Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 18, 1965, 6–6:30 p.m.

I–23517/65

SUBJECT

• Visit of Korean Minister of National Defense Kim, 18 May 65

PARTICIPANTS

• Defense Department Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Robert S. McNamara
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—John T. McNaughton
  • Assistant to the Director, Far East Region/ISA—Captain Jon L. Boyes, USN
  • Interpreter—K. Zabalakas
• Korean Side
  • Minister of National Defense—Sungeun Kim
  • Assistant to MOD—M Gen Woo Joo Chang
  • Senior Military Attache, Embassy Washington—B Gen S.K. Yoon,ROK Army

Military Assistance Program—Minister Kim said that the ROKG understood the FY 66 MAP had been increased. The Secretary replied that it looked as if there might be some increase to the program; at least at this point it looked more favorable. He said that the Congress had proposed a substantial cut, but that was reversed. We now believe that FY 66 will be a satisfactory program. However, he said in 1966 each country must take effective means to use MAP dollars in the best manner possible. For Korea, the FY 66 MAP should help, but it should also be the time for the ROKG to consider the proper size of the Korean armed forces. The Secretary said that in relation to North Korea and Communist China, the ROK must bear in mind how much strength plus that of the U.S. is needed to protect South Korea, but it should not be too large. Korea must look at what should be the proper size of its forces in 1966, keeping in mind available MAP funds and the pay problem. Kim said that President Park was worried about the threat of Red China and North Korea. The Secretary said we should be worried about this threat. We would continue to assure that the U.S. strength plus that of South Korea was enough—that in considering the threat we must always think of the combined power of the South Koreans and the U.S. He said that he, personally, thought the South Korean forces were too large. The ROKG should give careful thought to what size is necessary in respect to its resources. The Secretary said we should always keep in mind that the Chinese Communists, and their servants the North Koreans, will move toward any weakness, whether it is in the south or the north. We must be strong everywhere, and firm, but “we do not need two fists when one fist will do.”

South Viet-Nam. Kim said South Korea has received a request from the Government of Viet-Nam for additional South Korean forces to be sent to support Viet-Nam; they will do their utmost to help that country in its troubles.

Kim said the VN war was known as the “McNamara War,” but since the Korean troops are going to SVN, the war is becoming known in Korea as “Kim’s War.” The Secretary said that the U.S. determination in SVN shows the U.S. is against Communist aggression anywhere and this helps South Korea against Communist aggression in the north. Kim said that in order to send more Korean troops, constitutional processes were required. He, personally, wants to send these additional forces and is not seeking any bargains. He needs the Secretary’s support and cooperation to sell the Korean National Assembly on sending more troops. The problem is a sensitive one, for if the size of the Korean forces to SVN is increased, the South Korean people worry about an increase in the ChiCom and North Korean threat. Also, any force reductions in U.S. or Korean force levels create domestic problems. Kim said he believed it necessary, if one RCT is sent to SVN, that an RCT cadre be formed in Korea and, likewise, if a Korean Division went to SVN, the ROKG should mobilize and put into training one division in Korea to maintain the image of force.

The Secretary said that Kim should talk to General Beach about this. He said he doubted the need to replace an RCT or division sent to SVN, but he was not a military expert. He added that he would be surprised if the replacement of units was needed. Kim said such action was necessary to swing the Congress of Korea behind the idea of additional forces and this replacement of units was a way to do it.

The Secretary said that we have a strong commitment to Korea with the Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. will act and provide sufficient forces to fight. Further, we will recommend, advise, and assist on the proper level of forces needed by ROK. He said President Park made an important point this morning (18 May breakfast Park-McNamara)² when he said that it is necessary for Korea to make economic progress to be strong. The Secretary added that the ROKG should not put into its military more force than is required; Korea must use its resources wisely. He said that he was inclined to feel there was not a requirement to have as large forces as Korea now has.

Military Transfer Program and Pay Raise. Kim said he felt that there should be an easing of the Military Transfer Program and that a pay raise was essential. The Secretary said that we should remove any inequities in pay that existed between the military, civil service, and the civilians, and certainly take necessary steps to correct and improve conditions that were not satisfactory. We should undertake a joint study together in Korea on the pay problem and the actual requirements to be met. The Secretary replied that the Transfer Program should continue. He was willing to consider the Military Transfer Program in light of prevailing economic conditions, tax revenues, expenditures, and what is in the best interests of our two countries. He said Korea’s economy is important,MAP is not the place to solve the economic problems, and the Military Transfer Program helps the economy. We would like, therefore, to pursue the Transfer Program. It is important not to hold up a military pay raise and economic developments because of the Transfer Program. We will continue to keep the Transfer Program under study and look over the Program each year for adjustments if they become necessary.

MAP Excess Material. Kim asked for the Secretary’s views on the transfer to Korea of MAP excess material sale proceeds. (Koreans proposed proceeds of sales should go to Korea for barracks, and quarters since their budget and MAP funds are so austere.) The Secretary said that he had not seen the proposal. He would be glad to look into the proposal when it was received.

Compensation for Korean Casualties in SVN. Kim said a problem existed in not having sufficient funds to provide adequate pensions and death benefits for Korean casualties in SVN. The Secretary said that Kim should draft a paper of what he thought was necessary and talk this over with Ambassador Brown and General Beach.

Korean Logistical Support to SVN. Kim said President Park wanted him to bring personally to the Secretary’s attention the need for Korean participation in logistical support in SVN. The Secretary said that if Korea could meet the requirements and meet the bids as to quality, quantity, time and price, he saw no reason why ROK could not get some of the business. He said that under our AID programs it seemed quite appropriate for Korea to participate.

Kim said the problem was one of equity between Korea and Japan in providing the logistical support in SVN. He said Japan made money out of the Korean War by supplying materials while the Koreans did the fighting and now the same thing was going on again in SVN. He said the Koreans need a “special advantage.” The Secretary said if everything was equal, he would tend to favor Korea because of the need to boost the Korean economy.

Kim said Korea wants to have a U.S. procurement office in Seoul to help them compete with the Japanese who have such an office (Kim might be talking about U.S. Army Logistics Center Japan (USALCJ) which services the Far East). The Secretary said he did not think we were favoring Japan in such a manner, but he did not want to favor Japan over Korea procedurally. He would have the procedural problem looked into. (ISA was asked to do this.)

Secretary Invited to Visit Korea. Kim invited the Secretary to visit Korea on October 1, 1965, which is Armed Forces Day in Korea. The Secretary said he would very much like to come if possible; he and Mr. McNaughton had been trying for over a year to visit that area but just had not been able to do so. He would keep it in mind.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 333 Korea. Secret. Drafted by Boyes, and approved by McNaughton on May 21. The meeting was held in McNamara’s office at the Pentagon.
2. See Document 49.