183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
Washington, May 8, 1971,
0114Z.
80353. Subj: Anti-PDRY Campaign. Ref: Sanaa 277; Jidda 1470.2
- 1.
- Report cited para 1 Sanaa reftel based on personal observation of source who has reported accurately in past. We recall that when approached by us following PDRYG forces’ seizure in summer of 1968 of war materiel in cases marked with distinctive US clasped hands symbol from Southern Yemeni insurgents, Saudis responded that they not responsible for use that might be made of discarded US ammo boxes. Thus Department cannot rule out possibility that Saudis may be permitting use of old MAP-furnished crates to transfer non-MAP munitions to YAR/PDRY border. While PDRY charges of alleged US–Saudi plotting against Aden are by now old hat, publication by it of photos of any handclasp boxes it might seize is as predictable as it is unwelcome to us.
- 2.
- Department appreciates that Saudis likely be more incensed than contrite if confronted with USG protest against alleged delivery of USAID-marked boxes to southern dissidents. However, at Ambassador’s discretion, suggest that you find low key way to get across following to ranking Saudi officials: USINT Sanaa recently received information that ammo boxes with US clasped hands insignia have been delivered to NUF elements. While provenance these crates is unknown, USG nevertheless disturbed that use of such boxes to transfer war materiel whatever its origin is likely to create false impression that USG involved in aiding or sponsoring NUF operation. To extent this belief spreads in Yemen and PDRY, it could undermine claim of NUF and other anti-NF dissidents to be patriots acting without foreign direction to expel unwelcome radical regime under Soviet and Chicom influence. If PDRYG forces continue to capture and exhibit quantities of arms and ammo ostensibly provided by USG to insurgents this could also excite Soviet suspicion. It clearly undesirable that Soviets be [Page 569] encouraged assume that anti-PDRY campaign may not just be quarrel between different factions of South Yemenis but effort by US, with Saudi and dissident southern Yemeni help, to oust radical regime that has allowed USSR to develop foothold in strategic Aden outpost. Soviet reaction to what it likely regard as open US support for NUF cannot be accurately predicted but could well be increase in its own military aid to PDRY. This development if it occurs would be in neither USG nor SAG interest.
- 3.
- Defer to Ambassador’s judgment of best level in SAG at which these points can be most effectively made but hope that Sultan will be included in this approach. Peg might be in context of tour d’horizon with Sultan of general threats to USG/SAG mutual interests in Peninsula. This might also be suitable opportunity for Ambassador to draw upon guidance previously provided for use with Saqqaf to share with Sultan US views of situation in PDRY and our estimate probabilities of insurgents’ success in toppling Adeni regime. Discussions with Sultan would in our opinion usefully supplement our contacts with Saqqaf and Kamal Adham on this subject.3
Irwin
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 SYEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on May 7 by Ransom and Wrampelmeier; cleared in NEA/ARP and EUR/SOV; and approved by Davies. It was repeated to USINT Sanaa and CHUSMTM Dhahran.↩
- Telegram 277 from Sanaa was not found. Telegram 1470 from Jidda, May 6, stated that Saudi Arabia did not ship weapons to foreign forces packed in crates marked with the U.S. AID clasped hands insignia and that the Saudis would resent any U.S. approach that implied the Saudis were trying to implicate the United States in “SAG supported operations in the south.” (Ibid.)↩
- Thacher met with Saqqaf on May 21 and Sultan on June 9. (Telegrams 1731 from Jidda, May 23, and 1964 from Jidda, June 10, respectively; ibid.)↩