Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, June 3, 1965.

1271. 1. In courtesy call on President Pak he raised question of ROK combat troops for RVN, asking clarification whether number desired was regimental combat team as mentioned by Amb Lodge or division mentioned by President Johnson. I replied that question was one of timing. A division was wanted, but combat team was all that could be accommodated at first. Pak said he would ask Assembly for authority to send up to division, to avoid necessity approaching Assembly twice.²

2. In response to direct question Pak stated it was his considered judgment that asking Assembly now to approve dispatch combat troops to RVN would not add materially to problem of obtaining Assembly approval of settlement with Japan. In fact there might be some advantage in presenting Assembly with several important questions at once. Opposition would have problem where to concentrate its fire. (FonMin made same point to me earlier today.) Pak expects about same result in vote on combat force as was achieved in vote on 2,000 non-combat troops.

3. Pak has requested GRVN through charge here for formal request for division. As soon as this is received he plans publish it and ask Assembly approval. He regrets that matter has prematurely leaked to press, and has instructed Min Defense to deny flatly that any agreement for dispatch or division was reached in Washington or that any firm plans for such dispatch yet exists.

4. Memcon follows.³

5. Comment: While I hesitate to question Pak’s judgment on internal political matter and certainly did not feel justified in doing so to his face, I am afraid that I cannot share his easy optimism. To send 20,000 combat troops to RVN is a major undertaking for any country. It certainly is for Korea. Many Koreans will have sincere doubts as to wisdom of such a course. The opposition will claim that at same time Pak is turning Korea over to Japanese economic domination under unsatisfactory settlement, he is also weakening Korean defenses and increasing Korean danger from Communist neighbors, thus confirming his irresponsibility and incapacity to govern.

How much force this will add to “extreme struggle” against Japan settlement already promised by opposition cannot be accurately appraised. That it will add something seems inescapable.

I would therefore be much happier in terms of our primary objective of buttoning up Japanese settlement to see the troop question deferred until the settlement is ratified. At the least I would like action to be deferred until we can see more clearly how the opposition and public react to the troop dispatch proposal as publicized in press which is now center of public discussion here, and also to aftermath of Washington visit and program of Tokyo and SOFA negotiations.

Consequently I recommend that we seek to delay any further GRVN request at least long enough to permit a more accurate reading of the situation here.⁴

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S–VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.
2. The Embassy learned from the Presidential Secretary that Pak understood the need for additional troops in Vietnam, wanted to “make additional forces available as gesture of appreciation for warm treatment and support accorded him on recent presidential visit,” and would request the National Assembly authorize sending a division to Vietnam. (Telegram 1268 from Seoul, June 2; ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. In light of Brown’s comments, the Department of State requested that, since the Korean-Japan treaty “has top priority,” Saigon should “get GVN to hold off on making formal request for ROK division.” The Department of State also questioned whether Pak might be reneging on his commitment to achieve a treaty with Japan by pressing the troop issue. (Telegram 2788 to Saigon, June 3, repeated to Seoul; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S–VIET S) Brown replied that in his view Pak did not intend to replace one issue with the other and was not hindering negotiations with Japan. (Telegram 1283 from Seoul, June 7; ibid.) The Embassy in Saigon reported that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister agreed to hold the request for additional Korean troops until the matter was discussed with him further. (Telegram 4064 from Saigon, repeated to Seoul as telegram 85, June 5; ibid.)