156. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter)1

Dear Warren:

As you know, Saudi Arabian National Guard Commander Prince Abdullah has requested through Ambassador Thacher that the U.S. assist in implementation of a major reorganization and reequipment of that force along lines proposed by a British Advisory Mission. Abdullah has stated that he would like to purchase U.S. equipment in place of that recommended by the British. Ultimately, Abdullah indicated, he intends to phase out his British advisers and to bring the National Guard “close to the Americans.” Abdullah has pressed for an early positive response to his request.2

Raytheon Corporation has also been in contact with Prince Abdullah regarding its interest in carrying out this program. Raytheon on October 27 submitted to Abdullah a proposal to undertake a definition of the proposed program, including budget estimates and work schedules. According to Raytheon sources, Abdullah expressed considerable interest in the Raytheon proposal but declined to accept it pending confirmation that the U.S. Government will support National Guard reequipment. Raytheon has appealed to the Department for U.S. Government support for its efforts to win this potentially valuable program for American industry.

We perceive important political and commercial advantages in supporting a bid by American industry to obtain this project. The National Guard plays a key role in preserving internal security and public order in Saudi Arabia. It also acts as a reinforcement for the Frontier Force and for the regular army in defending Saudi borders from outside aggression. The National Guard is administratively separate from the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and it has relied hitherto on British rather than American advisers. With the exception of a modest purchase of U.S. small arms and training through FMS in 1966, we have had few contacts with the Guard. Award of the reequipment program to an American firm would enable us to develop a closer relationship with this important organization and to monitor its activities and capabilities. [Page 500] It might also give us some leverage to guide the National Guard’s development in a way wherein it will contribute to maintenance of political stability in the Kingdom and not to creation of an imbalance between it and the regular armed forces—a danger inherent in the equipment purchases recommended by the British Advisory Mission.

The potential advantages to the U.S. balance of payments from American implementation of this program are also considerable. In addition to the purchase of vehicles, communications equipment, and other hardware, the National Guard would require contractor services for the management of the overall reequipment program, maintenance, training, and logistics support. The cost of this program is estimated at between $150 and $200 million.

Moreover, we are reliably informed that King Faisal and other leading Royal Family members would prefer that this program be undertaken by American rather than by British interests. We understand that the use of an American contractor has been particularly urged on Abdullah by Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan. The reason is Sultan’s own low estimate of British capabilities in this field and, no doubt, concern in some quarters of the Royal Family that the British recommendations contain excessive amounts of armored vehicles and artillery. The British are likely to oppose strenuously this threat to their hitherto predominant role with the National Guard. However, it is our impression that a Saudi decision to seek American help for this program has already been taken—provided, of course, that Prince Abdullah is satisfied that the U.S. Government will in fact support his reequipment efforts.

In light of the above developments and considerations, we consider it desirable that an early decision be taken to assure Prince Abdullah that the U.S. will support this program. We see two alternative approaches:

a)
inform Abdullah that we are prepared in principle to meet his reasonable requirements on a government-to-government basis through FMS procedures.
b)
support Raytheon’s bid for a contract to define the program in terms of American equipment and services. We would of course expect Raytheon to work closely with our military services in order to permit presentation to Abdullah of a final program that we could support through licensing of commercial exports and, where necessary, through supplementary Foreign Military Sales cases for equipment or services not available through commercial sources.

Our preference is that this program be carried out to the extent possible on a government-to-industry basis. We would therefore urge the second alternative. This approach would keep responsibility for this program primarily in the hands of private industry while enabling us to influence both the types and numbers of equipment that would [Page 501] be furnished to the National Guard. We especially wish to avoid assumption by the U.S. Government of the major implementing role in this program at a time when our plate is already full with SAMP, Naval Expansion, and the F–5 program. We therefore want to keep private industry out in front.

It is entirely possible, of course, that Prince Abdullah may prefer implementation of this program on a government-to-government basis. This would present some problems for us in light both of our involvement in other Saudi military programs and of Abdullah’s past unwillingness to deal with our Military Training Mission—which Abdullah regards as too closely associated with the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. Should Abdullah insist upon a government-to-government arrangement, I recommend that we agree to do so provided it is understood that a separate advisory mission for the National Guard could not be established. To the maximum extent possible actual implementation of the program, including in-country training, will be contracted to U.S. private industry in accordance with standard DOD procedures.

Should the Department of Defense concur with this approach, our Arabian Peninsula Directorate and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs are prepared to work directly with DOD/ISA and the concerned military service to draft appropriate instructions for Ambassador Thacher.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco3
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted on November 3 by Wrampelmeier and concurred in in NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, and PM/MAS.
  2. As reported in telegram 3651 from Jidda, October 19. (Ibid.)
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.