Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Seoul, April 16, 1968, 0335Z.

5708. Ref: Seoul A505.²

1. In ref airgram I transmitted ROK MND plan he proposed surface at aborted Honolulu meeting of April 7. I assume MND will now bring it up at April 17 meeting. I want to bring this plan to your attention now since Bonesteel has sent message to Sharp on it.³ In view of his message, I felt it would be useful to you to have in advance conclusions of politico-military assessment prepared by Embassy on the MND plan and ROK strategic intentions.⁴ Will have full paper with me at Honolulu for you and others to read and ponder. Following paragraph contains conclusions:⁵

2. “22 [21]. The April 5 MND plan would provide a force structure and equipment capability vis-e-vis North Korean which would:

A. Give the ROK ground forces an advantage in quantitative combat power, an advantage considered to be beyond the needs of a purely defensive mission, assuming adequate US augmentations.

B. Enable the ROK Air Force to match more nearly the combat strength supported by a hardened base structure as possessed by North Korea, and give ROKAF a higher capability for surprise quick strike action.

C. Greatly increase the Navy/Marine offensive capability by establishing about a division size amphibious force with a commensurate increase in shore bombardment means, as well as a significant surface striking force.

23 [22]. The implementation of the April 5 MND plan would provide the ROK with an increased military capability which could, without US support or sanction, engage in retaliatory actions of greater scope and magnitude against the North.

24 [23]. If logistic needs were accumulated in advance or logistic support from some source assured, the force structure contemplated in the April 5 MND plan could tempt the ROKG to undertake a preemptive attack against the North in the belief that it could win a relatively short war.

25 [24]. There are therefore grounds for serious concern that the ROK national leadership may be contemplating military moves which may range from substantially larger retaliatory actions to a preemptive strike against the North to effect reunification. A move of the latter type would be initiated at an appropriate time but prior to the anticipated overt military action by the North. The ROKs may in fact be counting on another dramatic raid by the North Koreans to provide the provocation for a justifiable retaliatory move which the proposed force structure would permit developing into a full-scale assault on the North.

26 [25]. ROK national leadership believes that if reunification can be effected rapidly by military means, the great powers will not intervene and will accept the fait accompli.

27 [26]. Full US support of the April 5 MND plan, as we interpret it, is not justified in terms of present US objectives in Korea because it could lead to a military force capable of independently taking courses of action inimical to the US national interest.

28 [27]. Since there are adequate indicators that the North Korean military capability has, in the relatively recent past, been significantly improved and its total defense posture enhanced, and if, as the ROKs expect, the North will attempt to unify Korea by overt military means in 1970 or possibly sooner, the ROK/US defense posture requires improvement. To effect a defense posture capable of holding north of Seoul, in addition to the availability and timely arrival of envisaged US augmentation forces, certain elements of the plan would, if implemented, contribute to this objective. Extensive hardening of forward positions is necessary: improvements in infrastructure for army, navy and air force needs should be undertaken, particularly construction for airfield dispersal and hardening and to support an air LOC; facilities to permit rapid receipt and forward movement of external combat and logistic support should be provided; selected improvements in mobility and communications for the existing force structure are required; and, though not mentioned in the April 5 plan, the availability in the area and largely under US control, of ammunition war reserves for all services should be assured.”

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Specat. Repeated to the Department of State for Bundy, which is the source text.
2. Airgram A–505 from Seoul, April 10, transmitted a briefing paper prepared by the Korean Ministry of National Defense entitled “Problem Areas in the Republic of Korea Defense.” In addition to a Foreword, Conclusions, and two annexes, the paper addressed five areas: (A) Defense of ROK, (B) ROK Force Improvement Plan, (C) Home Reserve Forces—Armament, (D) ROK Force Levels, and (E) $100 Million Package. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Porter forwarded a copy of the staff analysis, “ROKG Strategic Intentions and Military Planning—A Politico-Military Assessment,” to the Department of State as an enclosure to Airgram A–521, April 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 KOR S)
5. The numbers in brackets reflect the paragraph numbers used in the original document. The Embassy also sent two press articles to the Department of State containing reports of Pak’s comments to reporters en route to Honolulu. The articles, one from the Korea Herald and one from the Korea Times, both April 18, had in the Embassy’s view “an interesting relationship to the line of thought reflected” in this staff analysis. (Airgram A–535 from Seoul, April 19; ibid.)