Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul, April 18, 1969, 0300Z.

1940. 1. President Park asked me to call this morning to discuss plane incident and to inquire concerning moves that we intended to make. I informed him that we had been in contact with FonOff on matter of MAC meeting and gave him general outline of our intentions, which was all that was possible because we had not yet received final text of statement Knapp would make.² President said he wants to convey to President Nixon his firm belief that this incident will be repeated again as soon as North Koreans have an opportunity. Choice seems to lie between making them understand by a counterblow that they cannot count on continued patience and restraint as they pursue their aggressive policy, or we can give up our right to operate on and over international waters.

2. He said that after Blue House/Pueblo incidents of last year³ he had strongly urged Vance and me to agree to a strong warning to North Koreans that any additional incident would bring immediate retaliation, but we had refused to go along with that idea and as result US has this new incident to deal with. I commented that there were some additional factors which affect our attitude toward this problem. No one could say in advance what kind of immediate retaliation would be called for and it does not seem at all desirable simply to react without careful thought and consultation. Moreover, everyone knows that we could strike North Koreans and that they do not have the power to strike back at United States. This made it inevitable that their counterblow would probably escalate matters considerably because it would be against Republic of Korea, perhaps cities or major installations. At this point President was silent for awhile. He then said he nevertheless wished to convey to President Nixon his belief that this incident will be followed by others unless some strong reply is made.

3. President Park is most anxious to know what line President Nixon will take in his press conference.⁴ It will help matters here if we could convey whatever you may feel able to provide in that respect prior to press conference. I believe you can rely on him to keep matter strictly confidential until press conference.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Major General James Knapp delivered a statement, released concurrently by the Department of Defense, at the 290th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) at Panmunjom, Korea, on April 17 (April 18, Korean time). Knapp encouraged the North Koreans to acknowledge responsibility for the shootdown and to “take appropriate measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.” The full text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1969, pp. 382–383.
3. Reference is to the attack on the Blue House, the Presidential residence in Seoul, the day before the seizure of the Pueblo. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, part 1, Korea, Document 144.
4. See footnote 4, Document 15.