13. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)1
Washington, November 4, 1969.
Dear Dave:
Attached is a slightly expanded version of the paper that I showed you
last Wednesday. It is an effort to reduce to writing some of the more
critical foreign policy assumptions that, in my view, should govern
military planning in the next several years. We have not tried to be
comprehensive, but rather to pick out points which we think are
particularly relevant for military planning. We do not intend that this
paper substitute for other policy guidance which has emerged from
completed NSC studies, such as the
FIDP, or to preempt guidance that
may flow from future studies. I understand that your staff is working on
strategic guidance for the FY–72 budget.
This paper should be of some use to them.
I hope that the question of foreign policy assumptions for Defense
planning could be pursued by Ron Spiers and Warren Nutter and their
staffs as we discussed last week. In particular, I want them to discuss
how such guidance might be improved in the future and how State and
Defense can jointly develop the strategic guidance that will form the
basis for future defense budgets. It seems to me this should be a
continuing process so that when Defense feels the need of guidance or
assessment in a specific area of foreign policy, it can be provided
promptly.
I am sending a copy of this letter and the attachment to Henry Kissinger.
Sincerely,
Attachment
MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN
- A.
- Despite the absence of formal security treaties with
non-NATO powers in the
Mediterranean Basin, four US
administrations have made clear that the US has a special interest in the security of
Israel.
- B.
- In the Persian Gulf, current American oil and other activities
which return some $1.5 billion annually to the US balance of payments, are likely
to expand.
- C.
- The requirement for US forces
for this area has never been well defined, but air and naval
forces appear to be considerably more important, at least from a
political standpoint, than ground forces.
- D.
- Restrictions on US base use
(e.g., Greece, Turkey, Spain) if not outright denial (we must
regard Wheelus as lost now) will continue to be a significant
factor in any contingency involving the Arabs and Israelis.
Soviet involvement in such a contingency may relax these
restrictions somewhat, but it should not be assumed that they
will remove them. Ways to reduce dependence on these bases
should be examined.
- E.
- Reopening of the Suez Canal cannot be counted upon for the
next two years, or even longer. Therefore, the importance of
Diego Garcia and COMIDEASTFOR increases.
- F.
- Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean will not diminish
and may expand further. There is a good possibility that the
Soviets will gain access to air bases in the Mediterranean
area.
- G.
- With the British departure from Aden and the Persian Gulf, the
Soviets will continue to manifest increasing naval and other
activity in the Arabian Sea region.
- H.
- Any major changes in the Sixth fleet will have important
political implications in the Mediterranean Basin and would have
to be preceded by careful political-military consultations with
allied and friendly governments.
- I.
- While we have no intention of replacing the British in the
Persian Gulf area after their withdrawal in 1971, we have no
plans to terminate our naval presence there and believe we can
maintain our home porting arrangements on Bahrain over the next
few years.
[Omitted here are sections on Europe, East Asia, Weapons System, and
MAP.]
