Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

3. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 23, 1973.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with Panama

I have returned from the visit to Panama which you approved.² I spent three full days, February 9–12, from early morning until late at night with General Torrijos. We travelled through a good part of the country, visiting farms and villages, talking with officials, farmers and many citizens. I also had several long talks with the General, including one very serious and substantive private discussion of about three hours.

I have described the trip in the attached Memo for the Record at Tab A.³ It will give you a feel for Panama today, and especially for Torrijos the man and national leader, and his style of operation. My substantive talk with Torrijos is described in the Memo at Tab B.⁴

I believe it is fair to say that my visit with Torrijos and my discussions with him have put U.S.-Panaman relations on a somewhat new footing. He described it as a “new chapter” and “a new beginning.” The fact that the White House, and specifically Dr. Kissinger, saw fit to send someone down especially to talk with him had considerable impact. He said he had great difficulty dealing with “lawyers, diplomats and Zonians.” He could not get through to them and they could not understand him. He said it was a pleasure at last to be able to talk to an American who could understand his problems and also describe U.S. attitudes clearly and candidly, but without threats or double-talk. He would warmly welcome a Kissinger visit to Panama at any time.

The central items that emerged from our talks were these:

On the Canal Treaty: He has no faith in the ability of our negotiators or his to reach an agreement in any reasonable time frame. He wishes both sides could change their personnel and their attitudes. However, he is willing to let the traditional negotiating process continue pretty much as it has been if that is what we wish. He recognizes that it probably will not be possible to reach agreement soon on the “big questions.” By these he meant—transfer of jurisdiction, duration of a new treaty, the sea level canal option, etc.

Meanwhile, he believes it possible to make progress on other issues that divide us. He gave me a list of 12 items—attached at Tab C—that he thinks we can settle one-by-one and thus provide the clear impression of forward movement.⁵ He needs that to keep a rein on those from whom he gets the most pressure for drastic action—the students, intellectuals and “left-wingers” in his government. He said he was not worried about them—if he can demonstrate slow but steady progress.

Incidentally, one of the items on his list—removal of the cyclone fence separating the Zone from Panama—was accomplished two days after I left Panama. Another—the right to fly the Panamanian flag on ships transiting the Canal—is being accomplished this week.

What Torrijos wants, in short, is a parallel track approach—with traditional negotiations proceeding in their desultory way, while we move ahead on specifics. He said he would feel better if he knew that I was taking a personal role in the second track. I told him I would be watching it carefully and would stay in close touch with his Ambassador here. It is apparent that he is fearful, based on past experience, that if this process gets bogged down in the bureaucratic swamp, little or nothing will happen.

On the UN Security Council meeting in Panama (beginning March 15)—Torrijos assured me flatly that “there will be no violence, no riots.” He also promised to tone down any anti-American themes in the Panamanian media. (We have intelligence reports that he is doing this.)⁶

He said that Panama wants the meeting to be a success and that it will not be if it turns into an anti-American outburst.

Torrijos intends to open the proceedings with a speech of welcome. In it, he said, he would “set the tone” calling for serious and thoughtful discussion of serious problems. He will point out that this is not an appropriate forum for invective and wild rhetoric. He said he thought that if he, as the host, set that opening tone, the others, or most of them, would follow his lead. He will, of course, mention the Canal and Panama’s feelings but we can live with that.

Torrijos’ approach is clearly more reasonable and responsible than that of his Ambassador to the UN who has been charging around depicting the coming meeting as a chance to mobilize world opinion against the U.S. We have indications that Torrijos has already told him to lower the noise level.

Torrijos also told me that Castro would not be attending the meeting and he expected Foreign Minister Roa to represent Cuba.

I told Torrijos that if the UN meeting turned into an “anti-American donnybrook” it would do three things:

—lower Panama’s prestige;

—weaken the UN system;

—put out of business for some time those of us who want to deal seriously with U.S.-Panama problems.

He said he understood and agreed. Those were things he did not want to happen.

On the case of Captain Villa:⁷ I explained the background of the case and the reason for President Nixon’s pledge to the Villa family to do “all possible” to secure his release from jail in Cuba. I knew he was concerned that Villa was a CIA operative, and assured him this was not true. Our interest was purely humanitarian.

