Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

324. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 3, 1968.

SUBJECT

• USS Pueblo

The Problem

The North Koreans have continued to insist that we sign their document admitting espionage and repeated intrusions, apologizing for these “crimes,” and promising not to intrude again. They have denounced us for proposing an “overwrite” solution in which General Woodward would add in his own hand a phrase acknowledging receipt of the crew. They have not categorically rejected our proposal; rather they have refused to accept it, they have attacked us for putting it forward, and they have shown no sign of moderating their demand.

Recent Developments

The meetings in September made it clear to us that the North Koreans are willing to give us back the crew at the moment (or almost the moment) we sign their document. There would still be some procedural problems but they seem manageable.

The meetings in October made clear to the North Koreans what they may not have understood: that we are not prepared to sign their document but only to acknowledge receipt on it. We have not explained to them in so many words that we intend, after the release, to denounce the document, hanging our repudiation on this distinction between “signing” and “acknowledging receipt on,” and saying that we had signed only what Woodward had himself written. But there is no doubt that they now understand this intent. They have denounced our proposal as a “petty stratagem” designed to “evade your responsibilities,” and at present they appear determined not to leave this loophole open.

We called the last meeting (October 31) very quickly on the heels of the preceding one in order to appear firm in our stand. They hesitated for three days before agreeing to meet, but their position at the meeting was unyielding and they may merely have been taken a bit off balance by the unusual speed of our move. It is now their turn to call and they have made no move since October 31 to convene a session.

Our Choices

We can (1) stand on the overwrite proposal, perhaps with minor variations; or (2) sign their document, prefacing our signature with an explanatory statement and repudiating the document as soon as the crew are free.²

Time for a Squeeze Play

The fact that Christmas is approaching and that the Administration will soon change offers us an opportunity to give the North Koreans an ultimatum without grave risk of breaking off the talks. We can call a meeting, give them a package of proposals, and say: “Take your choice; these offers are good only if you accept one of them in time to get the men home for Christmas. This Administration will then withdraw them and will make no further proposals.” If this ploy failed, the new Administration would be free to resume the negotiations on whatever lines it chose.

Variations on Standing Pat

We can simply offer to the North Koreans our present overwrite proposal, giving them the Christmas deadline to take it or leave it.

We can also revive the alternative of a conditional apology (“if we intruded, we are sorry”) which we made last Spring and which was bluntly rejected then. We would dress it up in new language so that it might on the surface seem a new element but we would not include the unacceptable North Korean demands: the flat admission of “espionage” and of repeated intrusions. If the North Koreans are minded to settle the issue, this might satisfy their need for a piece of paper with General Woodward’s name at the bottom.

A Repudiated Apology

It is reasonably clear that if we simply sign their document we will promptly get the men back. The pros and cons of this course make an intricate argument which is summarized at Tab A. We do not recommend an outright apology, since it would be costly in foreign policy terms, but we recognize that the argument for an apology appeals to many reasonable men.

We could mitigate some, though not all, of the evil in an outright apology by coupling our signature with a simultaneous or perhaps even prior repudiation of the content of the North Korean document. We could, for example, have General Woodward say into the cameras and tape recorders just before he signs that, as has been made clear in the negotiations, the United States Government does not believe the Pueblo committed espionage or intruded, and that he is signing for the purely humanitarian reasons of getting the crew back. We are far from certain that the North Koreans would accept this procedure if warned about it in advance, and if not warned, they might at the last minute refuse to transfer the crew. And even such a “repudiated apology” would have demeaning elements from our viewpoint. Nevertheless, some variation on this ploy deserves serious consideration for inclusion in our take-it-or-leave-it package.

We would tell the North Koreans that we are now prepared to sign their document but will have to make a statement, before we actually sign, that their document contains statements which we consider false, and that our signature does not alter these facts. Release of the crew and publication of the signed North Korean document would follow. Our repudiation would be released to the press simultaneously with their document. We would have settled the problem through mutual acceptance of two wholly inconsistent statements.

We doubt that the North Koreans would accept this alternative, but they might. If they did, we would have paid a substantial but not exorbitant price to close out the problem.

