Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, January 21, 1966, 1010Z.

757. Troops for RVN. Ref: (A) Deptel 703;² (B) Emb A–272;³ (C) Emb A–275;⁴ (D) Emb A–276;⁵ (E) COMUSK 5436;⁶ (F) Embtel 758.⁷

1. CT feels that we have now progressed as far as we can in separate discussions with MND and DPM. FonMin reports that both are dissatisfied and are advising President that US responses to date inadequate to justify favorable decision. President, DPM, MND and FonMin are leaving Feb 7 for two weeks and target dates of April and July for arrival of new forces in RVN are receding rapidly. Time has therefore now come to try to bring matter to a head and seek decision from President who basically favorable and is neither accurately nor objectively informed by either MND or DPM.

2. It is unnecessary to elaborate theme that this early request for doubling ROK forces in RVN, coupled with fact that acceding to it will, at best, involve some temporary degradation present ROK military strength at home (Deptel 703 para 2),⁸ presents President Pak with genuine political problem which we must help him meet.

3. We feel that a definitive offer should now be presented. If there is to be any chance of favorable decision even by President Pak before Feb 7, it should be as generous as possible. Our concept of that offer is set forth in draft letter to FonMin (Ref F), as supplemented by General Beach’s letter to MND of Jan 18 (Ref D encl).

4. This offer will involve solid amounts of money. Amounts so paid here, however, are as directly spent for the prosecution of the war in RVN as those spent for maintenance of our own forces there. But for categories of accounting they would be charged to RVN and would be swallowed up in the cost of that great effort. In any event, if we are to get an extra division and brigade we must be prepared to pay for them. The amounts involved, while substantial, are small in comparison with the cost of doing the job ourselves.

5. I propose to hand this offer to the Foreign Minister, if and as soon as you approve it, hopefully early next week, stressing stakes involved and need for early ROK decision, before President leaves if possible. While chances of President’s submitting matter to Assembly before he leaves on Feb 7 is diminishing as each day passes, it would be very desirable to get favorable decision by President before Feb 7 in order to permit necessary military planning to proceed within government during his absence.

6. ROKs may well come back with assertion that they need more. As a fall-back position CT recommends that we be prepared, if it will clinch the deal, to add a 25 percent increase in per diem for ROK forces in RVN.

7. Would appreciate Washington approval soonest, so we can expedite decision here.⁹

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC for POLAD, Tokyo, and Saigon.
2. See footnote 2, Document 69.
3. In airgram A–272 from Seoul, January 17, the Embassy forwarded copies of a January 13 letter from the Korean Minister of National Defense to General Beach detailing Korean requests submitted in exchange for providing additional troops for Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S)
4. See footnote 3, Document 71.
5. Airgram A–276 from Seoul, January 19, transmitted copies of General Beach’s reply to the Korean requests submitted on January 13. A copy of the airgram without attachments is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S.
6. Not found.
7. Telegram 758 from Seoul, January 21, contained the Embassy’s draft letter to Pak explaining the terms the United States was prepared to offer in exchange for a Korean division and brigade for Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S)
8. In paragraph 2 of telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8, the Department of State instructed Brown to explain to Korean officials that by meeting the U.S. objective of sending a brigade by April and a division by July to Vietnam “it may be necessary for the ROK to accept some temporary lessening of TE of the ROK active forces in Korea until shipments of equipment and supplies can reach Korea for the activation of reserve units, the reconstitution of support and service elements, and the reconstitution of ready reserve units.” The United States would, however, provide the needed equipment as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
9. In telegram 758 to Seoul, January 22, the Department concurred with most of the Embassy’s recommendations. The major points of divergence involved the amount of death and disability payments to be paid and a potential increase of 25 percent in the per diem rate paid to ROK troops serving in Vietnam. (Ibid.)