121. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1

1666. Subject: Possible Kuwaiti Purchase of French Mirages. Ref: Kuwait 1491 and previous (notal).2

1.
In conversation with MinDef and Interior Shaikh Saad, I asked him status of Kuwaiti study of its military requirements, US survey team report and when he planned send team to Pakistan, Europe and US. Was there anything further US companies such as Northrop could do help Kuwaitis make up their minds re aircraft or other equipment they wanted?
2.
Saad replied GOK had still not made up its mind finally on aircraft. Mirage and Harrier were still in running in addition to F–5s and A–4s as proposed in US report. What about F–4, he asked. I replied [Page 381] that, as we had explained before, F–4 simply not suitable weapon to defend against threat as agreed upon between Kuwaiti military and US military survey team.3 Moreover, said I thought GOK should think hard before acquiring odd and incompatible assortment of weapons from various countries. Such approach might make sense politically, but certainly not militarily or economically. Compatibility of one’s own system internally, and with friendly neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan) very important also. I said these points argued strongly for US equipment throughout including F–5s, since US equipment best in world.
3.
Saad replied emphatically that politics not involved in GOK decision re aircraft or any other military item. Added he hoped have additional info for me “in about two weeks.”
4.
I saw Saad again at function Sept 9 and said would be glad ask Northrop reps visit Kuwait again if he felt this would be useful in helping make up Kuwaiti minds re aircraft to buy. Saad sidestepped question but asked me see him again Sept 14.
5.
For Tehran: Re Tehran 5400,4 Emb here in close touch with Kuwaitis on their military program and plans. For Pitts’ info, Northrop rep Rogan in Beirut fully clued in on status Northrop offer of F–5s to GOK. We obviously cannot guarantee Kuwaiti eventual decision to purchase F–5s but we and Rogan working hard on it. See no need at moment for additional Northrop effort here but of course this decision is Northrop’s to make.
Stoltzfus
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret. It was repeated to Amman, Beirut, Islamabad, and Tehran.
  2. In telegram 1491 from Kuwait, August 10, the Embassy reported that the Kuwaiti Air Force had completed its study of the Department of Defense survey team report; that the Kuwaiti Army was now evaluating its portion; and that, eventually, a Kuwaiti team would visit several countries and prepare a final report for the Minister of Defense. (Ibid.)
  3. The Departments of State and Defense had earlier identified Iraq as the only real threat to Kuwait. (Memorandum of conversation, August 11, 1971; ibid.) Kuwait also identified significant internal security threats. (Telegram 1796 from Kuwait, September 27; ibid.)
  4. In telegram 5400 from Tehran, September 7, the Embassy reported that Kuwait was seriously considering the purchase of French Mirage aircraft that would be based in Pakistan. Northrop had thought Kuwait would purchase F–5s, and was now trying to get King Hussein of Jordan to convince Kuwait to purchase the F–5s. (Ibid.)