108. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1
1293. Subject: Kuwaiti Internal Security and Defense Programs.
1. Summary. There has been a remarkable shift in the past two years in Kuwaiti attitudes toward the United States. Today we have excellent possibilities of working out mutually beneficial relationships in the security, military and commercial fields which should spin-off beneficially in all directions. All of this could be locked-in in the course of the next few months, although detailed contracts will naturally involve time. Hundreds of millions of dollars in export sales are potentially involved2 as well as the possibility of making a major contribution to the peace and prosperity of this region. All of this is occurring against the back-drop of the turbulence of the region and the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. As the Kuwaitis have quietly contemplated their future in the midst of turbulence, they have decided that their future rests with us. The doors are open.
End summary.
2. In the course of the past two years there has been a remarkable reversal of GOK attitudes toward the United States. Starting from a position of bristling antagonism they have come full circle to a position of intimacy and basic trust. This is particularly true in respect to internal security and defense matters.
3. Long and patient discussions with senior Kuwaiti officials have contributed to their high level decision to strengthen their internal security and defense forces in coordination with the United States. This decision now has been formally confirmed by the Supreme Defense Council.3
4. Two years ago Kuwait internal security was a forbidden city to all foreigners, except the British, and it was evident that there was an inner sanctum closed to them. Gradually, however, the Kuwaitis relaxed [Page 345] in respect to US with the first breakthrough being in the field of physical security and narcotics. The superb performance of the Secret Service during the Vice President’s visit was quite helpful. Subsequently the Minister of Interior requested our help in terms of training, equipment and technical assistance in establishing a security command center. This, in turn, led to the successful visit of Major General Abdul-Latif al-Thowaini to the United States. It is my expectation that in the weeks ahead we will complete arrangements with the Kuwaitis which will prove of inestimable value here and elsewhere in the region for years to come. It should cover the entire spectrum of security interests.
5. When I arrived in Kuwait I found the Crown Prince, the Minister of Defense and Interior, and other significant Kuwaitis bristling over the fact that Kuwait was not eligible for FMS treatment. The ultimate removal of this anachronism had a significant effect on their reactions to US and to me as an Ambassador. It has had broad and favorable ramifications on many issues.
6. In the defense field it has opened up a new game with most promising implications for our export sales, our relations with Kuwait, and our possibilities of contributing to peace and cooperation in the Gulf area. The small Kuwaiti military forces have been traditionally equipped by the British, although American trucks and sundry other commercial-type equipment show up in their inventory. Our first major equipment sale consisted of two Lockheed Hercules aircraft (L–100–20).4 The negotiation was extended, enlightening to both sides, and extremely valuable in terms of our mutual relations. There have been many spin-offs from it. When it was over Shaykh Sa’ad apologized for their indecisiveness. He and Major General Mubarak explained that it reflected lack of experience with our documentation and negotiating methods, and their bitter experience with the British over the years. No one should misunderstand the bitterness of the Kuwaitis in respect to their past contracts with the British. They are absolutely convinced that they have been consistently cheated—and there is some evidence to support their beliefs.
7. Last summer Shaykh Sa’ad told me that the government had decided to strengthen its military forces across the board and wished the United States to help them. This led to a GOK request to Lockheed to manage their planned air defense system program. Lockheed produced its first rough cut last month and will return in about a week with a more detailed draft.
8. Meanwhile in an absolutely astounding reversal of traditional Kuwaiti customs, Major General Mubarak has raised with me the possibility of seconding an American military officer directly to him as a [Page 346] technical adviser and the Minister of Defense has sent me a letter requesting that “the authorities concerned in the Department of Defense in Washington be contacted to send a team, expert in air defense matters to prepare the necessary studies and research to set up an air defense system for Kuwait.” While eschewing a negative response I have suggested that Lockheed is quite capable of preparing the basic air defense study. We now have, however, a direct invitation for the introduction of American military advisers in Kuwait. The potential advantages and disadvantages should be carefully studied in Washington.
