Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, May 2, 1968, 0700Z.

6043. For Bundy from Ambassador.

1. Two weeks after the Honolulu meeting of the two Presidents, it is possible to assess its effect in Korea. If there is no pronounced, or even noticeable change in Korean thinking as a result of the meeting, it can be said that the top echelon, especially President Park, derived a considerable sense of achievement from it. Drawing their inspiration from the top levels here as usual, press and public alike seem to feel considerably reassured in the ever-vital matters of American support for this country, and the sensitivity of the American President to their problems. As this is the effect we were striving to achieve, success of the meeting seems clear.

2. This is not to say that such successes have any permanent character. It is in the nature of this people and their leaders to require assurances and gestures periodically, and this will be especially true while North Korean pressure is maintained, and while candidates for U.S. Presidency discuss solutions for Viet-Nam problem in terms which cause uneasiness here and in other parts of free Asia.

3. The fact of a day-long meeting of American and Korean Presidents would have its own considerable impact here, but this was supplemented by a communique at Honolulu which provided considerable support for ROK Government in matters of internal security and investment—certainly the areas of greatest concern to the Korean President. Park is said to be in something of a glow about this, and if that is true it is understandable because no one accuses him of giving anything in return. Even the opposition, not noted for its perception or objectivity, feels required to stand publicly on the position that the communique contained nothing new, or was more or less the same as previous pronouncements. This is hardly political fare to arouse the interest, or the fears, of the Korean public.

4. In ROKG eyes, the contribution of the country, i.e. fifty thousand troops to the Vietnam problem, has found clear expression of American appreciation in this bilateral meeting, placing American/ROK relations on the special plane the ROKs think they merit. What the other allies think of this is of little concern to ROKs as long as proper inference is drawn here—and ROKG has seen to that. The Vietnamese, Thais and Australians may now proceed singly or collectively to Washington, but the ROKs have had their day with our President and they appreciate it.

Porter

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. Confidential; Exdis. Attached to a May 2 memorandum from Rostow to the President that indicates that the President saw the telegram.