Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf—Summary of Developments

In November 1970 you approved a basic strategy for the Persian Gulf as British “withdrawal” approached. [NSDM 92 at Tab B].² The NSC Under Secretaries Committee was instructed to develop an imaginative US presence. With the British treaties formally terminated at the end of 1971, the Committee is now reporting to you at Tab A on the steps that have been taken.³ A map is attached to complement the following summary:⁴

Diplomatic Representation

You had approved the expansion of diplomatic representation to the Lower Gulf and the accreditation of our Ambassador in Kuwait to posts there.⁵ Late last year the final political configuration of the Gulf emerged with four independent entities: Bahrain, Qatar, the Union of Arab Emirates (the seven tiny Trucial states⁶ of which the largest, Abu Dhabi, is taking a lead) and Oman (independent since 1833).

• —These four states have all been accepted as members of the United Nations with our support.
• —You have sent letters congratulating the heads of each state on their independence (and to Oman on our establishing diplomatic relations). You have received warm replies. Your letters were delivered personally by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the area.
• —You have accredited our new Ambassador to Kuwait (William A. Stoltzfus) as our first Ambassador to the Gulf states.⁷ His impressive performance as our DCM in Saudi Arabia promises an imaginative presence.
• —State plans three Missions at the Chargé level—in Bahrain, in Abu Dhabi as the capital of the UAE (it will also serve Qatar) and in Oman at the very tip of the Gulf. Bahrain, as the more developed state, has been the first priority and a Chargé was dispatched there last fall to set up our machinery.⁸ As facilities can be arranged, State will be moving to create the remaining two missions with emphasis on an imaginative rather than quantitative presence. Some upgrading in our Kuwait embassy on the economic/commercial side is required since they will bear prime immediate responsibility for overseeing regional cooperation in this field.

Assistance and Exchange in the Gulf

The heart of our presence will be US technical and educational assistance and cultural exchange through private and public channels. These states have their own oil money and do not need economic aid. This will require new kinds of effort and programs. To this end, the Under Secretaries Committee is recommending (1) increasing State’s budget for scholarship and exchange fellowship activities in FY 73; (2) focusing now on opportunities to provide technical advisors on a reimbursable basis and on concessionary terms when legislative authority and appropriations can be obtained; (3) encouraging the private US sector to become interested in meeting the needs of the Gulf.⁹

Military Presence

The Under Secretary will be forwarding separately a study and recommendations on arms sales to the Lower Gulf. On your approval, however, steps were taken to place Kuwait on the list of countries eligible to purchase arms under FMS credits.¹⁰

In December, we concluded an arrangement by Executive Agreement to retain—with Bahraini, Saudi and Iranian approval—our small naval presence of three ships which have been there for the last twenty-two years.¹¹ We will be utilizing a consolidated 10% of the base formally used by the British and replacing the obsolete flagship with a larger and more modern one which will increase somewhat the numbers of US personnel involved. In short, the size of the force remains the same, and the Bahrainis rather than the British are now our landlords. Nevertheless, there has been some reaction in the Arab countries and on Capitol Hill.¹²

One comment that might be made in conclusion is that the transition in the Gulf has at least begun with more ease than we—or the British—dared hope. In addition to Oman (independent since 1833), Bahrain, Qatar and the Union are now launched and we are moving into a relationship with each.

There have been two minor ripples; both are largely viewed as products of internal, endemic squabbling.

• —The ruler of Sharjah, member of the Union, was assassinated byhis cousin last month. The UAE troops helped install the deputy ruler of Sharjah as the new ruler to maintain the line of government against the plotting cousin. This was, incidentally, the first time the UAE acted in the interests of Gulf security. There was a strong suggestion of complicity in the assassination by another Union member and Union members have made their displeasure known.¹³
• —Recently, Qatar’s deputy ruler deposed the ruler and assumed office. The new ruler has long been regarded the chief executive in fact while the ex-ruler has been known to vacation abroad at great lengths.¹⁴

This is just to point out that while the transition went reasonably well there is still potential for instability.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2. Tab B is Document 91. Brackets are in the original.
3. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a December 23 memorandum from Irwin to Nixon. The report, “Diplomatic Representation in the Persian Gulf and Oman,” was contained in an August 16 memorandum from Sisco to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee. Kissinger approved the report on November 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92)
4. Attached but not printed.
5. See Document 106.
6. The UAE accepted Ras al-Khaimah as a member in January 1972. (Telegram 115 from Dhahran, January 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1187, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf Cables)
7. Stoltzfus was appointed Ambassador to Kuwait on December 9, 1971; confirmed by the Senate on January 7, 1972; and presented his credentials on February 9. Resident at Kuwait, he was also accredited to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
8. The Embassy in Manama opened on September 21, 1971, with John N. Gatch, Jr., as Chargé.
9. The recommendations are in the report, “U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Technical, Educational and Cultural Programs,” transmitted to the Under Secretaries Committee by Irwin, August 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92)
10. See Document 92.
11. See footnote 3, Document 91. In telegram 187449, November 16, 1970, the Department notified regional posts that it would inform the British of the decision on-MIDEASTFOR and advised the posts of the order in which the Gulf states would be similarly informed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) As reported in telegram 190369 to London, November 20, the Department had already notified Britain in confidence of the decision to maintain MIDEASTFOR. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)
12. In a December 14 letter to Rogers, J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote: “It is apparent from the documents which have been furnished to the Committee on Foreign Relations that the plan to establish a naval base on Bahrain reflects a considered decision on the part of the Executive Branch… Sharing a British base is one thing, but establishing a base of our own is quite another matter. In the past our role in the Persian Gulf has been subsidiary to that of the British. With their departure from the Gulf and with the establishment of a U.S. base, we will immediately become directly involved in all matters affecting the Gulf.” (Ibid., DEF 15–4 BAHRAIN–US)
13. Telegram 516 from Tehran, January 25, relayed confirmation of the assassination. (Ibid., POL 23–9 UAE) Sheikh Zayid, the new President of the UAE, told Dinsmore that Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah “triggered the action.” (Telegram 317 from Dhahran, February 16; ibid.) An account and assessment is in Intelligence Note RNAN–6, “Persian Gulf: Coup and Countercoup in Sharjah,” February 4. (Ibid.)
14. On February 22, Deputy Ruler and Prime Minister of Qatar Khalifa bin Hamadi Than replaced Sheikh Ahmad in a coup. The overthrow was announced the following day in Qatar. (Telegram 368 from Dhahran, February 23; ibid., POL 23–9 QATAR) This required Stoltzfus’s credentials to be rewritten to reflect the new ruler. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 2; ibid., POL 15–1 QATAR) United States officials conveyed their desire to reaffirm a friendly relationship. (Telegram 33390 to Dhahran, February 29; ibid.)