Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

192. Talking points for President Johnson¹

Honolulu, April 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Additional Korean Forces in Vietnam

Background

Following your December 21 luncheon meeting with Park in Canberra, Ambassador Porter worked out agreement that the Koreans would deploy an additional brigade (approximately 6,000 troops) and 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. The civilians would free 5,000 logistic troops now in Vietnam for combat duty, and the result would be an additional light division.

With the January raid and resulting tension, Park shelved this, with our tacit consent, and has never sought National Assembly approval.

Nonetheless, we have gone ahead with a substantial part of the commitments we offered in the negotiations. All told, we had offered direct support and equipment costs for the light division totaling approximately $88 million, plus additional military assistance totaling about $45 million. Of the latter, we have already gone ahead with virtually the whole, including the $32 million counterinsurgency package described to you at this morning’s briefing. As a matter of practical fact, all these items made sense, and we would have found them reasonable in any case. However, you should note that the $32 million has been funded from DOD funds under an authority that exists only where there is a relationship to Vietnam.

Thus, there is basic truth in what General Wheeler says—that we have performed a lot already, while they have not moved on their side.

Park’s problem is quite simply that he is not at all sure of getting Assembly approval, in the face of a general feeling that Korea needs its forces at home. Porter has reported since that they might now ask for additional commitments. Moreover, as General Wheeler pointed out this morning, the $12 million worth of equipment now set aside in Okinawa for the Korean light division contains many items of highest priority for South Vietnamese armed forces.

Suggested Talking Points

1. Suggest you start by feeling Park out on his Assembly problem, while making it absolutely clear to him that the additional forces would be most useful.

2. If he asks for additional commitments from us, you might point forcefully to the very large totals we are now providing under MAP and service funds this year, shown in Tab A attached.² The total is about $292 million. You could, of course, say that you would study additional requests within reason.

3. If he takes the opposite tack—saying that he simply cannot get Assembly approval unless things really cool down in Korea this summer—suggest you at least point out clearly how much we have already done under our commitments, and note that this presents us with something of a Congressional problem—particularly for the $32 million. You might go on to explore the possibility suggested by Secretary Rusk—that they increase their forces in Vietnam simply by delaying rotation or by “rounding out”. While Park has a commitment to his Assembly to get specific authority for additional major units, he once before evaded this by a “rounding out” that amounted to about 2500 men. If he could use the same technique—up to perhaps 5000 men—it would be most useful.

General

Suggest strongly that you take up this topic privately with him. If he has his Ministers in the room, the price would go up, and he paint himself into a bad corner.

Finally, we have already agreed—at his request—that the subject will not be mentioned in the communique or in any press backgrounder. We stuck to this agreement this morning and told the press that so far as we knew, the topic would not come up. Obviously, he would be highly sensitive to any implication that he agreed to an increase at this meeting. However, he is also well aware of the need—and he now has a general request for more forces direct from Thieu.

WPB

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel, [Meeting with Park], April 1968. Secret. The paper indicates the President saw it.
2. Attached but not printed. The breakdown of support consisted of $160 million, including around $12 million for the light division, in 1968 MAP funds; $100 million in supplemental MAP funds; and $31.2 million for the counterinsurgency package.