19. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
The President said his concern was that we were going to have a great amount of attention today on this particular thing. He didn’t think there was much point in going forward with Option 2.2 It’s too much of a piddily thing to announce it on Monday.3 To me, it’s not all that significant. What he had in mind to say was just the facts—that we have run these flights many times, they have been completely unarmed, they have been well outside the territorial limits, he has ordered a continuation of the flights and will take whatever steps are necessary to see that they are protected.
HAK thought it would most certainly be read as an end to it. The President said suppose it is. HAK said maybe some of the President’s supporters would also think this. The reason they are quiet on the Hill is that they don’t want to get ahead of the President. The President said if we crack it on Monday he will still get the supporters to come along. HAK agreed.
The P said he would use the phrase “he would use whatever action is determined to be necessary” and wondered if HAK had any [Page 45] problems with that. HAK said no but in that case he posed two additional questions. If the question is asked whether this same flight has been flown since the incident the answer would be no since they will not fly another pattern of this kind for another two weeks. On the other hand, we do have another plane standing by. The P said whether we do option 2 or not, we would do that. He would keep these flights on the same pattern. The President said he is not trying to provoke so no special missions would be set up. If the question is asked whether that means a flight will be in the area, the answer is that it will be in that area whenever it comes up on its regular schedule or we are resuming scheduled reconnaissance. HAK was worried that the headline would be “President orders armed fighter escorts.”
The President said don’t let the Times editorials bother you. When they push him in one direction, it makes him go all the more in the other. You just don’t appease them.
The President said the Czech thing4 was important. HAK suggested he play that one low key until we see what we are going to do on the other thing. He added that this is going to make the Soviets look particularly repressive and we would look good because of our restraint.
The President said HAK’s plan for today should be to get the plan ready and recheck with Mel and Helms. HAK said he would have a session with Rogers too.
The President said how about spend 15 minutes with the Statutory members of the NSC (specifically Lincoln) just to get their ideas on this thing.5 He said he favors option 1 because if they took option 2 they would have to take a very tough line in Vietnam and we don’t have to with option 1. That would mean the risk of Cambodia.
HAK said we have had a cable from the North (South?) Korean President urging strong action. Our ambassador said we can’t.6
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 435, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korean Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/18/69–4/28/69, Vol. III Haig. No classification marking.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 15.↩
- April 21.↩
- Reference to the anti-Soviet “Ice Hockey Riots” of March 28–29, which followed the second victory of the Czechoslovak ice hockey team over the Soviet Union in the world championship. In response to the widespread anti-Soviet disturbances, Soviet Marshal Grechko visited Czechoslovakia and Gustav Husak replaced Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.↩
- No record of a meeting has been found.↩
- Document 18.↩