21. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
-
Panama
- Fon. Min. Juan A. Tack
- Amb. to the White House Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla
- Amb. to the OAS Nander Pitty
- Amb. to the UN Aquilino Boyd
- Mr. Juan Antonio Stagg, Adviser, Foreign Ministry
-
U.S.
- The Secretary
- Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker
- Asst. Secy. Jack B. Kubisch
- Mr. William Jorden, NSC
- Mr. S. Morey Bell, Panama Country Director
SUBJECT
- The Secretary’s Bilateral Conversation with the Panamanian Foreign Minister
The Secretary: I want to present a gentleman who is our very best diplomat, Ambassador Bunker.
Minister Tack: I know that, sir.
(photographers intervene)
[Page 61]The Secretary: Now if you will just sign here (the treaty) we can wrap this up so I can put Ellsworth on some other problem. (prolonged laughter)
Minister Tack: I very much appreciate this opportunity, given the limited time you have, and it is logical to raise with you only the important matter of the Panama treaty negotiations. Ambassador Bunker began this years ago (1965, when he negotiated text of the joint presidential declaration)2 and has not finished it yet (laughter).
The Secretary: He does tend to drag things out, as he did in Vietnam. He has a great desire for job security (laughter).
Minister Tack: These negotiations have taken a very long time, but that is not altogether bad, for we have come to know each other well over the years.
From time to time the positions of the two parties have seemed very close. But then differences in interpretations of words pulled us apart. To illustrate, the U.S. has said it seeks a “new agreement”. Panama of course agrees with that. But occasionally the U.S. uses the word “revision”, and we do not know what to think. We hold that the 1903 treaty is anachronistic and must be abrogated, and to Latin Americans who are highly sensitive to language usages, your use of the word “revision” seems to us you are trying for something which only appears new.
Panama, you know, is the only country in the world that looks in five rather than four geographic directions. We look north, south, east and west, as others. But we also have to look at the center—where the United States sits among us.
Panama’s objective in the negotiations is clear and simple: we wish to perfect our independence by reintegrating the Canal Zone into the life of the Republic of Panama. Without that reintegration our independence will not be complete.
We are, I assure you, aware of the great importance which the United States attaches to the Canal Zone. We are not irresponsible. We are willing that the U.S. should continue to administer the Canal Zone for a time. But we must insist that your administration be civilian only in nature, and that it be designed to serve the whole world.
We are interested in the most rapid negotiations possible. As you noted, Mr. Secretary, former Secretary Rogers and I spoke of (eight) “principles”.3 Do you know, if we could agree on those principles, [Page 62] I could dictate to my secretary the text of a treaty in less than a week’s time.
The Secretary: You will understand that I have just begun reading in on the treaty problem, but I am already aware of the “principles” and they seem to be an appropriate way to start.
I should like to make several points. First, I have assigned Ambassador Bunker to this task. He is our most respected diplomat, a good personal friend in whom I have total confidence, and he has direct access to me. I will personally watch the course of negotiations, especially of course if there should be a deadlock. I am not saying this out of politeness, but rather conviction.
If there is a settlement possible that is consistent with the needs of both parties, we shall reach for it. We shall not delay difficult choices. Both sides, perhaps, will have to make adjustments.
As for your comment on “revision”, let us settle everything first and then decide what to call it.
I know you want a treaty for a fixed term, and we have no real problem with that.
We are approaching this negotiation with the desire to bring it to a prompt conclusion.
I would say, however, that we do not react very well to public pressure. We must approach the talks honestly and quietly and seriously, and get them done quickly.
I believe we can come out of this with a strengthened relationship—and, for that, you cannot extort from us and we cannot impose our will on you.
Minister Tack: We very much appreciate the significance of Ambassador Bunker’s appointment, and we feel it important that he come to Panama as soon as possible. President Lakas, General Torrijos and I will have open arms for him, and welcome him with all the respect he merits.
The Secretary: I have to swear him in first (laughter).
Minister Tack: We hope we may begin our conversations soon.
The Secretary: When do you go down, Ellsworth?
Ambassador Bunker: In the last days of October or early days of November.
The Secretary: Where will the negotiations take place? Will the two of you negotiate together?
Minister Tack: We shall negotiate together, at least in the beginning. With respect to the locale, formerly they were held almost exclusively in Washington, but it is important that they now be held in Panama, for that instills much-needed confidence in our people.
[Page 63]The Secretary: Well, my only concern is that Ambassador Bunker was separated from his wife for—what was it, Ellsworth, six years? And now I have promised him he can have some family life. I would be grateful if you would keep the human element in mind, so that I can keep my promise to the Ambassador.
Minister Tack: We have no problem with having some of the negotiations held in Washington, although we would hope that most of them could take place in Panama. We would want the negotiations in Panama to be effective, of course, not simply symbolic.
The Secretary: Frankly I would appreciate your doing this for me. We abused him badly in Vietnam. From the point of view of national policy we have no problem with holding part of the negotiations in Panama.
Minister Tack: We intend to make a maximum effort to resolve this problem. It is, of course, not a juridicial one, nor an economic one, but entirely a political one. We also want to achieve the least complicated treaty possible. Our people will have to understand the treaty.
The Secretary: I understand some of Panama’s domestic political problems, but if we do a good job then the outcome will be acceptable to the people of both sides. Again, Mr. Foreign Minister, we approach this with good will and a willingness to compromise.
(non-substantive interchange with Ambassador Boyd).
The Secretary: Our spirit is constructive, Mr. Foreign Minister. I shall keep a personal eye on the negotiations. And I shall be delighted to meet with you further at any time you think it necessary, especially were there to be a stalemate.
(parting courtesies).
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972–August 1974. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bell; cleared by Kubisch; approved in S. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers. Kissinger, who became Secretary of State on September 22, was attending the U.N. General Assembly session.↩
- Bunker was serving as the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization for American States when he assisted with the negotiations. For text of the joint statement of September 24, 1965, see Public Papers: Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1020–1021.↩
- See Tab A, Document 13.↩