Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

72. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, January 15, 1966, 0630Z.

735. Subj: Korean Troops for Vietnam.

1. In course of wide-ranging conversation with DCM January 14 Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak had number of interesting things to say about how Korean Govt views U.S. request for additional Korean forces to be sent to Vietnam.

2. Yi said U.S. request for additional division and brigade had come as something of a shock to President. President, Yi said, was quite proud of his prompt and effective response to U.S. earlier request, speed with which Tiger division and Blue Dragon regiment were despatched to Vietnam and disciplined and courageous performance of forces in Vietnam. According to Yi President never expected to be confronted with another request so soon. However he responded affirmatively out of friendship for President Johnson and a strong feeling of loyalty to U.S. engendered during his state visit to Washington last May. At same time he had grave misgivings about Korean public reaction to being asked so soon for such a heavy additional contribution. In Yi’s own words President feels that despatch of additional forces requested will “overload Korea” but he is anxious to comply if politically feasible.

3. With such mixed attitude Yi said President feels he has to proceed cautiously and only after taking careful political soundings. President not only wants to be sure that Korean public will not feel they are being asked to do too much. He also thinks it important to be able to represent and defend Korean’s involvement in Vietnam as clearly in the ROK’s own interest.

4. President feels, according to Yi, that it is in interest of ROK to oppose communism anywhere in East Asia. In his own view this is sufficient justification for Korean intervention in Vietnam provided that intervention does not endanger security of ROK and does not impose an economic burden. However President does not feel such justification will be sufficient in presenting matter to National Assembly. Average Korean does not really see war in Vietnam as direct threat to security of ROK. On contrary he believes diversion of ROK forces to Vietnam weakens defenses of ROK while at same time inviting retaliation from north. To overcome this probable reaction to despatch of any further ROK forces to Vietnam President feels he will have to be able to demonstrate in National Assembly that there are corollary and significant benefits to ROK.

5. These corollary benefits should meet two conditions. They should be easy to explain to Korean public as flowing directly from Korean involvement in Vietnam and they should be large enough to convince Koreans that U.S. properly appreciates sacrifices that Korean people are making to assist in Vietnam. Yi then cited as an example question of death and disability benefits. Korean people would not be able to understand he said if U.S. was stingy in matter of death and disability benefits. U.S. would have to be prepared to be extremely generous in matter of death and disability benefits for those Koreans killed or wounded in action.

6. Yi concluded this portion of conversation by reminding DCM that sixty-six was an election year. Yi said that he was fairly confident that President would be reelected in sixty-seven if all went well, particularly, in view of weakened and divided state of the opposition party. President was however worried that opposition to despatching additional troops to Vietnam would snowball and become issue around which opposition leaders could rally to attack government and possibly have a decisive effect on election outcome.

7. Comment: We believe Yi who is close to President Pak was expressing with reasonable accuracy how President assesses problem presented by our latest request for ROK troops. Question remains when he will be able to take final decision. Judgement as to public and political reaction can probably be made over course of three weeks remaining before Pak leaves for Southeast Asian trip, since possibility of additional troop despatch gradually becoming known and will be hinted at in Pak’s opening address to National Assembly next week. Whether and when terms and amount of support U.S. willing to offer “in appreciation” will seem sufficient to Pak will depend on progress of current negotiations which are still in opening phase. With positions two sides far apart, we are exerting every effort to get favorable decision before Pak leaves on trip and will let you know as soon as possible what we believe will be necessary to get it.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Tokyo, and Saigon.