Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0410Z.

4131. Refs: A) State 111264 B) Seoul 4129.²

1. Following is text of letter which President Park proposed to send President Johnson in response to latter’s letter (reftel). Ambassador’s comments on letter and his meeting with President contained Ref B. Following text is provided on FYI basis only. Letter was not signed by Park and although Yi Hu-rak may anticipate that we will transmit it, it has no official standing.³

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, I received your kind letter which has given details of your views again through Ambassador Porter.

I understand your view that the Pueblo incident, a question of immediate concern to you, should be dealt with separately “in somewhat different perspectives” and with differing tactics from the longer run question of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea as you have termed.

However, the North Korean commandos’ intrusion into Seoul has given such a particular and serious impact upon my people that an alien would find it hard to grasp it fully and the indignant feelings of my people against the North Korean Communists seem to have reached the apex.

Although it is understandable to me that you are seeking an earliest possible solution to the question of the Pueblo, you will no doubt know that my personal understanding cannot be equated with that of my fellow countrymen as you may have experienced yourself in dealing with various problems such as the Vietnam war. If Your Excellency considers it absolutely necessary to have further closed meetings with the North Koreans in order to have the crew of the Pueblo back, it is likewise necessary for us to have your assurances on the following points:

1. The problem of the North Korean raiders’ incursion on Seoul, as separate from the question of the Pueblo, will be brought before the Military Armistice Commission meetings in the immediately near future.

2. And we lodge a protest with the North Koreans; press them to admit the aggressive act, apologize for it and pledge that such an act will not be repeated in the future.

3. In case the North Koreans refuse to accept this:⁴

A. The United Nations forces take an immediate retaliatory action;⁵

B. And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the United Nations forces will take immediate punitive action should they continue to make resort to such actions in the future.⁶

These, I believe, are the minimum measures⁷ for ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea.

I know Your Excellency is concerned with the security of our country more greatly than anyone else and are taking measures⁸ to strengthen our national defense. This I appreciate always.

But a fact remains that the infiltrations by the North Koreans into the South have increased, not decreased, since the Armistice although we have done our utmost to strengthen our defense capability. Therefore, I want you to understand the increasingly keener awareness among my people that increased defense capability alone will not⁹ be complete in solving the problem of our security.

If we are to dissuade the North Koreans from their aggressive acts, simultaneously assuaging the wrath of my people, we should make the North Koreans fully recognize our resolute determination that we will not allow them to commit an aggressive act without subjecting themselves to¹⁰ immediate punitive action.

What I have so far outlined above is related to the measures for ensuring the security of my country, for which you have shown such a great concern, and I do not think that there may be any point of disagreement with you.

In summation, I am sure, that the security of the Republic of Korea rests on:

1. Strengthening¹¹ our defense capability to such an extent where we maintain an absolute supremacy over the North, and

2. Driving it home to the North Koreans that an aggressive act will be met with immediate, stern punitive action.

If the North Koreans feel free that they can act on a premise that aggression against the South can be committed with impunity, no increase in our defense capability will give complete solution to our cardinal problem, an effective guarantee against any re-invasion by the North.¹²

With my warmest good wishes,

Sincerely, /s/Park Chung Hee. End text.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Flash;Nodis; Cactus. A retyped copy of this telegram was given to President Johnson under a February 10 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968)
2. Documents 159 and 171.
3. The letter, February 9, sent to President Johnson contained minor differences from this text. A translation of the official, signed letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I.
4. The final version contained the added phrase “and change their attitude.”
5. This paragraph was changed to read: “The Republic of Korea and the United States Forces take an immediate retaliatory action in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries.”
6. This paragraph was revised to read: “And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the Republic of Korea and the United States Forces will take immediate punitive action, if the North Koreans make resort to such actions again in the future.”
7. In the final version the word “required” was inserted here.
8. This phrase was changed to read “and have taken measures.”
9. This section was modified to read “that strengthened defense alone will not.”
10. In the final letter the word “our” was inserted at this point.
11. At this point in the final letter the word “of” was inserted.
12. President Johnson responded to this letter on February 28 in the aftermath of the Vance visit to Seoul. The President wrote that Vance had thoroughly discussed the issues contained in this letter while in Seoul and immediately upon his return had made recommendations for the President to consider. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I)