Torrijos said he felt that he had been “double-crossed” by Castro. First, he had given assurances that the boats and men would be released to Panama and he then had provided only the boats. Second, he pledged that the boats were in “good condition” then they almost sank one day out of Havana and had to be towed back to port. I told Torrijos we had both been double-crossed.

Torrijos said he had no faith in Romulo Escobar Betancourt, Rector of Panama University, who had been negotiating with the Cubans. He could not be sure that Escobar stated Panama’s case clearly, or that he reported accurately to Torrijos on his talks in Havana. What he wanted to do, he said, was to send his G–2, Lt. Col. Noriega, to Havana. He could be sure Noriega would convey his feelings accurately—and that he would get an accurate report back. But “some of your people” had warned Noriega not to have anything to do with the Cubans. If he did, he would be tarred as a “communist” and it would affect his relations with us.

I gave Torrijos my personal assurance this was not true and would not happen. If Noriega could get Villa out of Havana, we would be grateful and I would guess that it would improve, not damage, our relations with him. Torrijos said he would take my word and would send Noriega to Cuba “next week.” I have just had a report that Colonel Noriega will probably go to Havana today (Feb. 23).

Other matters you may wish to consider:

Treaty Negotiators: We have been working on a new treaty for almost ten years. The net result: nothing. The President should pick a new chief negotiator, one who will work on this full time. Robert Anderson is a wise and dedicated person, but he has too many other responsibilities and interests to give this matter the attention it deserves.

U.S. Ambassador: Relations with Panama over the next few years are going to be crucially important, in themselves and in the effect they have on our overall posture in Latin America. Bob Sayre is a lame duck. The replacements I have heard rumored are for the most part inadequate, and even disastrous. We need a tough-minded able ambassador who can put our own house in Panama in order and work effectively with Torrijos. I hope you will not let an appointment go through without looking hard at it.

Helicopter: The only specific request Torrijos made of me—and he did it reluctantly—was to ask help in getting fast delivery of a helicopter they wish to buy for his personal use. His personal pilot had just been killed in a helicopter accident in Texas. The head of the Air Force told me privately that the pilots—who fly Torrijos all over the country 3 or 4 days every week—are worried sick that they will go down with him aboard. I have discussed this with General Scowcroft and believe it is on track. It will have a tremendously useful effect if we can provide delivery of the helicopter before the UN meeting—or if Torrijos at least knows by then that it is on the way.

Recommendation:

1. That you approve the two-track approach to negotiations and authorize me to monitor the operation, working with State and Defense.

2. That you discuss with the President the importance of picking a first-class Ambassador to Panama and that selection of an able, full-time negotiator for Canal Treaty problems be considered.

3. That you approve an all-out effort to make available for sale to Panama as quickly as possible the requested helicopter (UH–1N) for General Torrijos’ use.⁸

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1335, NSC Unfiled Material, 1973 [9 of 12]. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. Jorden recommended the visit in a January 31 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.)
3. Tab A, dated February 20, is attached but not printed.
4. Tab B, a Memorandum for the Record dated February 20, is attached but not printed.
5. Tab C, undated, is attached but not printed. Some of the proposed unilateral actions included returning the Old France Field airport, permitting the sale of lottery tickets in the Canal Zone, allowing Panamanian police partial jurisdiction in the Canal Zone, and the establishment of equal wages for all workers within the Canal Zone.
6. In telegram 549 from Panama City, February 2, the Embassy reported on the potential of Panamanian grandstanding at the Security Council meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–3 CZ)
7. Villa, an American citizen, had been imprisoned in Cuba since the seizure of two Panamanian-registered ships by Cuba in December 1971. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Documents 252, 262, and 264.
8. Kissinger approved the third recommendation and took no action on the first two recommendations. On March 12, Scowcroft sent a handwritten note to Jorden, writing: “Bill—HAK is a little reluctant to launch a two track approach until he knows exactly what our long-term objectives are and what the potential pitfalls may be. Perhaps you would want to send something up which would help sort this out for him. Brent. The helo paper has gone to DOD.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1335, NSC Unified Material, 1973 [9 of 12])