195. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency1
TDCSDB–315/01422–68
[location not
declassified], April 23, 1968,
1520Z.
Country: South Korea
DOI: 18–20 April 1968
Subject: President Pak’s Critical Reaction to the Honolulu Conference
ACQ: [1 line of source text not declassified]
Source: [5 lines of source text not declassified]
- 1.
- [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] said that President Pak Chong-hui was deeply disappointed by, and critical of his meetings with President Johnson at the Honolulu Conference. President Pak, during a private discussion with Chief Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak and Defense Minister Ch’oe Yong-hui on 19 April, said he felt President Johnson attempted to evade the key issues of military assistance to Korea and a formal revision of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. President Pak said he sensed President Johnson has lost considerable political power and influence since his announced decision not seek re-election. He said President Johnson no longer exercises effective authority over Congressional actions on foreign military and economic assistance programs.
- 2.
- As a result of his discussions with President Johnson, President Pak said he could not consider sending additional ROK combat troops to Vietnam in the foreseeable future. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] implied that President Pak made this decision after it was clear to him the U.S. Government was unwilling to offer substantially increased military assistance, in addition to the $100 million pledged by the Cyrus Vance mission in February 1968.)
- 3.
- [5– 1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 4.
- Yi Hu-rak was extremely critical and outspoken against President Johnson after Present Pak briefed him on the results of the two meetings with President Johnson. Yi said the ROK can no longer rely on the U.S. for long-range military assistance.
- 5.
- [3 lines of source text not declassified] said on 11 April, prior to the Honolulu Conference, that President Pak was willing to dispatch another ROK division to Vietnam provided North Vietnam showed clear evidence of disinterest in real peace negotiations, and provided the U.S. gave specific assurance of provision for weapons adequate to modernize the ROK army and detailed procedures removing domestic “redtape” and opposition to ROK military aid.
- 6.
- [1 line of source text not declassified] report class Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only.↩