Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and Iran¹

Washington, September 13, 1971, 2106Z.

167792. Subj: Gulf Islands: Secretary’s Letter to Douglas-Home. Ref: Tehran 4970.²

1. Following is text of Secretary’s letter to Douglas-Home which is being pouched London for delivery. Request Embassy deliver text prior to receipt of signed original.³

“The Right Honorable, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, London. Dear Alec: Since we discussed the Gulf Islands dispute in London last April⁴ I have followed this difficult problem with continuing interest. I now understand that Sir William Luce has negotiated an agreement in principle with the Iranians on an arrangement which would satisfy basic Iranian demands.⁵ I consider this a significant and encouraging development and wish to express my great admiration for the skill displayed on your side in bringing about this agreement.

We have received a message from the Shah indicating that the terms to which he has agreed⁶ are as far as he can go in being accommodating on this question. He has told us that if the Arab Shaykhs refuse to accept the terms to which the United Kingdom and Iran have agreed, Anglo-Iranian relations will be seriously jeopardized, Iran will denounce the proposed Federation of Arab Amirates, and Iran will reserve its rights to take such action as it deems necessary to protect its national interest. I am informed that the Shah has conveyed a similar message to you.

I fully understand the difficulty of bringing the Arab Shayks to accept this arrangement. I am confident, however, that the terms which you have negotiated on their behalf are as good as the Shaykhs can expect.

I know we are fully in accord that an amicable settlement of this nature is essential if there is to be cooperation and stability in the Gulf in the future. In looking at ways we might assist, I see little we could add to your efforts at this time to influence the Gulf Shaykhs. We do intend, however, to reply to the Shah that we are confident that the United Kingdom will make every effort to bring this promising opportunity for a settlement to a successful conclusion. With best personal regards, sincerely, William P. Rogers.”⁷

2. When London has delivered text Ambassador MacArthur may wish to reply to Shah’s message giving assurances indicated last sentence of letter.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA, NEA/IRN, NEA/ARP, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Rogers. It was repeated to Dhahran, Ankara, Kuwait, and Jidda.
2. In telegram 4970 from Tehran, September 7, the Embassy reported that the Shah and Britain had reached an agreement in principle. For the British, this agreement depended on concurrence from the Sheikhs. MacArthur recommended that the United States press the British to get the Sheikhs’ agreement. (Ibid., Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV)
3. Delivered September 15. (Telegram 8552 from London, September 15; ibid., Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII) In telegram 167813 to London, September 13, the Department suggested that, when delivering this letter, Annenberg state that in the event the Sheikhs responded negatively, the British should consult with the United States to determine whether an American approach to either Iran or the Sheikhs would be desirable. (Ibid.)
4. See footnote 2, Document 98.
5. A reference to ongoing Luce–Afshar talks, which the British disclosed to the United States on August 5. As reported in telegram 7280 from London, Acland told Annenberg that the Shah had recently shown flexibility on the issue of how to blur sovereignty. Moreover, if the Shah agreed to the criteria then under debate, Luce would be able to wrap up the islands issue by the end of August, paving the way for a federation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI)
6. In a September 8 paper, Saunders summarized the terms of the “London Formula.” In it, the Shah agreed to the following principles: 1) withdrawal by the two sheikhdoms of their official presence from the islands 12 months from the date that Iran established its presence; 2) silence on the issue of sovereignty for 18 months from the same date; and 3) an annual payment of $1.5 million to each of the sheikhdoms for 10 years, in addition to a generous sharing of any oil or other mineral revenue by Iran. Saunders concluded: “the issue for us is whether to leave the British and the Shaikhs alone at this critical point or weigh in with one or both sides.” (Paper prepared for inclusion in the President’s September 9 Daily Briefing; ibid., Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)
7. Douglas-Home responded on September 21 that while he took the Iranian position very seriously, he thought the Shah was anxious to achieve a negotiated settlement. Moreover, the Shah “may have anxieties about having his bluff called since he cannot want to use force if he can avoid it, thus jeopardising his relations both with the Gulf States and the whole Arab world. There is a chance therefore that he may not have spoken his last word. He is, of course, as we all know, a very accomplished brinkman.” Failure to achieve a settlement acceptable to the Shah would have an “undesirable” effect on British-Iranian relations, but Britain could not just hand the islands over to Iran since this would harm Britain’s relations with the Persian Gulf states. (Telegram 175137 to Dhahran, September 23; ibid., Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III)