124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait 1

202365. Subject: Military Aircraft Sales to Kuwait. Ref: (A) State 187880. (B) Kuwait 1753. (C) Kuwait 2072.2

1.
Re question raised in para 5 reftel (B)3—State and Defense have decided it not in US interest, nor in long-term interest GOK, that F–4, in any configuration, be acquired by Kuwait Air Force. We believe F–4 [Page 395] too sophisticated and too difficult for GOK to support and maintain, and that USG would be doing GOK disservice by selling it aircraft which could well produce another Lightning problem. As result this decision, USG will be unwilling consider F–4 sales to GOK, and we will not schedule visit to F–4 factory by Kuwait military procurement team when and if it comes to US.
2.
We believe GOK needs small, highly-effective air force equipped with one type high-performance aircraft capable meeting both air-to-air and air-to-ground requirements. This aircraft should (A) have relatively low initial and operating costs, (B) require minimum training and logistics support, (C) eventually be operated and maintained by Kuwaiti personnel with minimum outside support, and (D) should be compatible with aircraft of neighboring friendly states. We firmly believe F–5E best meets these requirements.
3.
In addition to logic para 2 above, which you should stress in your discussions with Kuwait MOD, several other factors have influenced our decision. Although these should not be passed on to any foreign sources, we feel you should know our decision was influenced by our strong belief that F–4 sale to Kuwait might saddle GOK with program it could never hope manage successfully without continuing intensive supplier-country maintenance of the type which has sometimes been lacking in Lightning program. This could, in long run, impair our relations and harm our commercial reputation both in Kuwait and Gulf. F–4 sale would also complicate US relations with Saudi Arabia, which has been persuaded to buy F–5 rather than F–4, and with Israel and Iran. Our relations with Jordan could also be affected; if we make such a sale, we would be hard put to refuse Hussein.
4.
Rationale countering argument voiced by Major Sabah in reftel C follows by septel.4
5.
We welcome your comments as to manner and timing our informing GOK of decision described para 1 above.5
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by G.Q. Lumsden, Jr. (NEA/ARP); cleared in draft by Scotes, Stackhouse, and Miklos; cleared by Dickman, Atherton, Norland (PM), Sanford (PM/MC), and Timberlake (DOD/ISA); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to USCINCEUR.
  2. In telegram 187880 to Kuwait, October 13, the Department stated that the Ambassador should tell the Kuwaitis to examine all possible aircraft, continue to recommend against F–4s, and recommend that Kuwait buy no more than one type of combat aircraft. (Ibid.) For telegram 1753 from Kuwaiti, see footnote 2, Document 123. Telegram 2072 from Kuwait is Document 123.
  3. Stoltzfus had asked if he was correct in assuming that the Department was not willing to sell F–4s to Kuwait in any configuration.
  4. To counter statements voiced by Major Jabel al-Sabah and following discussion with USAF experts, the Department wrote a detailed technical comparison of the various systems under consideration in terms of their usefulness in an air war with Iraq: the Northrop F–5E, the Dassault F–1 air-to-ground attack aircraft and day fighter, and the Fishbed J version of the MiG–21. The Department suggested that a small team of USAF experts brief Major Jabel on the comparative features and that the Ambassador make the strongest possible presentation in favor of the F–5E before Kuwait reached a final decision on aircraft purchase. (Telegram 214153 to Kuwait, November 24; ibid.)
  5. Printed from an unsigned copy. In telegram 2337 from Kuwait, November 22, Stoltzfus noted that since the Kuwaiti Government had not yet decided on the type of military aircraft it wished to buy, he believed it best to avoid any mention of F–4s until Kuwait raised the subject. When and if this occurred, he would argue the F–4s were too complex, requiring a level of maintenance and number of trained personnel beyond present Kuwaiti capabilities. (Ibid.)