The most dangerous aspect of such a proposal is that it places on the negotiating record an offer by us to sign their document. The North Koreans are certain to regard this as an indication that we are gradually knuckling under and they will simply press us to remove our attached condition—the repudiation. The “squeeze play” described above does much to meet this danger, but perhaps not enough. The North Koreans may well feel that if they disregard our ultimatum we will come back after Christmas or after January 20 with an unconditional offer to apologize.

We believe that this additional offer of a “repudiated apology” has a better chance of success than the others, but the costs to us in foreign policy terms would still be serious. We therefore are inclined to adopt the following more limited package, despite its relatively small chance of success, i.e., to say to the North Koreans that we are prepared to accept either of the following alternatives provided that it will result in the release of the crew before Christmas. If neither of these offers is accepted, they will both be withdrawn after Christmas and the North Koreans will then have to deal with the new Administration. The proposals would be:

a. Our present overwrite proposal.

b. A conditional apology similar to that offered last May, but in new language.

You may wish to discuss this problem with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford.³

Tab A

SHOULD WE APOLOGIZE?

Nature of the Case

The arguments in favor of signing the North Korean document come down to two propositions:

a. It is the only humane thing to do since it is clear that unless we sign the North Koreans will not release the crew—certainly not for a long time.

b. It is disadvantageous politically for us to let the affair drag on.

The argument against signing comes down to the single proposition that this Government should not solemnly place its authorized signature on a document it knows to be false, particularly if acting under blackmail and duress.

Apart from these, there are many secondary arguments—about the credibility gap, about the effects in South Korea and on our commitments in general, etc. In our judgment, these arguments tend to balance each other off or to fall in the category “an apology wouldn’t really be so bad because …” They thus should not be decisive in determining whether we apologize or not.

The Argument for Apologizing

Only when we sign their document will we get the crew back. If only because the North Korean charges are lies, they will insist on a piece of paper from us validating their lies. They have been and will remain wholly inflexible on this point. We have no means of pressure which look promising. All reasonable people know the North Korean charges are false and that we would be signing purely from humanitarian considerations. We would not be seriously damaged by a signature and we owe it to the crew and their families to pay this price for their release.

Moreover, there are political problems in allowing the matter to stagnate. It reminds people of our impotence and generates pressure for unwise actions, such as seizing North Korean ships. Better to cut the knot, even at some cost.

Assessing the case. It is probably true that the North Koreans will not soon accept any compromise, such as our overwrite proposal. And we do not seem to have any effective pressures against them. The humanitarian argument is the most valid argument for signature.

We do not believe the political argument is valid. If we resolve neither to apologize nor to do anything that might risk war or violate our basic principles, the political pressures can be contained.

The Argument Against Apologizing

The evil effects of signing a false document under pressure would be widespread, insidious, and long-lasting. Most foreign governments and even many Americans are puzzled by our reluctance to utter untruths but they respect us for this eccentricity. The Communist doctrine that truth is relative and can legitimately be manipulated is a major difference between them and us. If we sign we will have seriously damaged our good name.

Assessing the case. Many reasonable people find this argument vague and idealistic. We find it profoundly true. If we were to apologize, the price paid for freeing the men would be substantial, though hard to define. It would not be costly in the short run since the general relief and gratification that they were free would combine with their own revelations to override the negative elements. Nor would it impair faith in our security commitments which are on quite another level of solemnity and gravity. But over the long run the fact that in this case we had bent our principles for tactical, even though humanitarian, considerations would have to be counted, a serious cost. Whether we owe it to the men to pay this price, or should look on them as on other prisoners of war, is a question to which individual consciences and political philosophies will give varying answers. The price in international political terms would be considerable.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Brown on December 2. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that on December 3 the original signed memorandum was given to Rusk and a copy was sent to Smith at the White House.
2. In a memorandum to Rusk, drafted on December 9, Katzenbach detailed these and a third option—reformulating a “conditional apology” that met North Korean demands but contained no untrue statements, thus basing an apology on the crew’s confessions and similar statements—in a draft instructional telegram to Seoul for the next Senior Members meeting. (Ibid.) The options were discussed at a lunch meeting with the President on Tuesday, December 10. The first two options were approved, but the third was not. (Notes of Lunch Meeting; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, July to December 1968 [1])
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original.