Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

153. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, July 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Saudi Arabia: Feisal—and Then?²

NOTE

The House of Saud may well continue to rule Saudi Arabia for years to come, but this is far from assured. Beyond the question of King Feisal’s own health and advancing age and that of dissension within the royal family over the succession, there is at work an inexorable process of transformation in Saudi society. The process results from rapidly growing wealth, the spread of education and communication, and increasing awareness of the outside world. The inherent incompatibilities between this impetus for modernization and the still archaic Saudi political structure will be central to future developments in the kingdom. This memorandum assesses the present state of affairs and the outlook.

[Omitted here are a Table of Contents, Section I: The Setting, and Section II: The Challenge of Modernity.]

III. The Security Situation and Military Plotting

9. It is military conspirators, not civilian opposition, that have the greatest potential to threaten the Saudi monarchy. The regular army’s officer corps, mostly of middle class origins, doubtless contains many who do not identify with the royal house. [15 lines not declassified]

10. Feisal recognizes the potential threat from his military establishment and has always suspected its loyalty.³ [3 lines not declassified] The government has taken elaborate precautions to separate various military components and to remove them from the cities and other strategic areas. The bulk of the army is stationed in the border areas, some units even being posted inside Jordan. No regular army effectives are allowed near the capital. [3 lines not declassified]

11. As a check against the regular military establishment, the regime relies heavily on the paramilitary National Guard (the so-called “White Army”), a force recruited from tribes traditionally regarded as loyal to the monarchy. Elements of the Guard are stationed in positions that would allow them to intercept an army move against the government. While the Guard is roughly the same size as the regular army, it is not heavily armed. It lacks tanks and artillery, and has not been well trained for the mission of blocking an army move. As a force to maintain internal security, it has demonstrated its effectiveness in warfare against tribesmen, for example, but its capability against regular military units is unproven. It would be defenseless against air attack, even of the most rudimentary sort.

12. In an important sense, moreover, the National Guard’s reliability may be declining. For reasons of efficiency, many of the old formations have been fundamentally reorganized. In these units tribal forces fighting under their own officers have been replaced by elements drawn from various tribes. Further, non-tribal officers from the regular army have been assigned command of these mixed units. This reorganization has thus diluted the distinction between the Guard and the regular army and has called into question the ultimate loyalty of these converted units.

13. Other aspects of the security situation also appear to be changing. Live ammunition is probably more generally available now in Saudi Arabia than in the past. This increase is associated with the effort sponsored by Riyadh to unseat the South Yemeni regime, an endeavor that entailed arming and equipping numerous forces for combat. Also the unit stationed in Jordan has been provided munitions to use in the event of Israeli attack. Moreover, in the past year or so there have been alerts of various units including the air force, during which fuel and supplies necessary for combat were issued. These circumstances have improved the chances that plotters would be able to find sufficient ammunition to carry out their plans.

14. Nonetheless, it remains a difficult task to overturn the Saudi monarchy. [2½ lines not declassified] Speed would be essential to this operation, for if any of the central figures of the Saudi family were able to broadcast appeals for help, some units of the National Guard and perhaps other tribal elements would be likely to rally to the support of the family in numbers. [6 lines not declassified]

IV. Outside Factors

15. The death of Nasser last fall removed a perennial threat to Feisal’s regime. Nasser had at times past encouraged dissidents inside Saudi Arabia. Although the Egyptians had not sponsored subversion against Feisal since the latter agreed in 1967 to provide a $100 million yearly subsidy as long as the Suez Canal should remain shut, Nasser continued to be a powerful magnet or inspiration for Saudi dissidents. With the advent of Sadat in Egypt, on the other hand, Egyptian-Saudi Arabian relations have been positively cordial. Sadat’s recent reception of Feisal in Cairo lent the aura of Egyptian blessing to the Saudi regime—something it had not enjoyed for many years. Moreover, the Saudi successful mediation of Jordanian King Hussein’s differences with Cairo gave new lustre to the image of the Saudi regime as working constructively for the Arab cause. All this has probably served to boost Feisal’s prestige at home, even within his armed forces.

16. Feisal’s image could be considerably tarnished, however, if he fails to appear effective in defending Arab interests in the Persian Gulf—most immediately if Iran were to move to take the three small islands it claims near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. While the British ruled in the Gulf, the UK enforced the claims of the small sheikhdoms of the Arab coast to these islands. The Shah is now pressing his ownership and threatens to take possession of the islands as soon as the British leave later this year. He has sufficient force to do so and can quickly make good his threat. He would prefer to work out an accommodation with Feisal to whom the Gulf sheikhs look to protect Arab interests, and he regards Feisal’s position as unnecessarily obstinate. Seizure of the islands by the Shah could among other things damage Feisal’s standing in the eyes of the Saudi military.

17. The unsuccessful coup attempt in Morocco⁴ will also have an impact on attitudes within Saudi Arabia. Undoubtedly it will incline Feisal to be even more cautious. It may increase the determination of the royal family in Saudi Arabia to act decisively if faced with a similar challenge—a factor which could turn the tide in a closely contested situation. At the same time, the failure of the Moroccan army to join in the revolt may give conspirators inside Saudi Arabia pause, [2½ lines not declassified].

