have committed the YAR to full support of the insurgents and thereby risk all-out war with PDRY unless he had outside assurances of assistance in the event of hostilities. The Saudis have been urging the YAR to take this step for some time and have indicated their willingness to help. There has been no evidence, however, of a quantum jump in Saudi military and financial assistance, which heretofore has been insufficient to persuade al Iryani actively to support the insurgents. It is possible that Libya has also offered support. If so, when added to pressure from the Saudis and the YAR warhawks, it could have tipped the balance. Libya has been critical of the Marxist PDRY regime and has been mildly interested in the NUF, but there have been no previous signs that it wished to become heavily involved. Nevertheless, Colonel Qadhafi may have offered assistance to the YAR in the event that it moved decisively against PDRY, possibly in an effort to dilute the YAR’s heavy dependence on the Saudis and the West. If the Libyans prompted Egypt to send aircraft and spare parts to the YAR, this could also have been a form of Libyan assistance. As tension has built up, the YAR has called on several Arab states for assistance in the face of the PDRY threat, and it has asked the US for an emergency food airlift.
[Page 593]PDRY, because of its general isolation in the Arab world, has little choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are doubtlessly loath to commit themselves to the PDRY side, for even though their stock is currently low in the YAR, they probably do not want to put all their eggs in the PDRY basket. As a sign of their ambivalence, Soviet technicians are maintaining Soviet-supplied aircraft in the YAR, and the Soviet Ambassador to the YAR denied to Prime Minister al-Ayni on October 10 that the USSR was committed to PDRY in the present confrontation.
Possibility of Successful Mediation Dim. A Reuters dispatch announced on October 13 that the Arab League mediators had obtained another ceasefire, with both sides pulling back six miles from the border. Over the long run, however, the chances for a negotiated settlement are poor. With the insurgents occupying Kamaran Island and the YAR publicly pressing its claim to both Kamaran and Perim, it seems unlikely that the YAR will settle for terms acceptable to PDRY.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Department of State Use Only. Prepared by David E. Long (INR) and approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR/NEA). The fighting in Yemen generated other Intelligence Notes, including RNAN–33, “YAR–PDRY: When is a War Not a War?”, October 5 (ibid.), RNAN–34, “YAR: Throwing Down the Gauntlet to PDRY?”, October 11 (ibid., POL SYEMEN–YEMEN), and RNAN–38, “YAR/PDRY: Intensity of Border Fighting Increases,” October 20. (Ibid.)↩
- Attached but not printed.↩