25. Memorandum From the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell) to Ambassador at Large Bunker1
SUBJECT
- Your Call on the Secretary of Defense November 21, 1973—11:30 a.m.
A good friend who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA (Europe/NATO),2 who sympathizes with our concern over the Defense position on the Canal issue, and who travels abroad with Secretary Schlesinger, agreed some weeks ago to gather impressions of (a) his personal views on the issue and (b) the role he might play in decision-making within Defense on the issue. The following are his findings.
Instinctively, and as a generalized matter, the Secretary is worried at the apparently relentless erosion of American power positions abroad. Specifically he thinks of the Canal and the Zone as comprising one which should and need not be allowed to erode.
That sentiment was intensified by his difficulties in mounting the re-supply airlift to Israel. When country after country denied permission for refueling stops, and even Portugal hesitated before permitting use of the Azores, the Secretary was dismayed at how tenuous our worldwide LOC (lines of communication) are, and became more interested in preserving those such as the Canal which we have.3
He is also aware—though vaguely—that the Joint Chiefs are about to approve a “comprehensive” study of the strategic value of the Canal which asserts that while it has little value for Atlantic operations it is [Page 70] critical for Pacific ones.4 (Comment: Other friends in Defense have said things from which I infer that there is a rush on to have the Chiefs “red stripe” this study, so that it will be there to confront you and the President when and if you were to recommend major concessions. But this is my inference only).
Yet the Secretary’s intellect is such that “once he has let off steam” he will recognize that the Administration would not wish to run the domestic as well as international risks of another blow-up in Panama; that our “colonialism” is markedly out of step with the times; that there is legitimacy to Panama’s nationalist movement; and that there is a certain American-style “rightness” in returning to Panama rights and properties we no longer require but Panama needs.
It takes a special effort to switch on that intellectual approach—not just educational diplomacy, but also some effort to “reach” his particular personality.
The effort is worthwhile because no one can as a practical matter reverse ISA’s position on the Canal except the Secretary, not even Deputy Secretary Clements. Ambassador Hill is a hand-picked product of the Secretary, with the President’s specific blessing.
Also, since the Middle East crisis the Defense Secretary and Secretary Kissinger have become very close. Were Secretary Schlesinger to remain unalterably opposed to a forthcoming attitude vis-à-vis Panama, that would count a good deal with Dr. Kissinger.
Soundings I have taken elsewhere in Defense tend to confirm the foregoing analysis: the Secretary is tough on Panama but not irreversibly.
Recommendations:
1. Begin with the line you have developed—1964–65 association5 . . . Henry Kissinger has asked you to take this on . . . not certain you should have acquiesced . . . intractable problem . . . but: imperative (domestically and internationally) to resolve it.
2. Then mention your awareness that when he was CIA Director, and decided to change the NIE’s (National Intelligence Estimates) from simple intelligence analysis to an analysis-plus-“options” format, the first NIE that came to his attention, and which he personally rewrote in the new format, was the Panama one. It follows he has a deeper appreciation of the problem for the U.S. than most.
3. Finally: The homework you have done before your first visit suggests that
[Page 71](a) The problem for the U.S. is serious.
(b) We need this waterway—and your intent is to preserve it for us for a protracted period.
(c) But we do not need many of the trappings that now go with it.
(d) And, basically, it is the trappings that drive the Panamanians up the wall—and into international fora, possibly into direct action against our presence in the Zone.6
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, DOA–DOD, Liaison With. Confidential; Stadis; Nodis.↩
- Harry E. Bergold, Jr.↩
- A reference to Operation Nickel Grass, which resupplied Israel during the October 1973 war.↩
- See Document 33.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 21.↩
- In his memoir, Jorden described the meeting between Schlesinger and Bunker: “He [Bunker] called on Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and found the top civilian in the Pentagon only vaguely aware of the Panama issue, and inclined to think any change would be a bad one.” (Panama Odyssey, p. 208)↩
- Bell initialed “SMB” above his typed signature.↩