Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

17. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Alternatives Incident to EC–121 Shootdown

Military Options

If I understand correctly, the alternative military responses being considered against North Korea as retaliation for the EC–121 shoot-down have boiled down to airstrikes against two airfields:

• • [less than 1 line not declassified]
• • [less than 1 line not declassified]

I believe discarding the other military options was appropriate. If a military step is to be taken, an airstrike is the best bet for a number of reasons:

• • It can be related to the act taken against the U.S., i.e., it comes closest to being an eye-for-an-eye.
• • It is a one-time operation, i.e., it does not carry the disadvantages of having to be sustained over a period of time, as would mining a harbor or establishing a blockade.
• • It would be directed against a North Korean military installation, and would not involve, or would minimize, civilian casualties or the impression of a random measure directed against the entire North Korean populace.
• • It could be launched from U.S. bases, land or sea, thereby avoiding the implication of other nations.
• • North Korean airfields are more accessible than other potential targets.

If an attack is carried out, I believe the carrier-based attack strike is preferable for a number of reasons. Among those reasons are that:

• • B–52 strikes are synonymous—rightly or wrongly—with massive, indiscriminate bombing. At 30 tons of bombs per B–52, there is some justification for the “massive” impression. A strike involving B–52s could well be less acceptable in the eyes of world opinion, and even possibly U.S. public opinion, than one involving smaller ordnance loads and destruction impact.
• • If U.S. losses occur in the strike (and I believe there is more chance they may than the JCS papers indicate),² the loss of smaller attack aircraft will be more palatable (in terms of lives and dollars) than the loss of B–52s.
• • Attack aircraft (such as the A–6) can combine surprise (low-level, night attacks) with accuracy (the A–6 avionics are among the best available).
• • Attack aircraft are more maneuverable than bomber aircraft, thereby providing an advantage in minimizing losses.
• • A–6 aircraft can be refueled in flight, I have been advised, thereby providing the option of carrying out the strikes within roughly the same time frame as potential B–52 strikes.

Is Military Retaliation Desirable?

Again, if a military option is desired, the carrier-based attack option appears to be the best. I believe, however, it would be better not to use military options now for the following reasons:

