Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 4, 1968, 0355Z.

3925. Subj: Summary of Panmunjom Meeting February 4.

1. Pak opened by referring to Smith’s prepared statements at previous meeting, saying that some points were not clear and that therefore he had a few questions.

2. His first question referred to Smith’s request for meeting in atmosphere free from compulsion (see Seoul 3890 for Smith’s exact words).² Deliberately using words “free from compulsion” out of context, Pak stated that discussion would indeed have to be conducted in an atmosphere free from compulsion but that coercive atmosphere has been created by US side. He made point that US side had sent Pueblo into their territorial waters and had not apologized, but had instead threatened NK by armed forces. Specifically, US had concentrated vessels of the Seventh Fleet, including nuclear-propelled carrier Enterprise, in vicinity NK territory. (Pak’s interpreter said in English “in our territorial waters”; Pak’s statement in Korean, however, differs from this version. We are carefully checking language.)³ Pak referred also to introduction numerous fighters and bombers to ROK, issuance of standby orders to US troops and puppet ROK army thereby keeping them in state of complete combat readiness.

Pak asked whether he could understand that Smith’s reference to atmosphere free of compulsion implies that US will eliminate atmosphere of compulsion that it has created. Pak then referred to fact that at 261st MAC meeting Jan 24 Smith had failed to apologize for great criminal act and instead made a coercive statement demanding immediate return Pueblo and crew, and had reserved right to demand compensation.⁴ Pak asked whether he could understand that Smith’s statement at last meeting (Feb 2) implies that Smith denounces these coercive statements.

3. Stating that he was making his second inquiry, Pak referred to fact that Smith had stated at Feb 2 meeting that Pueblo not under command of CINCUNC, but was unit of US Pacific Fleet, and that Pueblo case was without precedent. Pak asked whether he could understand that this means case is to be dealt with as matter between two sides—DPRK and USA. He added that if this understanding is correct and US side appoints representative of USA, NK side would also appoint representative of DPRK.

4. Pak concluded his presentation by adding that if Smith not prepared to answer these questions now, “he may answer later.”

5. Smith responded that questions Pak had posed contained many technical issues which Smith will refer to appropriate authorities for guidance.

6. Smith then stated that he had additional information to give Pak, whereupon he read into record text of numbered para one of State 109693⁵ modified as follows: a. Number of machine guns on board Pueblo changed from three to two; b. Mistranslation of Pak’s statement regarding mission of Pueblo constituting a most flagrant violation of Armistice Agreement was corrected to reflect language contained in Seoul 3913;⁶ c. Paragraph dealing with position of Pueblo at time of boarding was changed to read as follows: “five minutes later the Pueblo reported being boarded by North Korean personnel at 1345 hours. Five minutes later North Korean submarine chaser no. 35, in company with the Pueblo, reported its position as 39–26 N, 128–02 E, even farther from the nearest Korean land.”

7. Pak replied with standard language about futility of trying to explain away aggressive acts which have already been made clear. He then added that this case cannot be solved in this manner.

8. Indicating that he did not wish to discuss matter further, Pak stated that he had raised serious matters at this meeting and that if Smith will study seriously and provide answers, he would be prepared to hear them. He ended by remarking, “Let’s conclude and meet later to have a talk.”

9. In response, Admiral Smith again requested information regarding names of Pueblo dead and wounded, to which Pak responded that as he had stated at last meeting, he had not yet got any mission to inform Smith of them. He reiterated suggestion to meet again and have talk. Smith then said “I agree” and meeting concluded.

10. Comments:

A. NK side made notable effort to be polite and was cooperative during meeting. There was no sign of irritation over absence of US apology, such as was evident at Feb 2 meeting.

B. Pak and his interpreter took great pains to insure that there was no misunderstanding of wording. Their most significant statement had been carefully prepared in advance.⁷

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Flash;Nodis; Cactus.
2. According to telegram 3890 from Seoul, February 2, Smith said: “I have requested this meeting in order to discuss with you in an atmosphere free from compulsions created by publicity the very serious situation which results from the fact that you have possession of the United States Ship Pueblo and also its crew.” (Ibid.)
3. The verbatim text of the February 4 meeting quoted Pak as saying, “the nuclear-propelled carrier Enterprise in (toward) our territorial waters.” (Telegram 3927 from Seoul, February 4; ibid.)
4. The verbatim text of Smith’s remarks on January 24 was transmitted in telegram 3608 from Seoul, January 25. (Ibid., POL 27–14 KOR/UN)
5. Document 262.
6. Telegram 3913 from Seoul, February 3, corrected errors to the verbatim text of the first Senior Members MAC Meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
7. Based on North Korean comments made at the meeting, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to submit a written request to the North Koreans for information on dead and wounded crew members. (Telegram 109841 to Seoul, February 4; ibid.)