Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, December 11, 1968, 2008Z.

285426. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-Sixth Meeting.

1. Approach of Christmas, combined with change of Administration here shortly thereafter, offers us opportunity to press North Koreans for release of Pueblo crew without serious risk of formal break in negotiations if they reject our offer. We plan to present them two proposals with warning that unless one is accepted promptly so that men can be home by Christmas, these proposals will be withdrawn and this Administration will make no further offers. Republican Administration would then have free hand for any subsequent dealings.

2. Our hope is that North Koreans will calculate that they are not likely to get more from President-elect Nixon than from President Johnson and will accept one of choices offered. We hope also that recent visit of CVA Hancock will have reminded them that winding-down of Viet-Nam war could liberate resources to improve US–ROK military posture and that they would be well advised to reduce sources of tension, both by releasing Pueblo crew and by desisting from infiltration attempts such as Ulchin.

3. For Seoul. Charge should convey to Prime Minister our intentions as outlined above, describing in general terms contents of package to be offered North Koreans.² Since we are quite willing to have NK intelligence pick up gist of foregoing, you may also brief MOFA, warning sternly against press leaks, and not describing to MOFA the alternative to the overwrite.

4. For Moscow. We are calling in Soviet Charge to convey fact that final offer from this Administration is about to be delivered at Panmunjom.³ You may as you judge appropriate raise matter in any contacts with Soviet leaders. If you can stimulate reflections among Soviets along lines of para 2 above, so much the better. At minimum, any reference by them to carrier Hancock should be countered with strong denunciation of Ulchin landings. If Soviets were to conclude (wrongly) that Hancock operations somehow related to Ulchin landings, we would not mind. If such landings are continued and expanded as we fear is Pyongyang’s intent, we may face situation as serious as that created by Blue House and Pueblo incidents.

5. Negotiating instructions for Seoul are contained in following paras.

6. Although protocol calls for Pak to speak first, we assume he will make only brief pro forma statement and turn floor over to General Woodward. If he delivers long denunciation of past US positions, Woodward should probably brush it aside with brief comment and go directly into presentation of our proposals. Of course, if Pak opens with something new or shows interest in overwrite, Woodward will have to decide on spot whether to explore possible opening or proceed with offers below. Following guidance is based on assumption Pak says nothing really new.

7. Woodward should draw attention to fact that Christmas, a national holiday of great significance to Americans, is only X days off and that USG very much wants to have Pueblo crewmen reunited with their families by that date.

8. Woodward should then point out that present Administration will end on January 20 and USG will from that point have a new President, Mr. Nixon, and new Secretaries of State and Defense. If Pueblo matter not settled by then, the new Administration will have to decide what measures it considers appropriate to deal with the problem.

9. This Administration intends, however, to make one last effort to solve the matter. Woodward should say that he is authorized to state that President Johnson personally and the other leaders of this Administration are prepared to go very far indeed in order to realize the humanitarian objective of reuniting the crew with their families at Christmas. They are prepared to offer General Pak and his authorities their choice of either of the following ways of handling the matter.

A. We are willing to make their draft Document of Apology and Assurance the basis for a solution, and General Woodward is authorized to agree to sign his name on that document, provided that he writes in above his name the phrase “I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew”.

B. If General Pak’s authorities prefer to avoid the use of this additional phrase, General Woodward is authorized simply to sign his name on the place provided, but under one specific condition. This condition relates to the fact that, as Pak is aware from the long discussions which have taken place in these negotiations, (1) the USG does not consider that the Pueblo was engaged in illegal activities, (2) the USG has not seen convincing evidence that the ship intruded into the waters claimed by Pak’s authorities, and (3) the USG cannot apologize for an action unless that action actually took place. If General Woodward were to sign Pak’s document without first adding the overwrite phrase above, he would have to make a formal statement just before signing to clarify those three points. The only reason the USG has considered instructing Woodward to sign is for humanitarian reasons in order to obtain the freedom of these hostages who are being held against this sort of ransom. Only if this fact is made absolutely clear in conjunction with signature, can Woodward be authorized to sign Pak’s document. Woodward should also make clear to Pak that, if Pak’s authorities announce prior to signature that the USG is admitting its crimes and apologizing, or otherwise divulge publicly the contents of the document to be signed, we would at that point be required to release our statement explaining what we consider to be the meaning of the signature.

10. After presenting above choices, Woodward should suggest Pak study them and offer to respond to any questions he may have. He should remind Pak that Christmas deadline, though it may seem sentimental to others, has great meaning for Americans which thus gives it political significance. These offers will all be withdrawn December 23 and a rapid decision by Pak’s authorities is essential.

11. Faced with our deadline, Pak will probably avoid closing any doors with further denunciation of A. He may, however, be puzzled by B and may wish to explore how it differs from repudiation after signature and release, which he presumably has always expected from us. If he comes back with questions, Woodward should state that formal statement referred to in our proposal B would be a clarification by us of the nature of that document and the reason we were signing it. Our clarification would contain the three points noted in para 9.B. above and would explain that we were signing a document which was in contradiction with those points in order to obtain the release of the crew. A text of such a clarification is contained in the following para and Woodward may offer it to Pak if he wishes.

12. Statement by General Woodward. “The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.”

13. For General Woodward’s information, we contemplate his reading statement in para 12 into tape recorders just before he signs. Text would be available for distribution to press along with NK document.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Tokyo and USUN. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Steadman, Toon, Meeker, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.
2. The Prime Minister was briefed on December 13. He expected a few days of public and media reaction to the outcome, but believed the act would be supported. (Telegram 11770 from Seoul, December 13; ibid.)
3. The Soviet Charge was informed orally by Toon on December 14 and was given a text of his remarks, which outlined the two options to be presented to the North Koreans at the next closed meeting. (Telegram 287260 to Moscow, December 14; ibid.)
4. In reply to procedural questions raised by the Embassy, the Department of State addressed the two most important issues in case an overwrite agreement was reached: (1) the type of announcement to be made once an agreement was made and the length of time between acceptance on and (2) the signing and release of the crew. Regarding the first, the Department preferred that each side announce the agreement and the time of the release, but would repudiate any North Korean attempts to claim the U.S. would “acknowledge and apologize for crimes.” Concerning the second, the Department preferred no more than a 24-hour delay, but was willing to accept a maximum of 48 hours, if necessary. Most other details had been previously discussed or left to Woodward’s discretion. (Telegram 11729 from Seoul, December 12, and telegram 286601 to Seoul, December 13; both ibid.)