9. Lockheed is proceeding on the basis of a number of assumptions given to them by the Kuwaitis and variously influenced by me, namely, 1) in the next ten years the primary potential enemy is Iraq; 2) an objective is military/political collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Federation, and hopefully, Iran; 3) there must not be a confrontation with Iran; 4) weaponry in region should be compatible. This essentially means Lockheed, Northrop, Raytheon, and Bell in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran; 5) Lockheed has been told by Major General Mubarak to leave the Lightnings out of its calculations and has been asked to act as the GOK’s agent in disposing of all air equipment currently held by the Kuwaiti Air Force except the two Hercules.
10. The throttles are down and the companies are swarming in. Lockheed’s President was here in late October and we believe we have set the stage for the sale of three Jet Stars, and I suspect two more Hercules. They will be back in about one week with the second stage of their air defense study and with a firm Jet Star proposal, embodying Kuwaiti requests for technical modifications of the inner configuration of the plane which appear reasonable.
11. About ten days ago Northrop made a first class opening sales pitch to which the Kuwaitis responded by requesting thirty planes (6 trainers and 24 FSEs). Northrop will return about Nov 27 with a technical team. If this contract can be worked out, it will significantly help the Northrop production line.
12. In response to Shaykh Sa’ad’s request to me, a Bell Helicopter representative is expected here soon. Sa’ad tells me flatly they wish to buy Bell helicopters and I suspect the opening number is sixteen.
13. Raytheon was also here last week with an attractive GCA proposal in response to Sa’ad’s approach to me and my subsequent visit to Andover. Down the road a bit, and dependent upon the Lockheed air defense study, a request for a Hawk briefing team is possible.
14. The proposal by Fitzgeralds Laboratories for a small navy is also under study but the Kuwaitis wish to delay this until January while they focus on air defense. They simply do not have the skilled manpower to do everything in a tight span.
[Page 347]15. On the army side, I have persuaded Sa’ad to put the possibility of TOW missiles on the shelf and to concentrate in the interim on 106 recoilless rifles. In a practical sense, they have no anti-tank equipment today.
16. Manifestly there are big export possibilities in this picture with many potential commercial spin-offs. To cite but several, we would not today be on a verge of Jet Star sales if the need had not been made apparent to Sa’ad and others over a long time and if Lockheed had not done such a good sales job on the Hercules. Lockheed, in turn, clearly sees the sales possibilities for further Hercules and the 1011, although Douglas is a competitor. Again, the Lockheed people have done quite a job in demonstrating the need for GCA equipment. This and our chipping away is pushing the Kuwaitis into belatedly getting at the task of modernizing their airfield. I have now been informally asked if we could make available an FAA adviser to the Ministry of Public Works. In conjunction with them we are trying to develop the technical justification. If this can be worked out it would enhance our chances to get the construction and management contract for the field. Northrop, among others, is warmly interested in competing for this lucrative contract. It is clear to me that we have a splendid opportunity to work out with the Kuwaitis a complete association in the civil and military aviation field. This would enhance our sales position in the entire region and could, again, contribute to fruitful relationship between the people of the region.
17. All of this also carries over into intellectual circles. The Kuwaitis now invite us into their university and we are trying to work out relationships between Kuwait University and American universities involving American professors here. One slide-off possibility is a Smithsonian scientific chair and a Smithsonian/Kuwaiti/others oceanography study of the Gulf. The potential benefits should be manifest. Our STAG lecturers are now enthusiastically received. Two years ago they could not get a visa.
18. If what I have outlined can be worked out, it would involve several hundred millions of dollars in export sales and great possibilities of mutual benefit for US and the people of the region. Furthermore, it would undoubtedly contribute to a lucrative spin-off in terms of non-military equipment. The Kuwaitis have been so burned, or at least have felt deeply so, by the British, French and Commies in past deals that they are absolutely set to go American.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW. Secret; Exdis.↩
- Walsh made this argument during his August consultation trip to Washington. During this trip, Walsh told representatives of the Department of Defense that Iran was not the only answer to problems in the Persian Gulf and that the Arab governments were both willing to act responsibly as the British withdrew and to form closer ties with the United States. The United States, he argued, could not afford to ignore a military market in Kuwait of $100 million. (Memorandum from Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, Director, DIA, to Moorer, August 23; ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Moorer, Box 17, 091 Kuwait)↩
- As reported in telegram 1227 from Kuwait, October 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW)↩
- See Document 78.↩