• • Despite the merits of conducting reconnaissance against North Korea and the clear claim we have to operating on the open seas and in the air away from claimed territorial airspace, it is not clear yet that we:
  • —need the volume of reconnaissance conducted.
  • —could not have conducted, and cannot conduct in the future, the requisite level of reconnaissance with adequate armed escort.
  • —therefore, took all the precautionary measures from a command standpoint that should have been taken. The resultant charge could easily arise that:
    • • we have unnecessarily exposed ship and air crews to risks near North Korea.
    • • we have not provided adequate protection for the crews.
    • • we are now taking added risks (to the immediate crews on the airfield strikes and to the U.S. and ROK generally in terms of sustained combat involvement) to retaliate for a situation which evolved from poor planning in the first place, i.e., we are compounding our errors.
• • There are alternatives available which would be palatable to the U.S. people, and which demonstrate our resolve, e.g.,
  • —an explanation of reasons for maintaining recce flights. —the vow to provide adequate armed escort and a virtual challenge to North Korea to stop us.
  • —instructions to our military to engage and destroy any North Korean aircraft or vessels approaching our vehicles outside North Korean territorial air space or waters.
  • —declaring the option of conducting strikes against North Korean bases if the North Koreans persist in interfering with our aircraft or surface vessels.³
• • I believe the public is supporting and even applauding the Administration’s present reasoned, calm posture. The newspaper, TV, and radio editorials indicate as much. The contacts I have made among the members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, point to similar acceptance of our current posture. From my sampling, it appears those on the Hill calling for military retaliation are a minority. I believe they will support, on the other hand, a program like that outlined above, which puts our reconnaissance back on station, provides armed escort, and serves notice we will thwart any attempts by North Korea to interfere with such activity. One of the major risks, therefore, in a military strike against North Korea is that of eroding support we need in:
  • —pursuing our Vietnam policies.
  • —the ABM debate.
  • —the increasing dialogue on the so-called “military-industrial complex.”
  • —the involvement of the military in foreign policy matters.
  • —resolution of campus disorders, which stem in part from the ROTC programs.
  • —trying to stem the tide of general disenchantment with matters of a military nature.
• • The immediate implications of a strike against North Korea go even further. It is not clear we have the capability now to handle a major confrontation in Korea, if the North Koreans should react with a major assault of any duration against South Korea. The Joint Staff informs me:
  • —sufficient ground force stocks exist for about 1 week of hostilities, after which ammunition and equipment would have to be diverted from Southeast Asia.
  • —sufficient naval and air force stocks are on hand for 30 to 45 days activity, after which diversions from Southeast Asia would have to be made.
  • —any military involvement in Korea would involve a deferral of the RVNAF modernization program.
  • —initial combat in Korea would include expenditure controls of combat supplies for U.S. forces.
  • —the capability to receive and move combat supplies into Korea, at least for 30 days after the initiation of any combat will be extremely limited.
  • —increased production of major combat items, especially ammunition should be initiated, and budget adjustments made, as soon as possible if military action in Korea is contemplated.
• • I believe a tie of this incident to Paris⁴ and military activity in Southeast Asia is possible, but it is not clear what the impact of a strike against North Korea would be. The enemy knows full well what kinds of presence we have in SEA, what kinds of pressure we have been maintaining, and what kinds of losses he (the enemy) is taking. I do not believe a failure to act militarily would be interpreted by the North Vietnamese leadership as an act of vacillation or irresolution on our part. A military strike against North Korea carries risks vis à vis our efforts in Paris and SEA, for the following reasons:
  • —We currently have the initiative in Paris, as being forthcoming, reasoned, and willing to de-escalate. A military venture against North Korea could be touted by the enemy—and the world press—as an example of the aggression and unreasonableness of the U.S. (however false such charges may be). The result could be the loss of some advantages we now have.
  • —The North Vietnamese and VC are trying to elicit a U.S. withdrawal. The risks of our involvement in another major conflict could give the NVA/VC encouragement that we would have to withdraw, either sooner or in less effective way, or divert major resources from the Southeast Asia effort.
  • —Our ability to contend the RVNAF is being given more and better equipment is improving, and is taking over more of the fighting, could be jeopardized.
  • —The strikes we are conducting—or planning to conduct—in 3d nations such as Cambodia and Laos would probably meet with general public approval now. Cast against the background of a raid against North Korea, which may touch off expansion of the military conflict there, such strikes in SEA could meet with strong public disapproval—on the grounds they risk still wider U.S. military involvement. Therefore, rather than helping in our Paris and SEA efforts, a North Korean strike could damage such efforts.
• • I have the feeling a U.S. attack which would be interpreted as mainly for the purpose of punishing the North Koreans, could be akin to incidents which plagued the last two Administrations, i.e., the episode that didn’t have to be, that carried far more risks than the potential pay-off would seem to dictate, and that led to general public disenchantment across a broad range of affairs. If, for example, we take losses during the strike, the question will be raised about losing more life to vindicate original losses. If, for example, we become involved in a more extended fracas at a time when the public is not heavily in favor of things military, the impact against the Administration on a wide front could be damaging to a high degree. If, for example, the Soviets decide not to proceed with strategic talks—as we postponed such talks in the wake of Czechoslovakia—the U.S. public clamor could be likewise damaging.

I wonder if we should take the chance. I believe the carrier-based strike against North Korean airfields is least risky among the military options. But I believe the risks even there outweigh the potential benefits by a substantial margin.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 438, Korea:EC–121 Shootdown, General Materials—EC–121 Shootdown. Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 7 and footnote 2, Document 10.
3. On April 18, Kissinger sent Laird a memorandum in which he indicated that “The President has directed that normal EC–121 flights in the Korean area be continued and that until further notice they be provided with armed fighter escort.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 9, K–3, Korea, January–December 1969)
4. Reference is to the Paris Peace Talks to negotiate an end to the fighting in Vietnam.