Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 3, 1968, 0242Z.

109693. 1. Subject to your views, we envision following scenario for next mtg: You should open with statement along following lines:²

“At our meeting on February 2 your side made several statements. I now address myself to these.

You characterized the USS Pueblo as an ‘armed spy ship.’ The Pueblo is a commissioned ship of the US Navy. It carried three 50-caliber machine guns. These were kept covered. They were not fired when the Pueblo was being seized by North Korean patrol boats. We have made quite clear that the Pueblo was on an intelligence collection mission in the Sea of Japan at the time of its seizure by North Korea. Intelligence collection by vessels of this type is a standard and accepted practice in the world today. The USSR, for example, has intelligence collection vessels stationed at the present time off the coasts of many countries, including Korea. Are you suggesting that neighboring countries have a right to seize vessels of this kind?

At the meeting of February 2 you charged that the mission of the Pueblo constituted an ‘act of aggression’ by the United States. The Pueblo was engaged in a mission that is accepted by the navies and governments of the world, and it engaged in no hostilities against anyone, including North Korea. The carrying out of its mission on the high seas cannot possibly be characterized as an aggressive action. Are you suggesting that Soviet intelligence-collecting vessels on similar missions are engaged in acts of aggression?

You stated that the mission of the Pueblo constituted ‘the most flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement requiring the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to this land.’ The Pueblo engaged in no hostilities at all. What provision of the Armistice Agreement did the Pueblo violate? Paragraph 12 of the Armistice Agreement provides that—

‘The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed.’

The Pueblo was not engaged in hostilities. The Pueblo reported it never uncovered its guns. It never offered any threat to anyone.

Your statement appeared to refer also to paragraph 15 of the Armistice Agreement, which reads as follows:

‘This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.’

The expression ‘the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side’ could, under no interpretation, extend beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast.

I come now to the crucial question of where the Pueblo was.

You have said that the United States Government ‘purposefully infiltrated your armed spy ship Pueblo into our territorial waters.’ Your version of where the Pueblo was does not square with the facts as we know them.

The Pueblo had strict orders to remain at all times at a distance more than 13 nautical miles from the nearest point in North Korean territory, in order to avoid any possible incident. We have no reason to believe the orders were not obeyed.

Where was the Pueblo on January 23, 1968? At 1000 hours Korean Standard Time the Pueblo reported its position as 39–24 N 127–59 E. Two hours later, when the Pueblo had been circled and threatened by North Korean submarine chaser No. 35, her position was 39–25.2 N 127–55 E. No. 35 radioed its position at exactly the same time (1200 hours) as 39–25 N 127–56 E. All these positions are more than 15 nautical miles from the nearest point in North Korean territory, Ung Do Island.

The Pueblo reported being boarded by North Korean personnel at 1345 hours. It radioed its position then as 39–25 N 127–54 E. Five minutes later North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 reported its position as 39–29 N 128–08 E.³ These positions also are clearly more than 15 miles from the coast.

These are the facts as known to the United States: A commissioned warship of the US Navy, carrying out an accepted and legitimate mission, engaged in no hostilities, and offering threat to no one, was seized in international waters. As your side must be aware, the rule of international law is that warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.

Even in the case of a warship that has entered territorial waters, the coastal state is not entitled to assert any jurisdiction over it other than to require the warship to leave the territorial sea if the warship does not comply with regulations of the coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards a request for compliance.

Let me emphasize here that this is the practice regularly followed by the United States. For example, the Soviet ship Barometer came within 2.8 miles of Puerto Rico on April 7, 1965 while maneuvering to remain near US Naval forces. On October 23, 1965 the Soviet ship Arban entered US territorial waters off San Pedro, California. And again on December 6, 1966 the Soviet ship Teodolit violated US territorial waters on three separate occasions. In each of these cases the United States observed the plain rules of international law in requesting departure of the ship in question without attempting to assert any other jurisdiction over it.

You have stated that the Pueblo was within the territorial waters of North Korea. All our evidence shows that it was on the high seas. You have stated a right to seize a foreign war vessel within your territorial sea. We contend international law gives no such right. These are serious points of contention that should be resolved. Yet, they need not be resolved before the release of the Pueblo crew and the return of the vessel. We are seeking a peaceful settlement of this matter by direct negotiation through the established machinery of the MAC. We ask for immediate release of the crew and return of the vessel.”

2. General Pak may then assert that obvious way to resolve this disagreement is for US to accept North Korea’s version of facts. In support of this, he may surface alleged confession of Commander Bucher or other evidence (such as purported ship’s log) for purpose of sustaining North Korea’s allegation. You can meet this as follows:

“You have referred to an alleged confession from the commander of the Pueblo [and other purported evidence].⁴ Because this alleged evidence conflicts with the data available to our side, we cannot be expected to accept it unless it is verified by the captain and crew of the Pueblo. Without the availability of Commander Bucher and his crew, we would have no way of satisfying ourselves as to the value of what you present as evidence.

I can assure you that after the release of the crew and the vessel we will, of course, conduct an inquiry, and we will inform you of the results of that inquiry. If we find that the Pueblo was in fact in North Korea’s territorial sea contrary to all our present information, we will be prepared so to acknowledge publicly and to express our regret.

Allegations made in this room as to the location of the ship will not resolve this disputed issue. Does your side have any proposals for a peaceful resolution of this issue? We are prepared to receive your proposal now or at our next meeting, which I propose to be held on February __.”⁵

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Meeker; cleared by Berger, Sisco, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. The President saw a copy of the telegram. (Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, February 3; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus I, Cactus State Cables, January 28, 1968 to February 10, 1968)
2. Additional contingency guidelines were also issued to cover several topics thought to have a remote possibility of being raised by the North Koreans, such as news leaks in Seoul and proposals to bring crew members to a MAC meeting. (Telegrams 109716 and 109752 to Seoul, both February 3; both National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. After receiving an inquiry from the Embassy in Seoul concerning these coordinates, the Department of State issued a correction reading: “Five minutes later North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 reported its position as 39–26N and 128–02 E. At the same time it reported Pueblo’s position as 39–23N and 128–02E.” (Telegram 3911 from Seoul and telegram 109717 to Seoul, both February 3; ibid.)
4. Brackets in the source text.
5. In reply the Embassy in Seoul recommended omitting any reference to a specific date for the next meeting. Porter explained that “normal MAC practice is not to set date for next session in current meeting, and in this instance next meeting would be dependent on when North Koreans prepared present their proposal.” The U.S. side could call the next meeting, if the North Koreans delayed doing so. The Department of State agreed. (Telegram 3912 from Seoul and telegram 109721 to Seoul, both February 3; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)