18. The foreign factor which could have perhaps the most weight in stimulating Saudi dissidents to overthrow the dynasty would be a new round of major Arab-Israeli hostilities. Feisal’s policy toward the Arab confrontation with Israel is regarded by many Saudis as lacking sincerity. While Feisal feels strongly on the question of Jerusalem, has adopted a tough posture concerning it, and given support to the Palestinian cause, this limited stance has not satisfied the country’s younger elements. The close Saudi relationship with the US in the face of growing anti-Americanism in the Arab world has increased public dissatisfaction with the ruling family. Although the stationing of Saudi troops in southern Jordan has given the military some sense of participation in the struggle against Israel, many officers realize that this gesture is chiefly symbolic. Another Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis, especially if it involved Saudi forces in Jordan, would probably shake the Saudi regime. Public sentiment would be aroused, disorders probably would break out in Jidda or at the oil complex in the Dhahran area and could occasion anti-American activities throughout the kingdom. In such a time of high emotion, military officers might seize the opportunity to move against the House of Saud.

V. The Succession Question

19. The matter inside Saudi Arabia which may have the greatest bearing on the possibility of a coup is the succession problem. The royal house appears increasingly divided over the question of who should succeed Feisal. Though the King is still in reasonably good health, he suffers from mild arteriosclerosis and has had serious stomach troubles in the past. Jockeying for position in the succession struggle has been underway for some time. As the senior eligible half-brother of Feisal, Prince Khalid, now himself nearly 60, was named heir in 1965. Popular with many tribal and religious leaders, the pious Khalid has, however, shown little interest in the governing process. Moreover, in the past few years he has undergone a series of heart attacks. He now performs only ceremonial tasks; it is questionable whether he will be physically able to assume the active direction of Saudi affairs after Feisal leaves the scene. Nonetheless, Khalid is strongly backed by the commander of the National Guard, chiefly because he opposes the rival Sudairi faction. The Minister of Finance also has been attempting to use his budgetary power to clip the wings of Khalid’s opponents. Most important of all, Feisal himself has not withdrawn endorsement of existing succession arrangements.

20. Next in line is Prince Fahd, 49-year old leader of the so-called “Sudairi Seven”—half-brothers of King Feisal by a single mother. The Sudairis are a tightly knit clique of able and ambitious princes; they dominate the Council of Ministers, a body which Fahd increasingly chairs in his capacity as Second Deputy Prime Minister. These brothers are unwilling to see [less than 1 line not declassified] Khalid try to run the country and would probably mount a formidable challenge if he were to attempt to take command. Some compromise might be possible, however, in which Khalid was accorded the title of King, but left the Prime Ministry and actual rule to his half-brother Fahd.

21. Fahd has sought in guarded fashion to appeal to the middle classes. In an unusual press interview in April 1970 he espoused an accelerated reform program, including the enactment of “basic regulations”—which many Saudis interpreted to mean a constitution. He proposed numerous social welfare measures, from low-income public housing to low-cost water and electricity. At the same time, he called for higher expenditures for Saudi military and security forces, organizations in which middle class elements play a major role. While he barely mentioned King Feisal and the regime’s efforts to carry out some reforms, he denounced corruption and influence-peddling within the Saudi government. Fahd may be all the more interested in advertising an interest in progressive reform in Saudi Arabia precisely because the repressive security policies he has carried out in his capacity as Minister of Interior probably have alienated reformist elements.

22. Though reportedly unhappy at Fahd’s assertiveness, including his tendency to bid for support outside the royal family, Feisal himself now clearly recognizes that Khalid’s succession has serious drawbacks and believes that a strong King is needed. In the past year or so, therefore, Feisal has let Fahd play an increasingly prominent role in government. Fahd, not Khalid, has acted in the King’s name when Feisal has been out of the country. More unambiguous steps to favor Fahd’s succession may be in the offing. Feisal is said to be considering convening a royal conclave to effect a family reconciliation to settle the issue. The King believes that the greatest danger to the dynasty would be indecision and bickering at the time of the succession. Nonetheless, this is a painful matter for Feisal, and he may continue to temporize.

VI. A Post-Feisal Regime

23. In this situation the death or incapacity of Feisal would offer a promising opportunity for a move against the regime. If it appeared that the key princes had become more unified, however, this might deter a coup. It is also very possible that in the face of an active threat, the princes would close ranks and put down opposition quite quickly. Although it would inevitably take some time for a princely successor to consolidate his control, the monarchy is deeply embedded in the fabric of Saudi Arabian society and stands a good chance of survival.

24. A new king would very likely follow much in the pattern of Feisal: gradually modernizing the mechanism of government and promoting especially economic but also some social change. If strong rivalries continue to divide the top princes, the progress of Saudi Arabia along this path would be slowed. Fahd’s succession by consensus of the family, on the other hand, could add to the efficiency of the government and also speed up the process of modernization somewhat. In any event no princely successor would be likely to attempt basic changes in the nature of the regime, say to give elements outside the royal family an important voice in ruling the country.

25. Pressures against the monarchy, therefore, are likely to continue to build. Should the House of Saud be overthrown, the successor regime would almost certainly be highly nationalistic and anti-Israeli. It would probably be exceedingly difficult for the US to deal with, and its attitude toward the major oil companies would be appreciably tougher than that of the present Saudi government. This does not mean that it would quickly seek to nationalize—rather that it would press for a larger share of profits and perhaps gradual steps to obtain greater control of the country’s oil resources.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. Secret.
2. This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated within CIA. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. See footnote 5, Document 133.
4. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–5, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972.