Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, January 5, 1966, 0830Z.

689. Department please pass DOD. Troops for South Vietnam.

1. Foreign Minister called in Ambassador January 4 to initiate troop talks.² They agreed that General Beach and MND should meet to discuss what would be necessary on military side to prevent impairment Korean security if further division and brigade sent South Vietnam. They also agreed DPM and Bernstein should meet, but FonMin refused limit their discussion to what would be necessary prevent added economic burden and insisted that they also discuss “political and economic plus to which Vice President Humphrey referred in his talk with President Pak.”

2. General Beach later met MND, who presented broad program of demands for additional trade benefits totalling $500 million, pointed out that (a) no economic benefits had yet been received as result despatch Tiger division, and (b) no significant amounts of equipment promised for ready reserve division or for improvement firepower regular divisions had yet arrived, and made a number of other points covered in COMUSK message 53935.³

3. At General Beach’s insistence MND finally agreed to formation joint US/ROK working group to consider practical military problems involved. Group hopes begin work soon.

4. MND stated Ministers concerned all had different ideas and he was going to see President later in afternoon.

5. At same time MND was at Blue House DPM met with Bernstein.⁴ DPM was more reasonable, confirmed that ministers had different ideas, repeated in the main the requests he had made to Vice President Humprey⁵ and stressed that he alone was to be the channel for talks on economic aspects of the proposed troop dispatch. These talks will continue.

6. Concurrently Yi Hu-rak told DCM that President was needled yesterday by Blue House press as to what Korea had got out of dispatch of Tiger division. He said President wants to send more troops but must be able justify his action to Korean people in simple terms and show that Korea is benefiting at least as much as other countries not militarily involved, i.e., Japan. Simplest explanation would be increased trade and aid. Yi had in mind about $100 million in directed procurement for SVN and $30/40 million in program loans.

7. There is clearly as yet no coordination or considered opinion within ROKG, but things are moving and with time and patience we believe we can sort things out.

8. We are more convinced than ever that, despite DPM’s currently more sophisticated and long range approach, key to satisfactory solution lies in Yi Hu-rak’s statement that Korea must demonstrably benefit at least as much as other countries not militarily involved, especially through directed procurement of materiel, services and manpower for SVN.

9. Further reporting will be limited to major developments and matters requiring Washington decision.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon and CINCPAC for POLAD and passed to the Department of Defense.
2. In telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8, the Department of State asked that the Embassy begin negotiations as soon as practicable in order to meet “high priority USG objective to obtain one Korean brigade by April 1966 and one Korean division force in SVN by July 1966.” The telegram also detailed the package of military and economic commitments the United States was prepared to offer the Koreans in exchange for providing troops to Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
3. Not found.
4. Detailed information on the discussion between the Deputy Prime Minister and Bernstein was transmitted in telegram 705 from Seoul, January 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) KOR S)
5. The Deputy Prime Minister told Humphrey that the United States could help Korea by increasing the amount of raw material sent to the ROK for processing, by assisting in the creation of export markets, by expanding procurement of Korean goods for Korean and all other forces in Vietnam, by excluding Japan from those markets for a few years, and by lending U.S. merchant ships to Korea to benefit its foreign exchange position. (Memorandum of conversation, January 2, enclosure 2 to airgram A–255 from Seoul; ibid., POL 27 VIET S)