Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State¹

Panama City, November 13, 1973, 2135Z.

6128. Subj: Canal Treaty Negotiations: Conversation Between Sec. of Army and General Torrijos. Ref: Panama’s 6083 and 6112.²

For ARA/PAN: Clear with Sec Army before distribution as Conf/Exdis.

1) Summary: Secretary of Army Callaway met with General Torrijos at Farallon (Rio Hato) for hour Nov. 13. Torrijos described himself as optimistic on possibilities of settlement of Canal issue, but emphasized repeatedly and forcefully during interview that USG must make significant gesture before Jan. 9³ toward resolving Canal issue if political tranquility is to be maintained.

2) General Torrijos began interview at his residence at Farallon by stating he was optimistic over possibility of reaching agreement with USG on new Canal treaty. Secretary said he was optimistic also. He mentioned his conversations with other GOP officials and said he was pleased with unanimous agreement on both GOP and USG sides that Ambassador Bunker was excellent choice as negotiator. Torrijos said that he had used Bunker appointment as indication to his people USG serious about resolving Canal problem and had raised Panama to priority USG had previously given to resolving problem with Viet Cong. Later in conversation Callaway returned to this, noted Torrijos had spoken in humorous vein, but wanted Torrijos to know U.S. regarded highly its friendly relations with Panama, held the Panamanian people and its leaders in high regard, and that there was really no basis for comparison between Panama and Viet Cong.

3) Callaway reviewed briefly his inspection of Canal installations, noted how well Americans and Panamanians worked together, and also observed both were pressing him for higher pay and more benefits. Costs were rising and he was considering a toll increase. (Torrijos made no comment on this.) He expressed satisfaction with GN–US armed forces cooperation noting specifically group of US soldiers receiving paratroop training at a GN base. He commended Panama’s positive approach on treaty negotiations and said he believed he understood issues which are important to Panama—national dignity, jurisdiction and increased ability to benefit from Canal. He hoped Torrijos understood great pride of US in Canal which was “moonshot” of early part of this century. He was also certain Torrijos understood prime importance USG attaches to maintenance, operation and defense of Canal.

4) Torrijos thanked the Secretary for his comments. There was one major problem in negotiations which had to be dealt with urgently. For the next twenty minutes Torrijos pressed forcefully his obviously strongly held view that Panama had been patient for ten years and he (as head of GOP) for five years without any results. The people, students especially, had no faith in negotiations. Patience was running out. He could not hold out much longer. He had to show results. USG had to do something significant to show its good faith. After several repetitions I asked him specifically what he had in mind. He said Gonzalez-Revilla had explained that in Washington.⁴ I said that I was aware of these suggestions; they had to be approved by Congress; and it was not likely Congress could act before January 9. I asked if the joint patrols would do it. He replied negatively saying joint patrols were risky so long as Canal Zone authorities persisted in their view of jurisdiction. Both Secretary and I tried to make clear that Zone authorities were carrying out orders from Washington and they could only change their actions when GOP and USG reached new understanding on jurisdictional concept.

5) Secretary noted there were extremists on both sides. U.S. President had same problem as Torrijos. It was easy to inflame either side but he agreed with Torrijos that this would return us to point zero. Situation was opportune to move forward constructively and positive attitude taken by Panama made Congress more receptive than it had been for some time.

6) Torrijos returned to his point that he needed something significant and posed possibility of Presidential declaration of principles indicating acceptance of Panama’s aspirations. In response Secretary asked if Presidential announcement of intention to seek legislation for significant concessions would do it. Torrijos thought it might if it were for something really significant. Then Torrijos asked why USG did not ask this “ghost” it continually parades to approve something and see what happened. Why don’t you ask Congress to approve use of Panamanian license plates on all Zone automobiles? He pressed this hard and then retreated somewhat with the observation that he did not want us to think that that would solve the problem. “It would help show your good will and give me something to use with the people but it would have to be done in such a way that I would not be accused of negotiating for five years and only getting the USG to use Panamanian plates,” he said.

7) Callaway said that he understood the point on demonstration of good will but he was certain USG negotiators would not want to be accused of giving away significant bargaining points. Torrijos retorted that he had maintained calm in Panama for five years and that he was entitled to some return for all of his effort and good will.

8) Secretary Callaway emphasized that Panama should not expect immediate results from Bunker’s visit in November.⁵ He understood first visit was for purpose of learning about issues first hand with object of developing his own views on how to proceed. Torrijos said he understood Bunker’s capabilities and Panama did not expect miracles. But then he recalled biblical account of “fishes and loaves”, after Jesus had been talking to followers even they grew impatient and wanted to be fed. Panama had now been listening for ten years and he for five and he had to have some fuel (a significant concession) to recharge his tank.

9) Torrijos appeared to have exhausted points he wanted to make and I told him I had been trying to arrange meeting with him to thank him for his action on Villa case.⁶ I noted that there was joke among us U.S. and Panamanians about him being best lawyer Villa had. I said that I wanted to present him with agreed honorarium. Torrijos relaxed somewhat during this exchange and was pleased.

10) Torrijos said he was entirely satisfied with USG support in preparing Panamanian unit for UNEF in Middle East. He also expressed satisfaction with work of MILGP and noted that most of MAP goes for education and training.

11) Comment: Torrijos feels under strong political pressure to deliver something significant on treaty negotiations. As he pressed his “five and ten” argument there was a strong hint that he considered his ability to remain in power depended on his performance on this issue. He mentioned again his satisfaction that GN had not thrown single tear gas grenade since he assumed office but expressed considerable pessimism about maintaining this calm atmosphere. He was cordial throughout but only occasionally broke a tense, forceful and earnest presentation with a smile or laugh.

Sayre

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840114–1819. Confidential; Nodis.
2. In telegram 6083 from Panama City, November 12, the Embassy provided an account of Callaway’s meeting with Lopez Guevara who argued that “the continuation of SOUTHCOM was intolerable and clearly illegal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972–August 1974) In telegram 6112 from Panama, November 13, the Embassy provided an account of Callaway’s meeting with Tack. (Ibid.)
3. The anniversary of the beginning of the 1964 riots. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Documents 367–379.
4. See Document 21.
5. See Document 26.
6. See footnote 7, Document 3.