168. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1
KRA 0513. 1. I have been deeply disturbed over last several days at growing irrationality in certain areas ROKG, most especially in President Park himself. Inputs in last day have confirmed that Park is almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans, with sort of “apres moi le deluge” philosophy accentuated by our secret talks with NK at Panmunjom. You will see, I trust, AmEmb’s and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports on today’s developments2 but these are confirmed to some degree by inputs from MI sources indicating directives for planning for immediate retaliation in event NK raids, and info from CS/ROKAF that he fears he may receive orders from Blue House for unilateral air strikes, which he knows would be suicidal. We are taking all feasible preventive measures, which cannot be 100 percent, and I feel, or at least hope,ROK Chiefs of Staff would disobey such orders, due to numerous talks with them, except after violent NK provocation.
[Page 357]2. However unreasonable Pres. Park’s obsessive drive may appear to Washington, I wish to state frankly that we have given him no real idea of what we intend to do or alternative courses, and so I believe we have brought large part of it on ourselves. It is absolutely essential, to my mind, that we give certain ROKs, including chiefs of services, some concept or strategy as to what we intend to do. They know we are making contingency plans, but they do not know what, where, when or why and in meantime our actions are highly confusing to them. Responsible ROKs, and I include military chiefs among these, are scared at recent turn of emotions in Pres. Park’s and a few others’ minds. They know full well that ROK cannot survive without genuine US support.
But they have no clear idea what we mean to do, and suspect we do not either, on next phases of action. This is not fear only of US compromise but equally that we might take some militarily provocative action that would precipitate war without their having taken even most elemental steps to safeguard their population or to mobilize their military strength. The only plan that we advance to ROKs is first a peaceful try to get back Pueblo crew (which does not impress anyone here as moving very fast especially since we seem to be withdrawing military power) while we build military power, then second, if Pueblo crew not returned some sort of action.
3. One Korean wag characterizes our concept of “the steel fist in the velvet glove,” as “the silken fist in silken glove.”3
4. Our inscrutable policy combined with Kim Il-Song’s speech last night on 20th anniversary of Korean Peoples Army (reported by FBIS and on news service broadcasts) in which he says, among other things, that “situation shows war can be touched off by US imperialists any moment”—these two factors do not help ROK sanity at moment. (We can see effective psywar of nerves in Kim’s speech, but not all ROKs are so “sophisticated.”)
5. UNC/USFK have studied CINCPAC TS Noforn message 030154Z Feb 684 and believe US military contingency planning is fine but can find in it no inkling of strategic concept we could express to ROKs which would enable them to know what mobilization or civil defense planning or implementation steps to take [garble] when to take care of their 30 million people, their homes or their industry. Only guidance I have is State message saying do not let them mobilize their reserve divisions at this time. I fully agree with guidance, but would like to be able to give ROKs some rationale.
[Page 358]6. Noforn messages we get do not seem to appreciate there are at least three, not one, unknowns in situation here. Most seem oriented primarily on what would happen if NKs took certain overt initiatives. We in USFK are not flapping here, but we would like some greater consideration of, first, what if ROKs take unilateral initiatives. Second, what if NKs deliberately provoke ROK unilateral initiative, and third, what if US actions, which we have not conveyed to ROKs in sufficiently timely fashion, provoke unexpected NK reaction. ROKs are most scared of possible NK unconventional guerrilla raid offensive and believe this inevitable if US does not take strong stand soon.
7. I have tried for some days now to express in more formal language the Mad Hatter’s tea party atmosphere among high-level ROKs here. Forgive my reverting to the vernacular, but most seriously it will be very important that Cy Vance come here prepared to answer in some way the questions of what the US is prepared to do, particularly re stopping NK infiltration threat by threat of force if necessary, and the what, when, where and why type of questions including some of ROK mobilization and civil defense. He should also be prepared, if necessary, to talk turkey re unilateral ROK retaliation at this time. Finally, if we could turn the visit into a sort of a minor session like Roosevelt-Churchill strategy talks at Argentina early in WWII some constructive results may be obtained. What is happening in Saigon is not making Pres. Park any more calm.
8. I have not shown this message to Amb Porter tonight but will show him first thing tomorrow.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson.↩
- See Documents 166 and 170.↩
- Reference is to the U.S. policy adopted toward the North Koreans in the wake of the seizure of the Pueblo; see Document 237.↩
- Not found.↩